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PREFACE
Economic literature is full of general theoretical discussions 
about the determination of wages, but there is, relatively speaking, 
a dismal shortage of detailed factual studies or discussions about 
wages in labour markets in the less developed economies. This study 
on the Wage Structure in the Rubber Estates in West Malaysia tries to 
fill a little part of this gap.
The study is divided into two parts. The first deals with 
the findings of a sample survey conducted on about 500 workers. A 
detailed description of the workers' earnings structure, at one point 
of time, highlighted the importance of the union-management agreements 
as a proximate determinant. This was supported by other information 
on the low rate of mobility amongst the estate workers and the increasing 
levels of unemployment amongst the estate population. This finding 
raised questions on the role of unionisation over a period of time, as 
distinct from that at a point of time, on the industry's wage levels 
(and therefore on the industry's wage structure). It also raised 
questions' on the influence of the Union's wage policy on the industry's 
unemployment levels. These questions were examined in the second part 
of the study. The examination confirmed the importance of the Union 
in determining the wage levels (and therefore of the wage structure) 
in the estates, but it rejected the probability that the Union was 
chiefly responsible for the unemployment problem in the estates. A 
summing-up chapter has been left out because thfs would merely repeat 
materials included more appropriately elsewhere in the study.
Almost all the materials discussed in Part I are original.
These add on to the existing knowledge of Malaysia. Much of the time 
spent in the field and in the analysis was necessarily taken up by
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this section. The materials in Part II are partly original and 
partly secondary, but their relationship to the industry's wage and 
unemployment levels has been attempted for the first time in an 
academic study. The interpretation in Part I is fairly definitive, but 
that in Part II is not as definitive mainly because of incomplete 
information and because much more time and money than available would 
have been required to collect this information. In the past, the lack 
of published information and the almost insurmountable difficulties of 
accessibility to primary data (for a single unofficial investigator) 
have been amongst the main factors deterring research scholars from 
pursuing the type of questions raised for Part II. Although these 
difficulties still exist, it is considered preferable to discuss such 
problems with whatever limited information is available than to wait 
until more information can be obtained (if ever) for them to be 
examined more scientifically.
In writing this thesis, I am of course indebted to a very 
large number of people in Canberra and in Kuala Lumpur. Most of all 
I am indebted to my supervisor, David Bensusan-Butt, Professorial 
Fellow, Department of Economics, Australian National University, for 
his invaluable advice all through the time I worked on this study.
I am grateful to others in the Department for their advice, in parti­
cular Professor H.W. Arndt (Head), Mr E.K. Fisk (Professorial Fellow), 
and Dr Colin Barlow (Senior Research Fellow), formerly Head of the 
Economics Division in the Rubber Research Institute of Malaya. 
Professor T .H. Silcock, Dr P.J. Lloyd, Dr D.H. Penny and Dr R.T. Shand 
have also shown interest. I would like to acknowledge the assistance 
rendered by Mrs B Gothe (Research Assistant) during the processing of
the data in the computer and the assistance rendered by the secretarial
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PART I
WAGE STRUCTURE IN 1967
2CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I
Objective of Study
The objective of this study is to describe in detail and 
discuss some aspects of the wage structure in a section of the 
estate sector of the rubber industry of West Malaysia as it 
exhibited itself in July 1967.1
The literature on wages is, of course, vast and an 
extremely limited study of the present kind can make no more than 
a very minute contribution to the development of such a large and 
highly complex subject. These pages do not aspire to add to the 
general theory of wages nor to offer criticisms of accepted
1The term Malaysia comprises West Malaysia and East Malaysia. West 
Malaysia consists of the states of Johore, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Perak, Penang and Province 
Wellesley, Kedah and Perlis while East Malaysia consists of Sabah 
and Sarawak. Until September 1963, the states comprising West 
Malaysia were known as the Federation of Malaya, and between 
October 1963 and December 1966, as the States of Malaya, or Malaya 
in short in both cases.
Fieldwork began early in 1968 but the year 1967 was chosen 
because conditions in 1968 were confused by a new Wage Award handed 
down by the Industrial Court in March 1968, the detailed implemen­
tation of which was being still hotly debated between the Union and 
the Employers' Association and which, as will be seen later in 
Chapter 10, was not finally resolved until another Industrial Court 
Award was handed down in August 1969. See Malaysia, Industrial 
Court, Award No. 8/68: Industrial Court Cases Nos. 7 & 9 of 1967 
between Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association and the 
National Union of Plantation Workers, March 1968, Kuala Lumpur 
and Award No. 16 of 1969, August 15th, 1969 between the same 
parties.
The reasons for selecting the month of July are discussed 
in Chapter 3 .
31doctrines. It is hoped, however, that the detailed information 
given here on some aspects of one particular labour market will be 
a useful addition to the evidence already available for wider 
generalisations and that it will have some particular interest of 
its own in West Malaysia.
Most of the existing detailed wage studies naturally
orelates to the advanced economies of the West. Though a number 
have come from India, as can be seen in the periodic papers and 
reviews published in the Indian Journal of Labour Economics, and a 
few from Africa,* 23 there is still room for many more about the markets
Besides the standard classics from Cantillon to Taussig, the main 
general treatises on wages the writer has consulted are: Hicks, J.
R., The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, London, 1932; Rothschild, K.
W., The Theory of Wages, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954; Dunlop,
John T. (ed.), The Theory of Wage Determination, Macmillan, London, 
1957; Taylor, George W. and Pierson, Frank C. (eds.), New Concepts 
in Wage Determination, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957; Brown, Phelps, 
The Economics of Labor, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962; 
and Salkever, Louis R., Toward a Wage Structure Theory, Humanities 
Press, New York, 1964.
2A few examples are: Reynolds, Lloyd G. and Taft, Cynthia H., The
Evolution of Wage Structure, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956; 
Robertson, D.J., Factory Wage Structures and National Agreements, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960; Ross, Arthur M., Trade 
Union Wage Policy, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1948; 
MacDonald, Robert M., Collective Bargaining in the Automobile Indus­
try: A Study of Wage Structure and Competitive Relations. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1963; Isaac, J.E., and Ford, G.W. 
(eds.), Australian Labour Economics, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1967; 
and Isaac, J.E., Wages and Productivity, Chesire, Melbourne, 1967.
3See, for instance, Berg, Elliot J., Wage Structure in Less Developed 
Countries (monograph 1968), and Trade Unions and Wage Levels - The 
Nigerian Case (monograph 1969), Center for Research on Economic 
Development, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
4in the less developed economies. In particular, there are as yet 
no detailed academic studies on wages in any labour market in the 
writer's own homeland, Malaysia. This study should, in a very small 
way, contribute to filling in this gap.
II
The Rubber Industry
For a first detailed study of wages and earnings in a labour 
market in West Malaysia, the rubber industry suggests itself as an 
obvious choice. It has long held and still holds a place of quite 
exceptional importance in the economy (Table 1.1). Occupying slightly 
more than two-thirds of the nation's cultivated acreage, the industry 
was in the 1960s the largest in the country, accounting for between 
one-fifth to one-fourth of the nation's total domestic product, and 
earning from slightly less than half to more than two-thirds of the 
total export revenue of West Malaysia. Until 1966, the last year for 
which the most comprehensive figures were available around the time 
the fieldwork began, it was also the largest employer of labour in 
West Malaysia. Though its relative importance has been on the decline, 
it is still today, as it was in the past, the most important single 
industry in the country.
Spreading over the length and breadth of West Malaysia, 
the rubber industry is, however, altogether too heterogeneous an 
industry for the wages of its whole labour force to be examined by a 
single student with only two assistants. Briefly, the productive units 
in the industry are divided into two main sectors, smallholdings and 
estates, but there are wide differences within each sector. A small­
holding is defined as any planted area of rubber under one management
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6and less than 100 acres, whereas an estate is defined as any planted
area of 100 acres or more/ There were in 1966 approximately 390,000
smallholdings in West Malaysia, over 80 per cent of them (covering
more than 50 per cent of the total smallholding acreage) being less
than 10 acres each, while a good many of the remainder were between 10
to 25 acres. Most of the holdings below 25 acres were Malay-owned,
2while most of those above are Indian and Chinese-owned. The estate 
sector, on the other hand, had 2104 estates in July 1967, with sizes 
ranging from 100 acres to over 5000 acres each. Most of those below 
1000 acres were Indian or Chinese-owned while most of those above 1000 
acres were Chinese or European-owned with the Europeans owning most of
3the largest estates. The smallholdings were operated mainly by family
labour, and labour was hired only amongst a very small number of the 
larger holdings; none of these holdings was known to have employed 
more than ten workers or was unionised. All the estates, however, 
hired labour ranging in numbers from 10 to well over 1000. Some of 
these estates were highly unionised and some not at all; but not all
1Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1967, Kuala Lumpur.
2 tBarlow, Colin and Lim Sow Ching, ’'Natural Rubber and West Malaysia,
Paper presented at the meeting of the South-East Asian Business 
Committee, Singapore, May 12-15, 1968, pp.2-3.
A brief note for those unfamiliar with West Malaysia: the popu­
lation of West Malaysia in December 1967 was 8,655,000 and comprised 
three major races, namely, Malays (50 per cent), Chinese (37 per cent) 
and Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese (11 per cent), with 2 per cent 
being other miscellaneous groups. (Malaysia Official Year Book 1968,
Vol. 8, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, p.370). Frequently, the term 
'indigeneous* is used to refer to Malays and ’non-indigeneous' for the 
others. Most Malays are in the rural areas and economically less 
advanced than many of the others, who dominate in the urban areas.
The Malays however held the political power because they form the 
majority in the electorate, not all Non-Malays being entitled to 
vote since not all are local citizens and also because the rural po­
pulation has more constituencies per given electorate. It has been 
the government 's policy to assist the Malays to participate more 
vigorously in the country's economy.
3Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1967, Table 2.1 
(p.9) and Table 2.6 (p.14). (Europeans, by definition, include 
Americans, Australians and Canadians).
7were organised into an employers' association. In view of all this 
heterogeneity, a decision was taken at the outset to consider wages 
only in the estate sector.
Ill
The Estate Sector
The estate sector was interesting in its own right. It was 
the more efficient sector, using a lower proportion of the total 
planted acreage under rubber but producing a higher proportion of the 
total annual production of rubber (Table 1.2).
TABLE 1.2
SIGNIFICANCE OF ESTATE SECTOR IN THE RUBBER 
INDUSTRY IN WEST MALAYSIA, 1955-1967
Year
Estate Production 
(in '000 tons)
Estate Acreage 
(in '000 acres)
Absolute % of Total Absolute % of Total
1955 352 55 2015 55
1956 351 56 2008 54
1957 368 58 2011 53
1958 389 59 1981 53
1959 407 59 1942 50
1960 413 59 1934 50
1961 429 58 1937 49
1962 438 61 1926 46
1963 458 61 1919 45
1964 477 60 1893 44
1965 491 59 1859 43
1966 514 57 1813 42
1967 528 57 1746 40
Source: Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook,
1955-1967.
8It also had special political and sociological significance
because of its still largely foreign and, to a lesser extent, non-
indigeneous ownership and its largely non-indigeneous workforce of
Indians and, to a lesser extent, Chinese. The long-term future of
the expatriate estates and that of the non-indigeneous labour on them
and the latter's future place in the overall political development of
the country are issues of great moment to West Malaysia.
Further, the wage problems of the estates have attracted more
public attention, official and unofficial, than those of any other
industry in West Malaysia. The estates have accounted for the largest
proportion of the strikes, the man-days lost and the arbitration
1boards set up since 1947. The sector also has the largest employers'
association, the largest workers' trade union, the longest history of
industry-wide collective bargaining and the most sophisticated collec-
2tive bargaining mechanism in the country. Yet detailed information 
on its labour market is notably absent. The estate sector therefore 
provided a significant field for a study of wage structure in West 
Malaysia .
IV
The Form and Arrangement of Study
Some published material about wages in the rubber estates is 
already available but, as will become evident later, it is mainly in
1See two Graduation Exercises supervised by the writer, namely, Poobala- 
singham, C., Inter-Industry Strikes Analysis, Malaya, 1946-1965, and 
Teoh Hai Yap, Arbitration as a Means of Settling Labour-Management Dis- 
putes in Malaysia, Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya, 1966/67.
2
International Labour Organisation, Report of the Trade Union Situation 
in the Federation of Malaya, Geneva, 1962, pp.40-42. See also Nijhar,
K .S ., "Growth of Union Membership and Size of Trade Union Units in 
Malaya," Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia, Journal of the Economics Association 
of Malaysia, Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya, December 1965, 
Vol. 11, No.2, pp.32-48.
9terms of broad averages and the methods of collection make its 
accuracy suspect. Hence, for a detailed study it was imperative to 
collect new data. This necessity has largely dictated the form of 
this study. For practical reasons, information had to be collected 
from only a very small number of estates not too far from each other. 
Though this endangered the general applicability of the results, it had 
the countervailing advantage that in interviewing in depth a few hundred 
workers much data could be collected that escapes official nets and many 
impressions obtained about the human realities behind the statistics.
The general picture that emerges is one that is broadly 
familiar to those who follow events closely in Malaysia. The estates 
have resident populations, mainly of Indian origin, of long standing. 
These populations are very immobile, and the combinations of rising 
numbers and declining employment has made jobs harder to get. Never­
theless, a strong union, the National Union of Plantation Workers 
(NUPW), has achieved in a series of agreements rising wages and 
improved conditions for workers on the more efficient and more 
unionised estates which were members of what was at the time of this 
study the employers' negotiating body, the Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association (MPIEA)^ ". However, not all estates were highly
More on these two institutions will be discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
In this study, the term Union refers to the National Union of Planta­
tion Workers, Employers' Association or Association to the Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers' Association, Member Estate to an estate 
in membership of the Employers' Association and Non-Member Estate to 
an estate not in membership of the Employers' Association.
The Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association was 
formally dissolved in December 1966, replaced by a new reorganised 
employers' association in November 1967, the Malayan Agricultural Pro­
ducers' Association (MAPA), but the Agreements entered into between the 
Union and the Employers' Association were operative in all the Member 
Estates, at the Minister of Labour's request, until March 1968 when a 
new Wage Award was handed down by the Industrial Court in that month 
for all estates in membership of the MAPA.
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unionised nor were all estates Members of the Employers' Association, 
and the conditions on the Non-Member Estates were noticeably inferior. 
All this, and the hierarchical structure of earnings between various 
grades as well as the other differentials to be discussed later, anyone 
in the industry will readily describe to the visitor in very general 
terms. Nevertheless, an exact description and a documented confirmation 
of these facts is worth making. The exact extent of the employment 
problem in the estates and of the differences in earnings between the 
Member Estates and the Non-Member Estates certainly came to the writer 
as a surprise.
A detailed survey of earnings and related matters of the kind 
made here can do little more than describe a situation at a point of 
time. It cannot in itself point directly to any quantitative explana­
tion in depth of the facts described, however much this may be desired. 
This needs a further study which would require, at the least, great 
masses of data about the techniques of the industry and the general
market for rubber, if indeed it could be effectively carried out at
1all in an industry with long gestation periods, in which technical 
progress is extremely rapid, for whose product the demand and price 
are extremely unstable, which has such a heterogeneous structure, and 
which is in a complex political situation. No such thorough analysis 
of the economic determination of the wage structure described will be 
attempted here. However, the survey material brings out very forcibly 
the major role the union-management agreements have in this structure 
and this factor is explored at some length in the latter half of the 
study.
i.e. rubber trees do not come into tapping until 5-8 years after 
planting, and will normally go on yielding for 20-25 years after 
that depending upon the standard of care and the intensity of tapping.
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The study falls into two main parts: Part I describes
the sample survey and discusses such supplementary evidence as has 
been gathered to confirm its results and assist in interpreting them.
Part II deals with the influence of unionisation, which contributed 
significantly to many of the findings described in Part I.
In Part I, Chapter 2 discusses the inadequacies of the 
available statistics on wages, the selection of the sample of estates 
and the workers for detailed investigation, the methods of collecting 
the information obtained from them, and lists the other sources from 
which information was also gathered. This is followed by a detailed 
statement of the principal findings on the earnings structure in 
Chapter 3. The probable explanations for these facts are then dis­
cussed in this and in the next chapter. Chapters 5 and 6 take up some 
materials on the estate labour market which were found to be distinctly 
related to an investigation of its wage structure and which were also 
interesting in themselves. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the princi­
pal statistical data on some types of movement covered by the general 
expression ’labour mobility', while Chapter 6 records evidence on the 
workers' unemployment experiences and relates to it information on 
unemployment obtained from other sources. Chapter 7 summarises the 
general picture that emerged from the sample survey.
Together, Chapters 3-6 contain almost wholly the original 
statistical material of this study.
The statistical data presented in Part I raise two questions 
of major significance in wage studies: one was related to the role of
the Union in influencing the level and structure of wages on the Member 
Estates and the other on the extent of its responsibility on the unemploy­
ment situation in the rubber estates.
These questions are discussed in Part II, which comprises of 
five chapters. The first of these, Chapter 8, introduces this part.
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The next, Chapter 9, describes the history of the two bodies involved 
in the negotiations and the role of the State in their transactions. 
Chapter 10 deals with the history of the negotiations and the results 
of the successive agreements signed. Chapter 11 discusses the social- 
political and the economic forces operating in the background of these 
negotiations. Finally, Chapter 12 concludes the study by assessing 
the role of the Union in obtaining improved conditions of work for 
workers in the Member Estates and their effects on unemployment in 
the estates.
Most of the information used in Part II up to 1958 is from 
secondary sources. Material for the later years however has been 
obtained mainly from primary sources (such as from the annual reports 
of the institutions concerned, Collective Agreements, the minutes of 
the various rounds of negotiations and statistical publications) and 
from personal interviews with senior officials in the main organisa­
tions involved with wage determination in the estates. Most of these 
have not previously been analysed in any objective study.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
I
Preliminary Survey of Published Wage Statistics
The publicly available sources of data on the wages of rubber 
estate workers are the following:
1. Review of Wages and Earnings in Malaya since 1947, Labour 
Department, 1951 (Mimeographed), and Supplement to the Review of Wages 
and Earnings in the Federation of Malaya since 1947, Labour Department, 
1952 (Mimeographed).1 The former gives figures on daily and monthly 
earnings of rubber estate workers between 1947 and 1950, and the latter 
does the same for 1951. In both cases, however, neither the selection 
procedure for the sample nor the method of collection of the data is 
known, nor is the format of the original questionnaire used available. 
The reports themselves admit,that the sample selected was "unscientific" 
and the results "may therefore be biased". Besides, the figures do not
distinguish between rates and earnings; further, detailed breakdowns 
by age or sex and earnings figures for kanganies3 are not available.
The term ’Labour Department' is synonymous with the term ’Ministry 
of Labour', the former being used in pre-Independence days (1957) and 
the latter since then.
2Supplement to the Review ............. , p . 3 .
3The term kangany refers to a junior supervisor amongst the estate 
labour-force, usually one of Indian descent; sometimes the term 
mandores is used. For those of Chinese descent, the term kepala is 
used, but to simplify, only the term kangany will be used in this 
study both for those of Indian or Chinese descent. The nearest 
English equivalent of this term would probably be the foreman, 
and some statistical reports use this term.
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2 .  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  o f  t h e  L a b o u r  D e p a r t m e n t  and t h e  M i n i s t r y  
o f  L a b o u r .  D e t a i l s  on  a v e r a g e  w a g e - r a t e s  an d  e a r n i n g s  o f  r u b b e r  e s t a t e  
w o r k e r s  s i n c e  1951,  e x c e p t  f o r  1958,  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e s e  r e p o r t s .
Th e s e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  s a m p l e ,  t h e  method  o f  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  and 
t h e i r  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  e s t a t e s '  wage s t r u c t u r e  i s  
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .
3 .  R u b b e r  S t a t i s t i c s  Handbook ( A n n u a l )  and M o n th ly  S t a t i s t i c a l  
B u l l e t i n . The f i g u r e s  p u b l i s h e d  h e r e  a r e  d e r i v e d  f rom  t h e  same s o u r c e s  
a s  ( 2 )  ab o v e ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  more  d e t a i l s  a r e  g i v e n  i n  t h e  f o r m e r .  N o t h i n g  
i s  g i v e n  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  f o r m e r .
4 .  M i s c e l l a n e o u s  s o u r c e s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  o c c a s i o n a l  comments 
made on e s t a t e  w o r k e r s '  e a r n i n g s  i n  t h e  U n io n  and t h e  E m p l o y e r s '  
A s s o c i a t i o n  r e p o r t s . 1 T h e s e ,  h o w e v e r ,  g i v e  no more  t h a n  v e r y  b r o a d  
a v e r a g e s  o f  o n l y  two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s  n a m e l y ,  T i m e - R a t e s  
T a p p e r s  and f i e l d w o r k e r s . (The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  w o r k - f o r c e  i s  
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  i n  S e c t i o n  I I I  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ) .  I n  any c a s e ,  most  
o f  t h e  f i g u r e s  a r e  d u b i o u s  s i n c e  t h e  U n io n  seems g e n e r a l l y  t o  hav e  
u n d e r s t a t e d  and t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o v e r s t a t e d  them ,  a p p a r e n t l y  f o r  ' b a r ­
g a i n i n g  s t r a t e g y '  p u r p o s e s .
The m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  ( 2 )  and 
( 3 )  ab o v e ,  and t h e s e  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  i n  some d e t a i l  h e r e .  The f i g u r e s  
p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  a r e  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  u s e d  i n  
t h e  A n n u a l  Su rveys  on Wages and Employment c o n d u c t e d  by  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  
L a b o u r  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
w o r k e r s  who wo rk ed  12 d a y s  o r  more  i n  J u l y  o f  e a c h  y e a r  s i n c e  1951,  
e x c e p t  1958.  B e f o r e  c o n d u c t i n g  t h e s e  s u r v e y s ,  a l l  t h e  known e s t a t e s  
i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  w e r e  f i r s t  g r o u p e d  by  s i z e s  and w i t h i n  e a c h  s i z e - g r o u p ,
^ S e e ,  N a t i o n a l  U n ion  o f  P l a n t a t i o n  W o r k e r s ,  G e n e r a l  R e p o r t s  1 9 5 4 , -  and 
M a lay a n  P l a n t i n g  I n d u s t r i e s  E m p l o y e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ,  
1 9 4 7 - 1 9 6 6 .
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a certain proportion of the estates was selected at random. The actual 
proportions and the numbers selected for different size-groups varied 
slightly over the years but these were always based upon the recommenda­
tions of the Department of Statistics and were intended to ensure that 
the sample was as representative of the industry as was possible. For 
most years so far, the size-groups and the proportions selected from 
each size-group followed approximately the following structure:
Group 1 : 100 - 999 acres : 5% of estates
Group 2 : 1000 - 1999 acres : 15% of estates
Group 3 : 2000 - 4999 acres : 30% of estates
Group 4 : 5000 and over acres : 50% of estates
The same sample of estates was then used for every three years at a 
stretch, and after every three years, arising out of a new list of 
estates compiled by the Department of Statistics, a new selection was 
carried out. In the meantime, if any estates in the sample fell out 
for one reason or another, replacements from the original list were 
made at random.
The procedure used for the selection of the sample, there­
fore, appeared sound. The collection of the data, however, was not as 
effective as could be wished, or at least this was the impression 
obtained from previous personal observations over two annual surveys 
during the collection of the data from the estates (1966 and 1967).
The main reasons are briefly discussed below:
In many cases, junior or trainee conductors  ^ who were actually 
on staff conditions of service and third-party contractors who were
^The term conductor refers to a supervisor of higher standing than the 
kanganies. Three types of conductors can be distinguished: Junior or
trainees, regulars, and seniors. All conductors are employed on staff 
conditions of service, covered by separate agreements made with them 
directly or with their union, the All-Malaya Estates Staff Union. So 
far as is known, no kanganies have ever been promoted to conductors.
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strictly speaking employers of labour, as will be seen later in 
Chapter 4, were included in the columns for kanganies when recording 
their numbers or earnings. On the other hand, many who were acting as 
kanganies, such as prior to confirmation (subject to satisfactory per­
formance), were included in their previous grades.
The definitions adopted in these Surveys for daily-rated and 
Piece-Rated Tappers were very rigid. Thus, Piece-Rated Tappers included 
all those whose earnings, however remotely, were affected by their out­
puts whereas daily-rated included only those who were on flat rates per 
day and variations in output, however large between tappers, was to 
have no effect whatsoever on their earnings differentials. But during 
the preliminary visits made to the estates (see Sections II and III of 
this chapter) and before the selection of the sample,it became apparent 
that all the tappers were actually on straight piece-rates or on time- 
rates (with an element of piece-rates incorporated in their earnings) 
with none being on a flat rate basis. This 'lumping-together' of those 
on straight piece-rates and of those on time-rates (with an element of 
piece-rates in their pay) in the Official Surveys was unfortunate in 
that it missed, as will be seen later, a very important part of the 
earnings structure of tappers.
Then again, amongst the fieldworkers, only the weeders were 
included. Others, such as pruners or those responsible for the elimina­
tion of insects and pests or of root diseases, were excluded fron this 
grade in the Official Surveys. This was also unfortunate since in the 
structure of the estates' labour-force these were categorised as field- 
workers and formed a fairly significant proportion of the total in this 
grade. Besides, the figures on the average earnings of male and female 
weeders were given only for adult workers, whereas those for 'young 
persons' (defined as those who were 16 and under) were 'lumped together' 
so that the proportion of males and females in them are not known.
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Finally, amongst the factory workers were also included 
quite frequently those who ought to have been excluded, such as elec­
tricians, plumbers, and other skilled workers in the estates not 
employed in the factory. This was done, apparently, "out of convenience" 
since there was no other column in the Official Survey Questionnaires 
to account for such miscellaneous grades. The Official Survey results 
were, therefore, not capable of giving earnings figures for 'pure' 
grades.
Apart from the above, the publicly available output lacked 
much detail. The figures on the average daily earnings given are all 
broad averages for the industry as a whole and give no breakdowns by 
geographical dispersions, size of estates, estates in membership or 
not of the Employers' Association, and other personal characteristics 
of the workers, such as their age. In any case, during the fieldwork 
it was found that the last of the Annual Reports of the Ministry of 
Labour available then was that of 1965 and no current figures were 
available. Attempts to obtain the originals of the Survey returns 
showed that all those up to 1963 inclusive were destroyed; some of 
those from 1964 up to 1967 were available but many were eaten up by 
white ants. These might still have been usable if not for the fact 
that the data within them on size of estates, their membership or not 
of the Employers’ Association, and the numbers of workers for the 
different grades (necessary for arriving at weighted averages) were 
extraordinarily incomplete.
Thus the existing data was felt to be inadequate for a study 
of the estate wage structure and it became imperative to select a 
sample of estates, and a sample of workers from within them, for a
detailed investigation.
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Selection of Estates for Investigation
With over 2,000 estates spread all over West Malaysia, it was
obvious that no single unofficial investigator could cover more than a
very tiny fraction of this total with the resources available for the 
1study. A decision was therefore made to restrict the selection of
the estates to those from the State of Selangor, and preferably to those
that were as close to each other as possible and yet not too far away
from Kuala Lumpur (selected as the base of operations). The latter was
useful so as the interviews with the officials in the Ministry of Labour,
2the Agency Hduses, the Union and the Employers' Association could be 
conducted simultaneously without too much inconvenience since all of 
them were located in and around the city.
Before choosing the estates to be studied, some main charac­
teristics of those in Selangor were examined. A summary of these is 
given in Table 2.1. The estates in Selangor were thus found to differ 
widely in geographical dispersions, organisation, ownership, size, and 
age and quality of the trees (as indicated by the different proportions 
of high-yielding acreage amongst them) ; they also differed in yields 
per acre by size of estates, though yields per acre did not differ
II
1Briefly, resources available specifically for the fieldwork were: 
time, 11 months to collect field data; finance, personal travelling 
expenses and an amount sufficient to employ two assistants of under­
graduate level for 4 months to assist in the Worker Interviews.
2An Agency House is a multi-purpose commercial organisation engaged 
in business activities ranging from travel, imports and exports, 
shipping, marketing, managing plantations and so on. Such houses 
usually represent overseas owners in local businesses, and 
occasionally also assist local owners in financial and technical 
problems of.estate management.
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TABLE 2.1
CHARACTERISTICS OF ESTATES IN SELANGOR, JULY 1967
Geographical3 
Dispers ions
Planted „ , » r-.• YieldsA Production _Acreage - Per Acre Numbers
(acres) (tons) (lbs p.a .) (Estates)
Klang 55,915 22,873 1038 49
Kuala Langat 22,688 10,657 1008 24
Kuala Lumpur 33,044 11,555 1068 48
Kuala Selangor 41,740 15,894 998 39
Sabak Bernam 73 95 1282 1
Ulu Langat 50,889 19,687 1134 58
Ulu Selangor 67,422 19,895 899 65
Total 274,771 100,656 1017 284
Ownership3 Malaysian Non-Malaysian Numbers
Organisation (51% or more) (51% or more) (Estates)
Public Com­
panies 3 77 80
Private Com­
panies 58 17 75
Partnerships 91 6 97
Others 28 4 32
Total 180 104 284
Ownership3 
Size (Acres)
Malaysian 
(51% or more)
Non-Malaysian 
(51% or more)
Numbers 
(Estates)
0 - 499 129 18 147
500 - 999 27 21 48
1000 - 1999 18 35 53
2000 - 2999 2 14 16
3000 - 4999 4 8 12
5000 & over - 8 8
Total 180 104 284
% of total 24,344 tons 76,312 tons 100,656 tons
production (24%) (76%) (100%)
% of planted 86,672 acres 188,099 acres 274,771 acres
acreage (32%) (68%) (100%)
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued)
Number and %c
\ ^ ^ o f  total
% of High-''''''^^^ 
yielding 
Materials
No. of Estates % of Total
0 - 9 24 8
10 - 29 11 4
30 - 49 16 v6
50 - 69 19 7
70 - 89 31 11
90 - 100 183 64
Total 284 100
Yield per acre*3 
_ and costs per lb Yield per acre Cost of Numbers
Size
(Acres)
(lbs p .a.) Product ion 
(M£ per lb)
(Estates)
100 - 299 609 36.5 17
300 - 499 694 38.4 10
500 - 999 737 36.2 7
1000 & over 876 37.5 6
All 806 37.3 40
Unionisation0
(estimated) Members Non-Members Totals
Estimated Acreage
covered 66% 34% 100%
Degree of unionisa­
tion (paid-up mem-
bership figures as 40-65% Nil-45%
% of employees)
Sources
aDepartment of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1967, on Geo­
graphical dispersions, ownership/organisation, ownership/size, and 
number of estates with different proportions of high-yielding materials 
Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.10, 3.3, 3.6, 4.5, 4.10 and 5.4.
bChan Chee Kheong, Ng Choong Sooi and Barlow, Colin: Results of 1964 
Sample Survey of Estates in West Malaysia, Rubber Research Institute of 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, Tables 2.7 and 10.14.
cPersonal Interviews with Selangor State Branch Secretary, NUPW.
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significantly by geographical dispersions. Further, Table 2.1 does 
not show wide differences in costs of production between estates by 
their size-groups. Finally, estates differed in whether the owners 
were or were not Members of the Employers’ Association and in the 
degree of unionisation between and within each group.
After interviewing closely a number of Planting Advisers1 
and other persons experienced with the industry's labour market, it 
was concluded that some of these characteristics would be insignificant 
in influencing the estates' wage structure. Thus, size of the estates 
(so long as they were neither too small, say below 500 acres or so, 
nor too big, say above 3,500 acres or so) was an insignificant inde­
pendent variable because, (apart from processing costs which generally 
formed only a small proportion ranging from 8 to 12% f.o.b. of the 
total costs of production in these estates and which, as gathered from 
the interviews, differed very little amongst the estates),it had very
2little influence on the economies of scale in the estates' operations. 
Organisation variations (whether the estate was owned by a sole-proprie­
tor, a partnership or a public company) also had no separate influence, 
or mostly correlated with size (larger ones being company-owned or
1
A Planting Adviser is a specialist on technical and other details of 
rubber and other plantation estates and is usually a very senior 
executive officer in the Agency House. All the Planting Advisers 
consulted during fieldwork had been managers of estates at one time 
or other in the past, a few up to 20 years' standing.
2
Contrast this with the findings in another study in developing 
economies in which size of establishments played a very important 
part: see Turner, H.A., Wage Trends, Wage Policies, and Collective
Bargaining : The Problems for Underdeveloped Countries, University 
Press, Cambridge, 1966, p.16.
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partnerships, medium ones being owned by partnerships or sole 
proprietors, and small ones by sole proprietors), and likewise had 
no significant influence on the estates’ wage structure. Geographical 
dispersions within any single state, such as Selangor, was also un­
important since there were no significantly known variations in the 
availability of labour to the different estates to influence earnings 
differentials solely on this ground. It may have had some influence 
amongst Non-Member Estates located in the remoter parts of West Malaysia, 
such as in some parts of the east coast states but these were outside 
the market selected for this study; with the Member Estates even this 
was not significant since they were bound by the Union-negotiated 
Agreements which, as will be seen later, disallowed regional differen­
tials in rates.
Two interconnected influences of major importance generally 
agreed upon were the degree of unionisation of the estates' labour 
force and the employers' membership or non-membership of the Employers' 
Association. Of the two however the latter is certainly the dominant. 
The more highly unionised the workforce the more likely that the manage­
ment would, if only in self defence, join the Employers' Association, 
and become subject to its general agreement with the Union and be 
obliged to give the Union representatives facilities on the estates, 
while Non-Members could within limits set their own inferior terms 
and conditions. Hence the simple either/or criterion of membership or 
non-membership is more dominant rather than the less easily ascertain­
able and less easily manageable criterion of degree of unionisation.
Using these broad criteria and with the assistance of the 
Planting Advisers, sixteen Member and eight Non-Member Estates were 
initially selected. Each of these estates was then visited personally, 
and the list finally pruned down to six Member and three Non-Member
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Estates. The reasons for this pruning were various: in three cases,
the estates were too remote; in six, food and accommodation for the
writer and his assistants during the period of the Workers' Interviews
could not be conveniently arranged; in three others, the management
1was uncooperative; in three others, records were inadequate; and, 
finally, nine seemed the maximum that could be investigated with the 
resources available.
A summary of their main individual characteristics obtained
2from the estate records and the Union officials, is given in Table 2.2. 
While nine was not as large a number of estates as could be wished, it 
is hoped that the selection process ensured that these were fairly 
representative, in some qualitative sort of way, of the larger estates 
in the estate sector in Selangor and, in varying degrees, of similar 
types of estates in other states of West Malaysia.
Attempts were made to eliminate the influence of extremes of 
sizes, yields per acre, yields per tapper and costs of production by
3selecting a sample that was as homogeneous as was practically possible. 
Even geographically, the dispersions were limited to two main regions 
of the seven shown in Table 2.2. In the views of the Planting Advisers
The causes were not related to the purposes of this study, but to 
recent unrest in the labour lines arising out of conflicts between 
Indians and Chinese. The management were too preoccupied with these 
problems to accommodate willingly research students on their estates 
at the time of this survey
2The names and addresses of the estates have not been recorded here 
because the writer is under an obligation to those who cooperated 
not to identify the estates in the study.
3It is impossible to select perfectly homogeneous estates for the 
sample and minor influences of inter-estate differences cannot be 
entirely eliminated but the list here was probably as homogeneous 
as any that could be selected.
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(or their assistants) who helped in the selection of the sample, these 
estates may be considered to be a fair representation of the estate 
sector in the states of Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Johore,
Kedah and Province Wellesley, though biased slightly towards the 
larger and above average efficient estates. They were however pro­
bably not as representative, except in a very broad sense, of the 
estate sector in Kelantan, Trengganu and Pahang where a majority would 
be amongst the smaller and below average efficient estates, and where 
a larger proportion of the estates were not in membership of the 
Employers' Association. Within these limitations, the conclusions of 
this study can be safely extended in a qualitative sort of way.
At one time, it had been hoped that comprehensive figures 
over a number of years could be collected from the estates selected 
on the following: details on acreage, crop and yield statements;
details on task-sizes, average cumber of hours of work per employee, 
average number of days worked per month, absenteeism, employment and 
unemployment figures, costs of production, population changes, changes 
in their age-structure, and profits. Much of what was wished for, 
however, could not be obtained. This was not so much due to lack of 
cooperation on the part of management (except to some extent when it 
came to costs and profits infornation), but more because the data in 
such detail was simply not available. Thus, whatever was available 
and that appeared relevant was obtained as an alternative. Some of 
these were very scrappy, such as those on population and age-structure 
changes, on average number of hours of work for various grades in 
recent months and average task-sizes, but they were useful at least 
in providing a partial sketch wh5re none existed before.
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Selection of Workers for Interviews
Once the estates were selected the next aim was to select a 
sample of workers on them which was representative of their labour- 
force, and no larger than could be handled with the time and financial 
resources available.
The main characteristics of the labour-force in these 
estates were examined. The manual workers belonged to four main 
grades, namely, kanganies, tappers, factory workers and field-workers; 
within tappers, there were two sub-divisions, one being those who were 
directly employed and paid on a time-rates basis, though with an element 
of piece-rates incorporated in their earnings (to be called Time-Rates 
system from now onwards) and the others employed indirectly via third- 
party contractors and paid on straight piece-rates basis (to be called 
Piece-Rates system from now onwards) /  These accounted for more than 
80% of the estates' total labour-force, in round figures 2700 out of 
3220. The remainder performed a variety of miscellaneous tasks: 
office boys, electricians, plumbers, carpenters, drivers, hospital 
cooks, hospital attendants, watchmen, maids in the creches and so on. 
There were also a few rare cases in three or four of the estates of 
field-workers and factory-workers being employed on piece-rate con­
tract basis but these were not regular workers and are not being con-
III
Tappers in the rubber estates are also known to be paid on the 
bagi-dua system, which involved a 50-50% sharing of the value of 
the output produced for any given period between tappers and the 
owners, or some other proportions mutually agreed upon, but none 
of the tappers in this sample of estates was paid on this basis; 
apparently, it is common only amongst the smaller and remoter 
estates, and also amongst smallholdings (which, as noted earlier, 
are not examined in this study).
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sidered here: the field-workers in this category however were only
amongst those employed for felling and clearing prior to replanting 
or budding and planting, while the factory workers were 'temporary 
hands' taken on because some regular workers were on sick leave.
The distinction between Time-Rates Tappers and Piece-Rates 
Tappers is also strongly correlated by race, since apart from extremely 
rare exceptions, all the Indians were on the former system and all the 
Chinese on the latter, while the Malays were distributed in both the 
systems though mostly on Time-Rates. Again, with very rare exceptions, 
all the Time-Rates workers were resident on the estates, and usually 
referred to also as Checkroll workers, whereas all the Piece-Rates 
workers were non-resident, living in nearby Kampongs or New Villages,^ 
and also usually referred to as Contract workers.
A decision was made to select the sample only from the four 
main grades of workers who had worked for 12 or more days in the month 
of July (and within tappers, from both types of tappers), since it was 
felt that the others were much smaller in numbers and too heterogeneous 
to allow a good sample to be selected within each estate. The names 
of all the workers in the selected grades were then arranged in four 
main lists -by occupations (for tappers, in two sub-divisions). Then 
within each grade in each estate, a random procedure was adopted: one 
out of every two names for kanganies and factory workers, and one out 
of every four names for tappers of both systems and for field-workers. 
The proportion of the workers between the grades had to be varied in
A Kampong is a Malay village, generally located in the rural areas 
or on the fringes of urban areas; a New Village is a village mainly 
settled by Chinese farmers or rural workers and was created during 
the Emergency period (1948-1959) to remove them from contacts with 
the Communist guerillas. (The Emergency is discussed in passing in 
Chapter 9 when the history of the NUPW is briefly reviewed).
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order to obtain totals neither too large nor too small for each grade; 
these proportions, however, could not be rigidly adhered always because 
of rounding-off purposes, and because errors were sometimes found in 
the original wage-sheets given to the writer by the management. On 
this basis, a total of 706 names was obtained. This initial number 
was kept large because a pilot survey conducted earlier to pre-test 
the proposed Questionnaire on some twenty workers in an estate not in 
the sample, had shown it likely that a few workers would be unwilling 
to cooperate, hard to contact, or would present very difficult communi­
cation problems.
The interviews were then conducted estate by estate with the 
help of two assistants recruited and specifically trained for this job. 
The assistants were both undergraduates from the University of Malaya, 
had some knowledge of economics and were of estate background. The 
interviews started with the names on the top of the list for kanganies, 
then factory workers, then tappers (usually alternating with directly 
employed and indirectly employed list), and then the field-workers. 
Those who could not be contacted on two successive occasions were 
then discarded (93 : 13% of 706) ; others were unwilling to cooperate 
(35 : 5%), and with some others communication was unsatisfactory (44 : 
6%). This procedure was occasionally modified to take into account 
other factors, such as the convenience of the workers, or the advan­
tages of interviewing all in the list of names within a particular 
'block' or group of fields at one time, or making even a third effort 
to contact field-workers or Piece-Rate Tappers who presented special 
difficulties (the former because of a consciousness of their low 
status in the estates and the latter because they were mostly non­
resident workers). In all cases, however, the names selected were 
from the lists compiled in accordance with the sample selection proce­
dure .
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A total of 534 workers were thus interviewed (76% of 706) and 
of these, 50 or 9% were eliminated from the analysis either because of 
a few obvious inconsistencies (28), many questions left unanswered (17) 
and due to other miscellaneous reasons (5).
It seems unlikely that much bias was introduced by the omission 
of the non-respondents: most of them just could not be contacted at all,
particularly the non-resident workers, and concurrent interviews held 
with management, contractors or the friends and relatives of these 
workers did not suggest that their employment histories could have been 
much different from those of the workers being interviewed. The few 
who were unwilling to cooperate or those with whom communication was 
difficult were, again in the views of those consulted in the estates, 
probably not much different in their past employment experiences. As 
for the false respondents or incomplete questionnaires, most of them 
came from the older workers who probably had poor memories: whether
this has affected the findings of this study significantly is difficult 
to say, but it seems unlikely that the total picture to be presented 
here later would be very different if these respondents had satisfactorily 
answered all the questions.
Table 2.3 summarises the sample by estates with the % of 
the total on each estate shown by occupational grades, race and sex 
(Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 shows that in terms of the total labour-force in the 
estates studied, the sample comprised 18%: this proportion is certainly
substantial. By occupational grades, the kanganies and the factory 
workers accounted for 50% of their totals in each estate, which gives 
them a very good representation; the representativeness of the other 
grades varied, better amongst the Time-Rates Tappers than amongst the
Piece-Rates Tappers and not too good amongst the field-workers.
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Table 2.3 also shows the breakdowns of the sample by race 
and sex. Again, the proportions represented for each group seem 
fairly well distributed, and there is little to suggest that the 
sample selected was not representative of the estates being examined. 
Earlier, a point was made that almost all Chinese were on Piece-Rates 
and almost all Indians on Time-Rates with the Malays being distributed 
in both systems. Table 2.3, therefore, shows the close parallels in 
the numbers of the Chinese in the sample and the numbers of the Piece- 
Rates Tappers. Where these figures do not coincide, it implies that 
there were a few exceptional cases of Chinese being not on Piece-Rates 
or of Indians and Malays being not on Time-Rates: the former could
arise if the Chinese were employed as daily-rated kanganies, or as 
factory or field-workers, whereas the latter were generally the 
exceptions to the rule. One weakness of the sample, as will become 
evident later, is that these few odd cases all got left out: this
seems a little unfortunate even though it probably could not have 
thrown new light that cannot be otherwise deduced from the analysis 
that follows later. A point to note here is that the Indians formed 
73% of the sample selected but, as will be seen later in Table 6.6 
in the- text, they formed only 46% of the total work-force in all the 
estates in West Malaysia in July 1967. This discrepancy is not as 
serious as it seems at first sight since it arose for the following 
reasons:
(a) As mentioned earlier, the estates selected were all from Selangor 
and were more representative of those in the west coast states 
than in the east coast states. Though no figures of estate labour 
by states are available, it seems well-known that the Indians are 
relatively larger in numbers in the estates on the west coast and 
the majority in those in Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Perak.
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(b) Also as mentioned earlier, the estates were biased towards the 
larger types. The statistics available show that in the larger 
estates of West Malaysia (those 1,000 acres or more), the Indians 
formed 48% (82,400 out of 172,400) of the total labour-force and 
only 39%) in the estates below 1,000 acres (23,100 out of 59,500).
This characteristic must have also applied to the Selangor estates, 
and given their overall majority here, the proportion in the larger 
estates would then be much higher.
(c) Finally, during the field investigation, it was found that many 
estate managers deliberately exaggerated the number of Malay 
workers in order to put them in good position with the local 
Labour Departments. If this was also true elsewhere, then the 
figures for the Non-Indians in Table 6.6 could be somewhat exagge­
rated .
A summary of the Questionnaire finally used in the interviews is 
given in Appendix A. Originally, a much more elaborate Questionnaire 
had been prepared seeking information on numerous matters not included 
in the final version shown here, such as on family income, side income 
from vegetable gardening or poultry rearing, and details on the earnings 
of each job in the workers’ employment histories, but during the pilot 
survey, it was found that either much more time would have been consumed 
than available for interviewing 500 workers or that the information 
obtained in a hurry would turn out to be inaccurate.
Briefly, the reduced form of the Questionnaire aimed at 
information of two types under four main headings: factual information
on earnings and personal, family and present and past employment parti­
culars; and impressionistic information on the subject's knowledge of
^Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1967, Table 12.1, 
p.129.
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labour market conditions, attitude to changing jobs, and on preferences
between the four main grades in the estates' labour-force.
1Following the experiences of another study,A the questions 
were deliberately designed to allow as much discussion as was possible 
between the interviewer and the interviewee rather than to channel 
their responses during interviewing into predetermined boxes. The 
intention was similar, namely, to let the conversation flow freely and, 
from these, to obtain the required information for this study.
The procedures by which the workers were to be reached for 
interviewing varied but the most common ones are discussed here.
Among estate residents, workers to be interviewed during the day were 
called out by the kanganies during muster-time (around 6.00 a.m. when 
they were allocated their daily tasks), and told to wait in the estate 
temple or estate school or some other convenient place at certain fixed 
times after work; those who did not respond were later interviewed in 
their quarters, or in the fields. For non-resident workers, the con­
tractor assisted in arranging for interviews during lunch or other 
breaks; when this was not possible the workers were later traced to 
their houses in the Kampongs or the New Villages and interviewed there.
Recording the information into the Questionnaires presented 
a few problems. If workers were very cooperative, this was done verba­
tim; if they were impatient, the factual information was recorded 
first, and short notes taken on the impressionistic types, to be 
recorded later after the interviews.
All sorts of characters were encountered during the inter­
views causing many worrying moments. There were the few habitual
Reynolds, Lloyd G., The Structure of Labor Markets : Wages and Labor 
Mobility in Theory and Practice, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1951, 
pp.299-301.
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drinkers who always became threatening when their women-folks were 
interviewed by men;there were the odd ones who mocked at every question 
asked; there were the 'anti-administration' types and the self-styled 
'politicians' who used the occasion to harangue the world at large; 
and finally, there were a few who acted aggressively, behaving like 
thugs or secret-society gangsters.
Much time was wasted because the estate workers refused to be 
interviewed on such days as pay-days, festival days, harvest days, 
religious days, Estates' Union-Committee election days or days when 
the estates celebrated any marriage or mourned any death. Language 
difficulties also posed problems. The two assistants were specially 
selected so that, together with the writer, interviews could be con­
ducted in English, Tamil, Malay and to a lesser extent in Chinese but, 
despite this, dialect problems cropped up. In some cases, managers 
responded by providing interpreters, but in others the interviews had 
to be cancelled. The writer's wife assisted with interviewing female workers.
The information obtained from these interviews however seemed 
reasonably accurate. The earnings data, being the most important ones, 
were always checked against the pay-sheets; other information, on the 
employment histories, were frequently checked against information pro­
vided by friends or relatives in the estates and were found to be 
generally close; and a small random number in each estate was re­
interviewed by another interviewer on fresh questionnaires, and the 
responses on these different occasions confirmed generally the accuracy 
of the information obtained. The information on the family particulars, 
however, did not come up as well as hoped and so is not used in the 
analysis in this study, while those on knowledge and attitudes are use­
ful mainly for interpreting the facts observed, and does not allow 
itself to be subjected to any accurate statistical analysis.
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After the interviews were completed, a Coding Sheet was 
prepared on the basis of a thorough examination of 50 Questionnaires 
selected at random. The information from the worker interviews were 
then put into cards and fed into a computer. Factual data presented 
few problems in the transfer-process, but qualitative types required 
the exercise of some judgement; generally, the approach used was to 
select the response that was most frequently repeated and, where this 
was not possible, the first response given was selected. This is not 
particularly satisfactory, but it was sufficient to provide some 
general impressions which were all that was required from this part. 
Tables were then prepared either directly from the computer or by 
counting from the cards.
IV
Information from other sources
Before, during, and after the work on the estates, informa­
tion was also gathered from officials of a number of organisations 
not only about these estates and the problems connected with them but 
also about other estates generally and the institutional bodies 
involved in the wage-determination processes. The main organisations 
from whom information was collected were the following: the Ministry
of Labour, the Rubber Producers' Council, the Malayan Estate Owners' 
Association, the United Planting Association of Malaya, the Rubber 
Research Institute, the Department of Statistics, Agency Houses, the 
Union and the Employers' Association.1
1For a brief background on some of these organisations, see Edgar, 
A.T., Manual on Rubber Planting (Malaya), Incorporated Society of 
Planters, Kuala Lumpur, 1960, pp.551-555.
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Much of the work in this phase was facilitated by previous 
personal contacts with many of the officials concerned, and by the 
fact that the writer was* then also holding an academic appointment 
in the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur and, having also frequently 
participated in public seminars on labour-management relations^, was 
already known of by many of them, a very useful consideration in a 
small country. Naturally, some problems were still encountered, such 
as overcoming the convictions of a few employers that labour market 
researchers were not all ’airy-fairy socialists or communists', and 
the difficulties of being dragged into various personal or institutional 
rivalries between those interviewed. But on the whole, nearly everyone 
cooperated extremely well (except perhaps on details of cost and 
profit figures) and were most hospitable, making this the most pleasing 
part of the field-work.
The information obtained and an interpretation of these is 
discussed in Part II of this study.
1For instance, during the seminars or public symposiums organised by the Amal- 
mated National Union of Local Authorities Employees (June 1965), Economics 
Society of the University of Malaya (November 1965), Congress of Unions 
of Employees in the Public and Civil Services (May 1966, August 1966,
May 1967), Ministry of Commerce and Industry for their Trade Commissioners 
in Training (August 1966), and the Malayan Trade Union Congress for their 
officials and branch officials (July 1966, January 1969). The writer 
also participated in the Asian Trade Union Seminar on Trade Unionism 
and Cooperation held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1966 and chaired a 
number of symposiums on industrial relations problems in West Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 3
WAGE STRUCTURE 
I
The purpose of this and the next chapter is to describe in 
detail and, so far as possible with the information obtained directly 
from the sample of estates itself, to explain the structure of wages 
on these estates as revealed by the interviews conducted on the sample 
of 484 workers. The bare statistical findings are recorded in Section 
II, explanations being reserved for Sections III and IV, and for 
Chapter 4.
But first some preliminary explanations need to be given 
here. The earnings data from the Questionnaires centre round the 
average daily earnings for the month of July 1967, the average daily 
earnings being computed by taking each respondent's total earnings 
(derived from basic rates or other supplementary earnings) for July 
1967 obtained from work actually performed during the month divided by 
the number of days worked during the month, excluding paid holidays 
and earnings obtained from paid holidays. The average daily earnings, 
rather than weekly or monthly earnings, was taken because almost all 
workers in the rubber estates were employed and paid on a daily basis, 
the minor exceptions being one or two kanganies in some estates who 
may be paid on a monthly basis, none of whom were within the sample of 
workers selected.
The earnings data for only one month in the year are being 
examined rather than for the whole year partly because it would have
been extremely cumbersome for a single investigator to work out the
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average daily earnings of the sample of workers for the whole year but 
mostly because the preliminary investigations had revealed that this 
was not really so necessary in an examination of the earnings structure 
in the estates. Thus, while the levels of the average daily earnings 
of estate workers for different months in any one year fluctuated 
slightly because of differences in the average amounts earned on over­
time or output, the interviews with the management had indicated that 
this did not significantly affect the structure of their annual earnings 
differentials since this tended to affect most workers almost equally. 
Further, while there were seasonal differences in the amount of employ­
ment of estate workers in any one year, there were no indications that 
this affected their annual earnings differentials significantly: this
was partly because management was required under the Employment Ordi­
nance of 1955 to offer all estate workers on their payroll a minimum 
period of at least 24 days of work a month,1 thereby reducing to that 
extent the influence of the differences in the amount of employment of 
each grade on their annual relativities, and partly because, as an act 
of policy on these estates, management tried to spread the differences, 
in the monthly employment available, as equally as was practically 
possible between all workers in one grade and between workers in the 
different grades. Consequently, all workers within one estate ended 
up by being offered approximately the same number of days of work in 
any one month.
federation of Malaya, Employment Ordinance (No.38) of 1955, Government 
Printer/ Kuala Lumpur, 1955. Section 16(1) states "Where a Labourer is 
employed in any agricultural undertaking on an estate on a contract of 
service under which he earns wages calculated by reference to the num­
ber of days' work performed in each month of his service, his employer 
shall be bound either to provide him with work suitable to his capacity 
on not less than 24 days in each month during the whole of which he is 
so employed, or if the employer is unable or fails to provide work on 
24 days in each month whereon the labourer is willing and fit to work, 
the employer shall nevertheless be bound to pay to the labourer in 
respect of each of such days wages at the same rate as if each labourer 
had performed a days' work".
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The month of July was chosen partly because, for any given
year in the estates, the average daily earnings for this month would
be nearest around the average for the year for most workers in all the
different estates, and partly to retain consistency with the general
practice of the Ministry of Labour and that of the Department of
Statistics in collecting estate data mostly for the month of July for
any one year.'1' That the average daily earnings of July was nearest
around the average for the year was because the months of June, July
and August were amongst the least affected by the wet season, usually
towards the latter part or beginning of any one year, or the dry season,
usually towards the earlier part of any one year; production figures
for this month, or for June and August of any one year, are generally
nearest the monthly average for that year. Thus, the production figures
for the rubber estates for June, July and August in 1967 averaged just
about 26% for the year whereas that for any other quarter was either
above or below this percentage: 20% for March, April and May, 27%
for September, October and November or for December, January and 
2February. In any case, all the managers interviewed also supported 
the view that the average number of days worked by estate workers for 
July and the average daily earnings for this month would be closest to 
the monthly averages for any year.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the results of this survey 
on the earnings structure of estate workers could have been signifi­
cantly different if the average daily earnings for the whole year had
Ministry of Labour, Annual Reports: (see Section on "Employment and 
Wages Survey"), and Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics 
Handbook (Annual)j
2Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1967, Table 
4.3.
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been taken rather than the average daily earnings for the month of 
July in the year; this would at least be true of their relative 
rankings even though, it must be admitted, the exact size of the 
differentials in percentage terms could have turned out to be slightly 
different.
The actual cost of the fringe benefits received by the estate 
workers, such as free housing (or in lieu of it a housing allowance), 
free medical attention, paid holidays and other such benefits, has not 
been included in the computation of their earnings. This is because 
detailed cost figures on these for each worker by grades in any of the 
estates were not available, the only figures available in the records 
being the total cost figures for "labour benefits"1 per pound of 
rubber produced in that month, which were made available generally 
but not for detailed scrutiny. The alternative of imputing a cost per 
worker by each grade presented insurmountable problems. Admittedly, 
the omission does distort comparisons between the estate workers' over­
all receipts with those of the other workers in the other industries in 
West Malaysia, but this is not being attempted in this study because of 
difficulties of obtaining detailed wage statistics for the other indus­
tries. It would require, at the least, another primary survey. The 
omission, however, does not affect to any great extent the comparison 
of the estate workers' actual hierarchy of differentials. This is 
because all the workers within any one estate in the sample (from kan- 
ganies down to the field-workers) were always entitled to enjoy the
1"Labour benefits" here are defined to include items such as hospital 
and medical expenses, labour lines, sick leave pay, holiday pay, 
maternity allowances, education and welfare, creche expenses, and 
employees' provident fund, or any other non-wage benefits made 
available to estate workers.
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same benefits in kind whether they used them or not or received in 
cash an equivalent value for some of the benefits provided, such as 
a housing allowance in lieu of free housing. Between the Member and 
the Non-Member Estates, the interviews with management revealed (and 
the total cost figures per worker confirmed1) that these were higher 
in the former than in the latter; this, as will be seen later in 
Section II, coincided with the structure of their earnings differen­
tials, one reinforcing the other rather than conflicting with it. The 
omission, therefore, does not distort significantly the rankings bet­
ween the occupations within the Member or the Non-Member Estates, 
within each occupation in the two types of estates and between the 
Member and the Non-Member Estates, even though it must be recognised 
that the exact size of the percentage differentials between the grades 
could have been affected, depending upon how much benefits one grade 
actually used relative to another, how much value they themselves 
attached to the benefits received irrespective of the costs incurred 
by the management, and how much it actually costs to provide similar 
benefits between the two different types of estates.
^The average cost of labour benefits provided for workers in July 1967 
in terms of rubber produced for the month was 4.56 cents per pound in 
the Member and 4.27 cents per pound in the Non-Member Estates. Using 
this information and that on total output and total labour-force given 
in Table 2.2 (p. 24), it was estimated that the average cost of labour 
benefits provided per worker in the Member Estates in July 1967 was 
$2.18 and in the Non-Member Estates $1.53, or a differential of about 
30% lesser benefits in the Non-Member Estates. Apart from suggesting 
that workers in the Member Estates received better fringe benefits, no 
more ought to be read into these figures because (a) the total labour- 
force figures given in Table 2.2 do not include workers from other 
miscellaneous grades, (b) the cost details were not open for scrutiny, 
and (c) numerous problems always arise with costing. Apart from this 
evidence, one does not need to interview workers for long to find out, 
qualitatively, that conditions of work such as medical attention, 
holidays and so on were preferable in the Member to those in the 
Non-Member Estates.
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Statistical Findings
The number of cross-classifications that are possible with a 
sample of 484 workers is very large, and it is not easy to set out the 
data in a convenient manner without making at least some cross-references. 
Here the data on the occupational grades will be presented first, 
followed by sub-dividing the earnings data of these grades between the 
Member and the Non-Member Estates, and then sub-dividing further within 
each of these two types of estates the sex and the age influences on 
the earnings of the different occupations. Wherever possible, the 
dispersions within each grade will also be recorded.
1.1 Earnings by Occupation
One major feature in the earnings structure of the workers 
interviewed was the four-fold occupational structure in the estates' 
labour-force, and within tappers, the division into the Piece-Rates 
and the Time-Rates Tappers.
The statistical data are summarised in Table 3.1. The 
Table brings out clearly a three-level hierarchical structure in the 
earnings of the estate workers, with the kanganies earning the highest 
average daily earnings ($5.16), the tappers and the factory workers in 
the middle ($3.84 and $3.78), and the field-workers at the bottom.
This broad structure of Occupational Differentials persisted 
when the workers' sex and employment by Member and Non-Member Estates 
were held constant, as can be seen in Table 3.2 which brings forward 
in index form some other earnings data to be discussed later in Tables
II
3.3 and 3.5.
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Table 3.2, therefore, establishes that Occupational Differen­
tials were a fundamental feature of the wage structure in the rubber 
estates. Some allowances however have to be made for the fact that 
there were no female kanganies in the estates' work-force and that the 
extent of the average differences between certain grades (for instance, 
between kanganies or Piece-Rates Tappers and the rest) varied somewhat 
when sex or estates were held constant. The overlapping that is seen 
in Table 3.1 does not really distort the broad structure presented, 
it being caused partly by the greater influences of sex and type of 
estates on the earnings dispersion of certain categories of workers 
such as can be seen later in Table 3.5 in which the earnings of male 
field-workers in the Member Estates exceeded those of female factory 
workers in the Member or Non-Member Estates and that of the female 
Time-Rates Tappers in the Non-Member Estates, and partly by a few 
'special cases' to be discussed later in connection with the disper­
sion of personal earnings in Chapter 4.
1.2 Earnings of Occupations by Member and Non-
Member Estates
One important feature explaining the dispersions in the 
earnings of the main occupational grades was the part played by estates 
in membership of the Employers' Association, Member Estates paying more 
than the Non-Member Estates.
Table 3.3 summarises the statistical data to demonstrate this 
feature. The Table shows clearly that, except in the case of the 
kanganies and the Piece-Rates Tappers who together accounted for only 
28% of the sample and in whose cases the differentials were trivial, 
a very marked difference existed in the earnings of all the other 
grades between those employed in the Member and those in the Non-
D
IS
P
E
R
SI
O
N
 
O
F 
A
V
E
R
A
G
E 
D
A
IL
Y
 
E
A
R
N
IN
G
S 
B
Y
 
M
EM
BE
R 
A
N
D
 
N
O
N
-M
EM
BE
R
 
E
ST
A
T
E
S,
 
JU
L
Y
 
19
67
47
c
0
•H 4H
4-> 0
CO G
•H fc* CO 0 m CO CO CM m CD CD m
> 05 CM CO rH r-H r-H CM rH rH i—1 rH
05 CO 2
Q
• in
CO
4->
CO
l O
c O
0 rH
X z 11
05 in rH 0 CM 0 rH 0 CD O CM 0
T3 f G 0 O O 0 CM 0 CM O CM 0
G 05 05 rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH r-H rH
HH > £2
< E
v - / 05
2
05
bn
CO CO m CM CM CM CM CD
5h rH rH CO CM 0 0 5 rH rH m
05 • • . • .
> m m CO CO CO CO CO CM
<
1
O 0 5
m 1 CM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0- 00
1
0 0 5
m cn 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
C/5- C D t>
2
1
O 0 5
m t » 1 CM r—4 l 1 1 1 1 1
m CO
g
•H
i 0 5
m m 0 CO 0 0 i> CO CM 0 0 l 1 1
• • rH CM CM
m
in
bO 1
G 0 0 5 t '- CO rH CM rH CO CM 00 1
•H m Tt< rH O rH
g • rH
G 0 0
CO
W
0 0 5
m r r 1 1 CD rH 0 5 CO m 0 5 CM
• • O rH rH CO r-H
CM CO
1
O 0 5
m Tt< 1 1 1 1 CO CD 1 1 CO CO
• • rH
r— 1 CM
. 1 2 0 rH CD 0 5 0 m
O CM O CM O CM CO i n CM
Z CM
in
in in in G
G G in in G in 05 in
in in 05 05 G G 05 G £ 2 G
g G £ 2 £ 2 05 05 £ 2 05 £ 05
05 05 E E £ 2 4 E £ 2 05 £ 2
£ 2 £ 05 05 E £ 05 E 2 E
E E 2 2 05 0) 2 05 05
05 05 1 2 S 2 in 2
2 2 in G 1 in G
1 05 O in G G G 05 G
• • G 4-> Z 05 O 05 O X O
m 0 CO 4-> Z X Z G z
05 z • •  o i CO G 0
•H in  1 0 5 O s =
G G  05 1 S t
CO 05 < J 05 T 3
bO a  05 E 4-> rH
G Cl -h •H U 05
CO co CO •H
X H Pg Pg
o
CM
in
rH
00
00
00
00
00
00
0 5
05
cd
o
O'-
00
rH
CD
05
00
in
5-1
05
£ 2a
05
2
05
>
in
rH
CO
4->
O
H
N
on
-M
em
b
er
s 
90
 
19
 
35
 
21
 
12
 
1 
- 
2 
3
.3
9
 
10
0
48
Member- Estates, the differentials ranging from 21 to 26% with the 
overall averaging at 15%. Considering that the value of the fringe 
benefits supplied in the Member Estates was also higher, as noted 
above (p .42), these differentials stand out very significantly.
With minor differences in the size of the differentials, 
the Member and Non-Member Differentials stood out again when sex was 
held constant, as can be seen in Table 3.4 which brings forward in 
index form other data to be discussed later in Table 3.5 in connec­
tion with the influence of sex on the earnings structure.
TABLE 3.4
MEMBER AND NON-MEMBER DIFFERENTIALS BY SEX 
JULY 1967
Members 
(Ave. = 100)
Non-Members 
(Ave. = 100)
Piece-Rates Tappers
Male 100 96
Female 100 99
Time-Rates Tappers
Male 100 86
Female 100 70
Factory Workers
Ma le 100 81
Female 100 81
Field Workers
Male 100 82
Female 100 78
Note: Kanganies excluded because all of them were men.
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There is little doubt, therefore, that the Member and Non- 
Member Differentials were important features of the estate wage 
structure. Thus, these were differentials that were well-known 
amongst informed observers of the rubber estate labour market and 
had been known to be in existence for some years now. In fact, the 
interviews suggested that the actual differentials in the market as 
a whole were wider still since the three Non-Member Estates here 
were amongst the larger ones from this category and were in all 
probability paying higher wage levels than most of the other Non- 
Member Estates, especially those much smaller in size such as the 
estates below 400 acres or so.
2.1 Earnings of Occupations by Sex
Within each of the main occupational grades in the Member 
and Non-Member Estates, sex also played a part in influencing the 
earnings structure (except in the cases of the kanganies who were 
all men).
Table 3.5 records this fact. Thus the Table shows that 
apart from the case of the Piece-Rates Tappers in the Non-Member 
Estates and apart from the trivial differentials for both types of 
tappers in the Member Estates, in all the grades where men and 
women were employed male earnings were significantly higher. In 
some sub-groups, the numbers were of course too small to convey 
significant statistical results,, but the general impression obtained 
in the field reinforced the data presented here quantitatively. It 
is of interest to note that apart from the case of the Piece-Rates 
Tappers in both types of estates, men predominated in numbers in
all the other groups.
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On the basis of information obtained from interviews with 
some of the Union officials, it had been expected that the dispersions 
in the earnings would be smaller in the Member than in the Non-Member 
Estates but apart from the case of the kanganies (Table 3.3), whose 
numbers in the Non-Member Estates were in any case too small to convey 
significant statistical results, these do not stand out too clearly in 
Table 3.5. The interviews, for instance, had suggested that the Union 
had been very successful in narrowing the spread in the personal 
earnings of the workers within each of these grades, but Table 3.5 
shows that apart from the case of the male Time-Rates Tappers in the 
Member relative to the Non-Member Estates, the differences in the 
spread of the personal earnings between the two types of estates were 
not significant at all. It seems then that what the Union had probably 
achieved was to narrow the spread in the personal earnings dispersions 
in the Member Estates relative to what might have been the case in 
previous years or in relation to the position in the other smaller 
Non-Member Estates but no detailed data on these two aspects are 
available to test this viewpoint.
2.2 Earnings of Occupations by Age
Before discussing the earnings of the occupations by age, 
it is useful to make some preliminary comments on the age-struc-ture 
of the work force in the sample. (In passing, it may be noted here 
that the facts on age-structure will be found useful also in connec­
tion with some of the mobility materials, to be discussed later in 
Chapter 5).
Table 3.6 sums up the main figures. The interesting features
to note in this Table are the following:
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TABLE 3.6
AGE-STRUCTURE3 OF OCCUPATIONS BY SEX AND ESTATES
JULY 1967
No . 15-24
Age
25-36
MEMBERS
-structure
37-46 47-54 55-64
Ave. 
Age
Average
Daily
Earnings
Kanganies 27 - 5 1 10 11 50.4 5.16
Piece-Rates 
Tappers: Men 24 7 14 2 1 - 28.9 4.41
Women 53 16 37 - - - 27.1 4.30
Time-Rates 
Tappers: Men 129 40 24 14 48 3 36.1 3.79
Worn en 77 14 24 28 11 - 34.3 3.61
Factory 
Workers: Men 31 5 10 16 - - 34.7 4.00
Women 3 - - 3 - - 39.0 3.07
Field
Workers: Men 36 20 5 2 4 5 32.1 3 .22
Women 14 - 4 5 5 - 40.5 2.86
NON--MEMBERS
Kanganies 8 - - 5 3 - 44.6 5.14
Piece-Rates 
Tappers: Men 7 1 4 1 1 - 31.9 4.24
Women 14 1 13 - - - 29.6 4.26
Time-Rates 
Tappers: Men 21 7 5 4 5 - 33.4 3.27
Women 8 1 4 3 - - 32.0 2.54
Factory 
Workers: Men 6 - 4 2 - - 36.7 3.23
Women 1 - 1 - - - 31.0 2.50
Field
Workers: Men 20 15 _ _ 2 3 29.5 2.64
Women 5 3 1 - 1 - 25.6 2.23
The reasons for the unevenness of the class-intervals will become 
clearer in Chapter 5 on Mobility.
3
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Though there is quite a large dispersion in the ages of the 
kanganies in the Member Estates, most of them (21/27 or 78%) however 
were 47 and above, and their average age markedly above that of any 
other grade. The dispersion is not as striking in the case of the 
kanganies in the Non-Member Estates, but their average age is also 
higher than that of the other grades in these estates.
In all the other grades in the Member Estates, with the 
exception of the Piece-Rates Tappers who are a special case (the 
reasons for which will become clear in Chapter 5), there is not much 
difference in the average age of the groups, except that it is very 
slightly noticeable that amongst the older workers who were 37 and 
above, the tappers and the factory workers were proportionately 
larger in numbers (120 out of 240 : 50%) whereas the field-workers 
were smaller in numbers (14 out of 50 : 287o) . In the case of the 
Non-Member Estates there is again not too much difference in the 
average age of the workers in the different grades, this time in­
cluding that of the Piece-Rates Tappers ; the point mentioned earlier 
about tappers and factory workers being slightly bunched towards 
those 37 and above relative to the field-workers is also noticeable 
here (15/36 or 46% in the case of the former and 6/25 or 24% in the 
case of the latter) .
Apart from the case of the male and female Piece-Rates 
Tappers, and the male factory workers in the Non-Member Estates, 
who together accounted for less than one-third of the labour-force 
in these estates (27/90 : 30%), the average age of all the other 
grades in the Member Estates exceeded that of each of the rest in 
the Non-Member Estates, reinforcing a point to be made later in 
Chapter 6, when unemployment in the estates is' discussed, that 'wel­
fare' considerations enter as well in the retention of workers on the
payrolls in the Member Estates .
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The influence of age on the earnings of the occupations can 
now be examined. The correlation results of the relationship between 
age and earnings in the individual occupations with sex and estates 
held constant are summarised in Table 3.7. Some of the eighteen
TABLE 3.7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISPERSION IN AVERAGE 
DAILY EARNINGS AND AGE OF WORKERS IN MEMBER 
AND NON-MEMBER ESTATES, JULY 1967
MEMBERS
No .
NON- 
No .
-MEMBERS
Kanganies: Males 27 0.043 8 0.002
Females - - - -
Tappers:
Piece-Rates: Males 24 0.026 7 0.002
Females 53 0.040 14 0.233
Time-Rates: Males 129 0.061 21 0.058
Females 77 0.001 8 0.095
Factory
Workers: Males 31 0.417 6 0.853
Females 3 0.999 1 -
Field
Workers: Males 36 0.298 20 0.205
Females 14 0.123 5 0.902
classes in Table 3.7 are, of course, much too small for correlation 
analysis but the figures recorded suggest fairly conclusively that 
no relationship exists in all cases where the numbers were large 
enough to give significant results, except to a very small extent in 
the case of the male factory workers in the Member Estates. If an 
estate worker, in other words, is to improve his earnings over time 
he or she must move up the occupational hierarchy; in this, age
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plays some but a very negligible part as seen in Table 3.6 and, as 
will become evident when the Occupational Changes are examined in 
Chapter 5.
Tables 3.1 to 3.7 have summarised the bare facts about the 
distribution of earnings in the sample of workers interviewed. These 
facts are discussed further in the next two sections and in Chapter 
4, Section III taking up the notable overall differences between 
earnings on the Member and the Non-Member Estates and Section IV 
discussing the Occupational Differentials in average earnings, while 
Chapter 4 will discuss the differences remaining. However, since so 
many considerations enter in the discussion that follows, some over­
lapping, a little repetition, and some segmentation in the argument 
unfortunately seems unavoidable. Both Chapters 3 and 4 will be 
concerned only with the relativities between (and within) the grades 
distinguished, such discussion as is necessary (and possible) of the 
absolute levels and their trends in recent years being reserved to 
Chapter 10 in Part II.
Ill
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN MEMBER AND 
NON-MEMBER ESTATES
As seen earlier, earnings on the Non-Member Estates were on 
the average significantly lower than those in the Member Estates, 
except for the earnings of the kanganies and the Piece-Rates Tappers.
Neither of the two apparent exceptions, however, was an 
important qualification. In the case of the kanganies,(as will be 
seen later in Chapter 4), personal reasons explain the unusually 
high earnings of two of them in the Non-Member Estates, and this
pulled up their average daily earnings in these estates almost to
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that in the Member Estates. In the case of the Piece-Rates Tappers,
on the other hand, the very trivial differences in their earnings
differentials were accompanied by a greater personal effort put in by
an average tapper in the Non-Member Estates: thus, the estate records
showed that the average task-size (number of trees tapped) of Piece-
Rates Tappers in the Non-Member Estates was 527 relative to that tapped
1by them in the Member Estates which was 435. It is, of course, true 
that task-size differentials between tappers need not always be an 
indication of the differences in the amount of personal effort put in 
by them during work since other factors such as the thickness of the 
bark of the trees (virgin or renewed bark), the terrain of the 
land (flat, hilly or undulating), and the level of tapping (low or 
high), have also to be considered. On the average however, task- 
size differentials between large groups of tappers in fairly homoge­
neous estates probably do reflect differences in the amount of 
personal effort put in by them during work, as seems most likely in 
this sample.
As for the other grades, the earnings differentials were 
all the more significant since the interviews with the management 
suggested that the number of hours of work per day of kanganies, 
factory workers or field-workers were higher in the Member than in the 
Non-Member Estates, averaging around 9 hours in the former and around 
10 hours in the latter. Further, the records also showed that the
Task-size figures are for all tappers in the estates as a whole and 
not just of the tappers in this sample of workers. Attempts were 
made to obtain task-sizes of tappers in the sample during the inter­
views but the results were very poor. The figures for the sample, 
however, would be probably very close to the figures for the 
estates as a whole.
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Time-Rates Tappers in the Non-Member Estates tapped a larger number 
of trees, averaging 496 trees per tapping task, as against 415 trees 
for their counterparts in the Member Estates.
The reason given by all the managers interviewed for this 
quite remarkable difference in earnings was that the Member Estates 
had to comply strictly to the provisions of the Collective Agreements 
negotiated with the Union whereas the Non-Member Estates had a much 
freer hand in setting the rates and terms of employment for the 
workers in their estates.^ But this, of course, is only a proximate 
explanation. One really has to ask how in a situation of extreme 
labour surplus in all the estates studied and more so in the Member 
Estates (as will be described later in Chapter 6) and with better 
non-wage conditions of employment making it unnecessary for them to 
"equalise" differences (Chapter 3), the Member Estates came to accept 
the necessity to pay higher wages than were prevalent on the Non- 
Member Estates in the same locality; and one also has to ask why 
the Union was able to enforce these rates upon the Member Estates 
and not upon the Non-Member Estates.
To discuss these questions in full here would anticipate 
some of the matters to be raised later in Part II, but briefly the 
explanations were related to the following:
1. Though the sample of estates selected was as homogeneous 
as was practically possible, there were some differences still between
The Collective Agreements referred to are: National Union of Planta­
tion Workers and Malayan Planting Industries Employers* Association, 
Collective Agreements, executed on 27th July 1964. Plantation House, 
Petaling Jaya. Five Agreements were signed between the Union and the 
Employers' Association on Wages, Paid Holidays, Hospitalisation Pay, 
Housing Allowances, and an interim one on a 'Fixed Weekly Day of 
Rest'. The one that will be discussed most frequently here is the 
one on wages. This will be referred to in the text as the Wage 
Agreement of 1964: see Appendix B.
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the Member and the Non-Member Estates: the Member Estates were, by
and large, the more efficient estates and were more able to pay higher 
wages. This can be seen from the information summarised in Table 3.8, 
from which it is clear that the margin of profits per pound of rubber 
produced, ex-estate profits per acre, ex-estate profits per tapper, 
and the estimated ex-estate profits per tapper per day per acre were 
all higher in the Member than in the Non-Member Estates.
2. The Union has been prepared, partly because the labour force 
in the Member Estates was more highly unionised (Table 2.2), but more 
as a matter of policy, to push the claims against these estates more 
strongly than against the Non-Member Estates, and that for social- 
political as well as for economic reasons, the Member Estates were 
more willing to give in to the Union's pressures and have not felt it 
wise, so far, to resist these pressures a outrance.
IV
Occupational Differentials
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 had shown that a three-level hierarchical 
structure in the spread of the earnings was a fundamental feature of 
the wage structure in the rubber estates. Very broadly, the average 
size of these differences could be ascribed to the differences in the 
skills and responsibilities of the different types of work performed. 
Kanganies, for instance, performed the most responsible of all the 
estates' jobs open to the manual labour force; they were equivalent 
to junior supervisors such as those employed in the smaller manufac­
turing factories, their tasks including supervising a work-force 
between 15-25 workers, advising them on the correct way of carrying 
out their duties, and ensuring that their subordinates completed the
work expected of them for the day. They also assisted management in
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TABLE 3.8
DIFFERENCES IN PROFITS BETWEEN MEMBER AND
NON-MEMBER ESTATES, JULY 1967
MEMBERS NON-MEMBERS
Absolute Index Absolute Index
Ex-estate average price of 
rubber per lb in cents3 45.41 100 45.31 99.8
Ex-estate average cost of 
production per lb in cents*3 32.40 100 34.50 106.5
MARGIN of profits per lb 13.01 100 10.81 83.1
Ex-estate profits per acre in
$ and cents (yield per acre 
x Margin*5)
11.06 100 8.11 73.3
Ex-estate profits per tapper
per day in $ and cents 
(yield perb tapper x Margin)
4.24 100 3.29 77.6
Ex-estate profits per tapper
per day per acre:c (yield 
per tapper per day per acre 
x Margin)
0.52 100 0.38 73.1
Notes and Sources: 
aData on ex-estate price of rubber is for R.S.S. No.1 grade. Obtained 
from estate records. Weighted averages for Member and Non-Member 
Estates. (See also discussion in Chapter 11 on Profitability Trends 
in the Member Estates). 
bCosts of production, yield per acre and yield per tapper per day in 
July are weighted averages (Table 2.2). Cost figures were standard­
ised and include staff salaries, staff accommodation and transport, 
medical and hospital benefits, fringe benefits, weeding, draining, 
manuring, pruning, labour, materials and general maintenance in 
estate. 
cYield per tapper per day per acre not available in estate records, 
but figures were estimated by using the yield per tapper per day 
information and assuming that an average tapper in the Member 
Estates tapped 8.2 acres and an average tapper in the Non-Member 
Estates tapped 8.7 acres, (assumptions based on Ratio of Mature 
Acreage to total number of tappers in estates: Table 2.2). Using 
this, the yield per tapper per day in the Member Estates was 3.98 
lbs and that for the Non-Member Estates was 3.49 lbs.
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the allocation of tasks to different workers, the resolution of 
conflicts arising from these or from any other sources, and dealing 
with any unruly elements in the estates' work-force. Thus, in the 
recruitment of kanganies, management gave preference to experienced 
men and/or those considered more able than the rest of the work-force, 
to those considered most 'acceptable' by the workers, and occasionally 
also to those considered to be 'physically strong'.
The earnings differentials between the two types of tappers 
reflected partly the usual incentive effects of straight piece-rates 
on the output of workers, but partly also other factors which will be 
discussed later when the 'race differentials' are reviewed in Chapter 
4. The larger size of the differentials between Piece-Rates and 
Time-Rates Tappers in the Non-Member Estates as opposed to that in the 
Member Estates is not easy to explain, but it may be that the manage­
ment in the Member Estates sought to keep these differentials narrow 
for fear of providing the Union an excuse to ask for higher wages 
for the Time-Rates Tappers at the next round of negotiations.
The earnings differentials between the Time-Rates Tappers 
or the factory workers over those of the field-workers also reflected, 
broadly, the differences in the skills or the personal qualities 
required for the different types of work performed. Tapping, for 
instance, was considered an art and required a considerable degree of 
skill in the use of the hand: the skill itself lay mainly in one’s
ability to obtain the maximum amount of latex possible from a given 
tree with the minimum amount of tree wounding or bark consumption, 
and to be able to do this under varying conditions such as under 
different levels of tapping or under different terrain conditions; 
not all estate workers possessed or could acquire this skill. Apart 
from this, tappers were also expected to be those who were more
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regular in their turn-outs, whether for daily tapping, late tapping 
or double tapping,1 so that frequent adjustments of tapping tasks need 
not be carried out and so that the latex is not lost forever (for 
latex once ’lost' when tapping is missed on any day need not always be 
recovered) .
Factory workers,, on the other hand, performed work which 
also required some special personal qualities over and above those 
required of the field-workers. Thus, some aspects of factory work 
required a special knowledge of factory procedures such as those re­
lating to materials-handling or use of first-aid equipment in an 
accident and a knowledge of safety measure procedures. Other aspects 
required a knowledge of simple arithmetic such as for weighing and 
recording latex received during the day or in mixing the required 
amounts of acid and water to the latex received. All of these duties 
demanded that the factory workers be generally more intelligent than 
the field-workers. Some other aspects of their work involved risks, 
such as when using acid or pushing the sheets into the rollers, 
whereas still others required care such as during the cutting and the 
packing of the sheets or drying them in the smoke-house. Like tappers, 
factory workers also had to be the regular types in their turn-outs, 
including when required for overtime work.
Finally, field-work neither involved responsibilities nor 
required skills or any special personal qualities, other than the 
simple one of following simple instructions laid down for weeding, 
digging, cleaning and so on. The exceptions, if any, were those involved
Double tapping involves tapping two different tasks in one day. It 
usually arises when the task not tapped on any one day, because of 
rain or other reasons such as festivals, is done on another day along 
with the usual task for that day. Double tapping usually -commences 
in the afternoon.
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in pruning or work connected with the elimination of pests or root 
diseases who were sometimes paid, on management's initiative, a few 
more cents a day.
Thus, the occupational structure in the estates' labour 
force reflected very broadly a structure in which the more able, 
skilled and more responsible were at the top, and the least able, 
skilled and of whom almost no responsibilities were required at the 
bottom with the others falling in-between; the Occupational Differen­
tials, therefore, reflected broadly these differences.
None of the above, however, could explain the actual size
of the differentials between these grades. This seemed an altogether
more difficult matter. Given the state of the labour market where it
is reasonably certain that supply exceeded the demand in all cases,
no attempt was made (and it is difficult to think how it could have
been made) to relate the ratios of the earnings differentials to the
differences in their marginal productivities and their relative supply 
1
prices. In terms of a fully competitive labour market, one would have 
expected only small differentials in earnings since the differences
Reference to supply prices reminds one of the principle of ’’equalising 
differences". This may be alright in a full employment market but in 
a market saturated with unemployed workers, there can hardly be any 
necessity to stabilise supply to the different grades by "equalising" 
with monetary differentials any non-monetary ones arising out of the 
nature of the job or other personal preferences of the workers. In 
fact, as happenöd here, the monetary and non-monetary differentials 
reinforced each other rather than compensated for each other, with 
field-workers being not only poorly paid but performing the most un­
pleasant tasks while kanganies being not only the best paid but 
performing the most pleasing tasks, and so on with the other grades.
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in skills between the grades were not too wide and since the personal 
preferences of the workers, even on non-monetary grounds alone, seemed 
higher for the higher grades. And with rising unemployment in the 
market, one would have expected declining differentials. But this 
(so far as the evidence goes) did not happen and needs explanation.
One possibility was the general view prevailing in the 
estates that the size of the earnings differentials ought to reflect, 
broadly, the 'status hierarchy' of the different grades. Whether or 
not the 'status hierarchy' was, in the first instance, the result of 
the pecuniary differentials arising out of straight supply and demand 
considerations at some time in the past was not the point; the point 
now was that since it was generally accepted that there was a 'status 
hierarchy', it was also accepted that earnings differentials ought to 
reflect this hierarchy.
Differentials also have, from the management's viewpoint, 
an incentive value. They provide an inducement for those lower down 
to better themselves in their work and aim for promotion, and were 
also a sanction to those higher up to maintain their performances 
since demotion, as will be seen later in Chapter 5, sometimes does 
occur.
Finally, the Union's policy has also been influential in 
maintaining past relativities. This of course affected the Member 
Estates more directly than the Non-Member Estates but the interviews 
suggested that the extent of the differentials in the latter were 
frequently also influenced by those in the former. How this was 
achieved and why it was done needs some elaboration:
The levels of the rates for the kanganies and the factory 
workers have never been specifically negotiated by the Union. The 
rates just 'grew up' and nobody knows when they did. In 1954, the
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NUPW simply accepted the rates prevailing and the extent of the 
relativities between them and the others. Since then, the Union's 
policy was directed at maintaining these relativities as far as was 
possible, or at least this is the impression that emerges when the 
history and the results of its successive rounds of negotiations with 
the MPIEA are discussed later in Chapter 10. The usual procedure in 
these negotiations has been for the greater part of the discussion 
to be devoted to the much more complex arrangements for the largest 
occupational group, the Time-Rates Tappers, and for the other changes 
to be made consequentially, beginning with the second largest group, 
the field-workers, and then going on to the 'other workers' amongst 
whom are included kanganies and factory workers. The Union is cons­
cious of its responsibilities to the workers in all the grades and 
it may be suspected that it is well aware of the difficulties that 
might be caused, to the leadership as well as to the membership in 
the close-knit community of the estates, if one section of its 
members appeared to be favoured unduly at the expense of the rest. 
Thus, since 1954, the Union has bargained for the incorporation 
within the Collective Agreements provisions for approximately equi­
valent percentage changes in the rates of field-workers and the 
'other categories' of workers once those of the Time-Rates Tappers 
have been negotiated. To the extent that these 'equivalent percen­
tage changes' can be determined once the rates of the Time-Rates 
Tappers have been negotiated, such provisions must have had some 
effects in maintaining the relativities between the grades. But 
two factors make it impossible to determine the exact extent of the 
influence of the Union's policy: firstly, the trends in the earnings
of the four grades need not always parallel the trends in their rates 
(but no information can be obtained on these), and secondly, there
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are also difficulties in determining these 'equivalent percentage 
changes', which will become clear when the results of the successive 
Agreements since 1954 are discussed in some detail in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER 4
WAGE STRUCTURE (continued) 
I
The detailed presentation and discussion of the earnings 
data from the sample is completed in this chapter by an examination 
of the differences in earnings within each of the main categories of 
workers on the Member and the Non-Member Estates. Since the dis­
cussion of these remaining dispersions is fairly complex in the case 
of the Tappers and very straightforward in the case of the others, 
the latter will be dealt with first very briefly in Section II, 
and the Time- and Piece-Rates Tappers thereafter in detail in 
Sections III and IV. In Section V, a comparison of the two types 
of tappers will be made'wi'th special reference to the 'race differen­
tial' with which it iS often connected.
II
1. Kanganies
Kanganies have a little hierarchy of their own with tapping, 
factory and field kanganies in descending order of average daily 
earnings: $5.70, $4.65 and $4.53 respectively. This undoubtedly
reflected general opinion amongst managers and workers that there 
were differences in the skills and responsibilities required of those 
performing these three types of work. The Union too has not sought 
to disturb these differences.
On Member Estates, the hierarchy and the numbers within 
each (given in brackets) were as follows: $5.74 (14), $4.95 (5) and
$4.29 (8). The pay of kanganies is not specified in the Wage Agree­
ment of 1964, the main reasons probably being that the number of
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kanganies were too small and their duties fairly varied between estates 
that it was difficult to bargain a standard rate for them on an 
industry-wide basis. In the six Member Estates studied here, their 
duties were however very similar. The pay in these estates was com­
pounded of daily rates and supplementary rates; both were bargained 
with the Estate Union-Management Committees1 and in consultation with 
their Planting Adviser, the former equivalent to $4.10, $3.70 and 
$3.50 for the three types of kanganies and the latter were overtime 
rates equivalent to time and a half for factory and field kanganies 
and output earnings for tapping kanganies, which was dependent upon 
the amount of rubber produced in the fields under their supervision.
There were, of course, dispersions within each of the three 
sub-groups, ranging from $4.23 to $7.11 in the case of the tapping 
kanganies, $3.79 to $6.15 with factory and $3.57 to $4.61 with field 
kanganies. These dispersions reflected mainly the differences in the 
amounts earned on overtime or output earnings, the opportunities for 
earning these being dependent upon the seniority of the kanganies 
(newly-promoted kanganies being given lesser opportunities) and 
favouritism by managers.
On Non-Member Estates, the pay arrangements were similar in 
that it comprised of daily rates, overtime rates and output earnings. 
The rates however were relatively lower for each of these three sub­
groups (as found earlier for the other grades in the Non-Member 
Estates: Table 3.3, p. 47) than those in the Member Estates, the
1As will be seen later in Chapter 10, the Estate Union-Management 
Committees were set up in March 1955 by arrangement between the 
Union and the Association, their main function being to discuss 
problems of mutual concern at the estate level. These Committees 
must be distinguished from the Estate Union Committees which con­
sist only of Union officials and whose sole function is to collate 
workers' grievances and bring these up to management for discussion 
in the Union-Management Committees.
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daily rates being $3.90, $3.50 and $3.30 for the three types of 
kanganies. These rates were set by management in consultation 
with their Planting Adviser. There were Estate Union Committees in 
existence in these estates but no formal Estate Union-Management 
Committees to discuss the rates set; management retained the right 
to discuss (or not) any issues with the workers' representatives.
The numbers in this sample are too small (and also because 
the sample turned out to be freakish) that no further examination 
of dispersions is possible. Thus, there were only four tapping, 
two factory and two field kanganies and one amongst the four tapping 
and one amongst the two field kanganies were those who were related 
to the proprietors of the estates and so earned exceptionally high 
rates per day. Because of this, the hierarchy in terms of average 
daily earnings does not stand out, this being $5.75, $3.90 and $5.50 
for the three types of kanganies. If the two relatives were removed, 
the hierarchy would have been as follows: $4.61, $3.90 and $3.50.
2 . Factory Workers
The details of the dispersions of earnings in this small 
sample were given in Table 3.5 (p. 50) and need not be repeated here.
On Member Estates, the provisions of the Wage Agreement of 
1964 did not lay down specific rates for factory workers. However, a 
Sex Differential in rates has long been in existence. The Union, 
though opposed to these differentials in principle, has accepted 
them for the time being presumably because of the relatively small 
number of factory workers (especially amongst women) in the estates. 
In July 1967, the daily rates were $3.30 for men and $2.90 for women 
in the estates, the rates having been negotiated initially in the 
Estate Union-Management Committees in consultation with the Planting
Adviser in the Agency House. The differences in the types of work
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customarily done in the factories by the two sexes have been the 
employers' main argument for the differences in the rates and this 
was substantiated by field observations. Thus, women were usually 
allocated easier tasks in the factory such as cleaning floors or 
washing tanks whereas men carried out the harder tasks such as 
rolling sheets into the machines or placing them on the racks in 
the smoke-houses. The differences in the total earnings between men 
and women were further widened by the amounts they earned on overtime, 
the former earning an average of 0.70 cents a day and the latter only 
0.17 cents a day, the reason being that men were preferred to women 
for,-overtime work. It was noticed that four men and one woman were 
paid less than file daily rates, the reason being that these workers 
either turned up late for duty during the day or were penalised for 
poor performances in the previous month. Within each sex, the dis­
persions arose because of differences in the amount of overtime 
earnings earned, older workers generally being given some preference 
in number of overtime hours allocated but other factors such as 
discrimination by management on personal preferences or that one or 
two factory workers were occasionally called upon to do extra work 
(and so earned more) also played a part.
On Non-Member Estates, the Sex Differentials and the dis­
persions amongst the male workers (there being only one female 
factory worker in this sample) can be explained on the same grounds, 
these estates merely following the practices of the Member Estates 
(but setting lower rates: $3.00 a day for men, and $2.50 a day for
women). There were two male factory workers who were paid below the 
basic rate, the reasons being similar to those explained earlier for 
those in the Member Estates.
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3. Field Workers
The field workers (for dispersions, see Table 3.5, p. 50) 
were larger in numbers than either the kanganies or the factory 
workers. Doubtless because of this, the Wage Agreement of 1964 
laid down detailed daily rates for those employed in the Member 
Estates. The Agreement however made no mention of overtime rates.
By past practice, overtime rates were negotiated at the Estate Union- 
Management Committee levels and, in July 1967, this was at time and 
a half in the six Member Estates. The daily rates fluctuated with 
the price of rubber and the Retail Price Index but so long as the 
former remained between 60 and 70 cents a pound and the latter 
within the range of 90-125 respectively, the rates for an eight- 
hour work were as follows: Men: 16-54 years $3.10, 55 and over $2.90
Women: 16-49 years $2.50, 50 and over $2.30; Men and Women; Under 
16 $2.30, Non-able-bodied workers $2.30. Nothing was laid down as 
to what happened if the price of rubber fell below 60 cents a pound 
but if it went over 70 cents a pound a Price Bonus of 2 cents per 
day worked for each whole cent by which the price exceeded 70 cents 
would be paid. Also, the rates were increased or decreased by 10 
cents for every 10 points or part thereof by which the Retail Price 
Index rose above 125 or fell below 90. (The Retail Price Index was 
based on the average price of a selected list of commodities and 
the surveys were conducted by the Department of Statistics).
The main point to note is that inequality of rates between 
the sexes has been accepted in the Agreement, other differentials in 
rates being not as significant. The explanation for the Sex Differen 
tial in rates was that women were allocated the easier tasks in the 
field such as cleaning, weeding or manuring but men performed the 
harder tasks such as digging, pruning or spraying. Where this was
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observed not to be the case (during the field observations), manage­
ment explained that it had become 'customary' to pay women lower 
rates or that it was 'administratively convenient' to have uniform 
rates for all workers in one sex within certain age-groups irrespec­
tive of the types of work they performed.
The sample included thirty-one men between 16-54, two of 
whom earned less than the daily rate. This, of course, was against 
the terms of the Agreement: the Estate Union Committees 'allowed' it
because the two workers were actually redundant but were employed so 
that they could maintain their dependents who had no other sources 
of income. Others in this age-group earned up to $3.98 a day, the 
additional income above the daily rates arising mainly out of over­
time pay or because some workers performed some special duties in the 
month such as standing-in for regular kanganies on sick leave. There 
were five men over 55, all of whom received less than the daily rates, 
the reason being similar to that elaborated earlier, namely, employed 
on humanitarian grounds. Finally, there were eleven women between 
16-49 and three over 50 in the sample, all of whom earned above the 
daily rates, some up to $3.10 a day because of additional overtime 
pay.
It is interesting to note that though provision for persons 
below 16 and for non-able-bodied workers existed in the Wage Agreement, 
the field observations indicated that they formed a very small portion 
of the total labour force in the estates, none of whom came into this 
sample.
On Non-Member Estates, the daily rates were $2.30 for men 
and $2.00 for women, irrespective of their ages. These were set by 
management in consultation with their Planting Adviser, but were not 
discussed with the Estate Union Committees. Except for one male
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worker between 16-54 who earned less than the daily rate because he 
was a new recruit and still on probation, all the rest earned at 
least the equivalent of the daily rate, some up to $3.38 because of 
overtime pay.
Ill
Time-Rates Tappers
The Time-Rates (or Checkroll) Tappers are much the largest 
and the most important part of the work-force of any estate. They 
are indeed the essential 'producers' of the rubber industry and the 
whole operation of an estate centres upon organizing their work of 
tapping, collection of the latex, and its processing later in the 
factory. It is to be expected then that the determination of their 
earnings would be the most carefully considered and hard-fought-out 
part of the whole wage system in the industry and that all other 
wages are treated almost as side issues.
Tapping, as already seen, is a skilled occupation and it 
is also a responsible one in the sense that the tapper must get on 
with his job without being continually under the close inspection 
of his superiors. It is natural then that some element of piece- 
rates should be introduced into his pay to encourage steady and res­
ponsible execution of his daily defined task. The term 'time-rates' 
is largely a misnomer for the present pay arrangements on both the 
Member and Non-Member Estates, but it reflects the common desire of 
the employers and the Union (or workers) that the general aim ought 
to be that competent tappers should earn approximately the same 
amount for the same hours of work.
The technical conditions in the industry, however, make
attainment of this objective very difficult. There is great diversity
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of yield of latex from trees of different ages and types as well as 
much variety in slope of ground, distances from collecting-points 
and systems of tapping. It is not to be wondered at that the wage 
system has become very complex, and that a fair spread of earnings 
still exists. Nor has its complexity been diminished by the effects 
of the Union to introduce some element of profit-sharing into the 
system by tying rates to the market price of rubber above certain 
levels .
With changing technical and bargaining situations the system 
has been altered over the last few years (so much so as will be con­
fessed later in Chapter 10) that it is virtually impossible to infer 
the trend of average daily earnings from the terms of the successive 
Agreements. But at the time of this survey, the earnings of the 
Time-Rates Tappers in the Member Estates were governed by the Wage 
Agreement of 1964 which also influenced the wage system for such 
tappers in the Non-Member Estates, and it is from this Agreement that 
the main explanations must be sought for the facts revealed in the 
sample of workers interviewed.
1. Member Estates
To explain the facts observed in Tables 3.5 (p. 50) and 3.7 (p. 54) 
requires first a clear understanding of the method of computation of 
the earnings of Time-Rates Tappers as laid down in the Wage Agreement 
of 1964. The method comprised the following:
1. A Guaranteed Factor which was a daily minimum amount that 
was paid to each tapper for each day that he or she was offered work, 
irrespective of age or sex, or the size of the task allocated, and
74
so long as he or she completed his or her duties.1 The Guaranteed 
Factor was also paid on days when a 'washout' occurred, that is, when 
rain has interrupted further tapping after the commencement of tapping 
and so prevents tappers from completing their normal duties. The 
amount was equivalent to $2.55 a day so long as the average monthly 
price of rubber was between 60 and 70 cents a pound and so long as 
the Retail Price Index range was between 90-125. The Price Bonus 
(see 2 below) applied when the price of rubber exceeded 70 cents a 
pound, though nothing was stated as to what happened when the price 
fell below 60 cents. The assumption seemed to be that when this 
occurred, a new amount would be re-negotiated, with the Union choosing 
to believe that when such negotiations began, the productivities per 
acre would have risen and there would then be no case for a reduction 
of the Guaranteed Factor. The amount varied with changes in the 
Retail Price Index, increasing or decreasing by 10 cents for every 10 
points or part thereof by which the Index rose above 125 or fell 
below 90.
2. A Price Bonus which was equivalent to 2 cents per day worked 
for each whole cent by which the price of rubber exceeded 70 cents a 
pound.
3. An Output Factor which was made up of a Scrap Element and a 
Latex Element. The Scrap Element was equivalent to 4 cents a pound 
(wet weight) for scrap brought in by a tapper. The Latex Element 
arose out of the rate per pound paid to each tapper for each pound
Tappers' duties generally covered the following: completion of task-
sizes allocated; maintenance of minimum standards of tapping and 
collection of latex, such as keeping to the required depth of tapping, 
or amount; of bark consumption allowed and avoidance of free wounding 
or accumulation of dirt during collection; collection of scrap and 
cup lump; keeping trees, spouts, cups and buckets clean; maintaining 
side channels; and monthly spot marking.
75
of rubber brought in by him in excess of an average assessed yield
for a given category of fields, frequently termed as the 'excess 
1
yield'. For this purpose, all the fields in an estate, other than 
those newly brought into tapping or those declassified, were classi­
fied by the Agreement (after negotiations between the Union and the 
Association) into three main categories (A, B, C), according to the 
provisions of the 1959 Wage Agreement which took into account the 
year of planting of the trees, the materials planted with, and their 
average yields per acre (see Chapter 10). The rate per pound and 
the assessed yield varied between these fields: 8, 10, 12 cents a
pound and 14, 8, 4 pounds for A, B and C fields respectively. If 
tappers were asked to commence tapping later than 10.00 a.m. (other 
than double-tapping) a Late Tapping Element was incorporated into 
the Latex Element by increasing the rates per pound on the 'excess 
yield' to 10, 13 and 16 cents a pound, the assessed yields still re­
maining the same. The Agreement also made provision for subsequent 
changes in the classification of fields arising out of changes in 
their yields per acre during the life of the Agreement.
Fields newly brought into tapping or those declassified had 
special provisions. This is because the former requires very careful 
tapping and task-sizes may therefore have to be lower which may affect 
the earnings of the tappers in these fields, whereas the yields per acre 
in the latter are very much below the average in an average estate and 
a piece-rate system would probably spur the tappers to increase produc­
tivity in thes<e fields. Thus, areas newly brought into tapping are
1
The 'excess yield' was calculated monthly, not daily. Thus a short­
fall on the assessed yield on any day worked would be set off against 
the 'excess yield' brought in on other days in the month for the 
purposes of calculating the amount of 'excess yield' brought in 
that month.
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classified into Category A as soon as the yield per acre or the yield 
per -tapper justified such classification but in the meantime the 
tappers in these fields were paid at suitable daily or poundage rates 
(piece-rates). These rates were based on the average daily earnings 
of tappers in Category A fields on the estate or when there are no 
Category A fields on the estate, on the earnings of a tapper for a 
daily poundage of 24 pounds of latex (dry rubber content) in Category 
A fields; this amount is generally considered to be the 'average' 
for tappers in these fields. Tappers in declassified fields were 
paid at suitable poundage rates too provided that the average daily 
earnings of a tapper in such fields were not allowed to fall below 
the amount of the Guaranteed Factor and further that the piece-rates 
set were not less than the equivalent of the average daily earnings 
for latex (dry rubber content) of tappers in these fields divided by 
their average yield per tapper before declassification.
Finally, tappers called upon to apply stimulants (hormones 
used to increase yields of trees) were considered to be engaged beyond 
their normal duties and were therefore to be paid additional wages, 
the actual amounts however left to management's discretion but gene­
rally negot iated with the Estate Union Committees. There were no 
provisions in the Agreement for any other form of additional payment 
such as for 'ladder tapping' or 'long latex carrying'^ but, as will 
become evident later in this chapter, this did not prevent the Estate 
Union Committees from making local arrangements with their management.
'Ladder tapping' means tapping at levels from.60 to 120 inches in 
height when the use of ladders is required: 'long latex carrying'
means, if explanation is necessary, carrying the latex for an 
exceptionally long distance to the factory or to the nearest loading 
station.
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The Agreement does not specify much on implementation at 
estate levels, except that the Estate Union Committees could make 
representation to management if they considered that any field should 
be reclassified under its provisions. By past practice, however, such 
consultation has always been held in these six Member Estates.
A question that arises is related to the general objective 
of such a complicated wage system. Apart from ensuring that tappers 
can share in the trends towards increased productivities in the 
estates (or possibly in any increased prosperity because of increases 
in rubber prices) and also to ensure that a certain minimum wage was 
earned that was relatively free of rubber price fluctuations, the 
system was also designed to prevent the diversity of technical condi­
tions between fields with widely varying productivities causing equally 
unequitable diversity of earnings possibilities, as will become 
evident later in Part II. Thus, the Guaranteed Factor and the Price 
Bonus were equal in amounts for all the Time-Rates Tappers and they 
therefore reduced to that extent the possibilities of any earnings 
differentials arising from these sources.
The amounts earned on the Latex Element formed a significant 
proportion of a Time-Rates Tapper's earnings (averaging 25% but going 
up to 70 - 80% in a few cases) and could, therefore, cause wide earn­
ing differentials between the tappers. The method adopted for setting 
the rates per pound on the 'excess yield' and the assessed yield for 
the different categories of fields, however, reduced its potentiali­
ties. Thus, as seen earlier, the assessed yield and the rate per 
pound on the 'excess yield' varied in amounts between the different 
categories of fields, a deliberate attempt being made to set a higher 
assessed yield and a lower rate per pound on the 'excess yield' for 
fields whose productivity was high, such as for Budded or Clonal
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Areas, and a lower average assessed yield combined with a higher rate 
of pound on the ’excess yield' being set for fields whose productivity 
was low, such as for Old Seedling Rubber areas. The effect of this was 
that tappers allocated their tasks in the higher yielding areas or in 
the lower-yielding areas were not put in at an unduly advantageous or 
disadvantageous position. Similarly, the treatment of 'new fields' 
as Category A fields and 'old' as Category C fields were designed to 
achieve this same objective.
But there were so many factors involved in the organisation 
of tapping tasks that the objective of levelling-off dispersions in 
earnings could not be perfectly attained and, as seen earlier in 
Table 3.5 (p . 50), a wide spread in earnings still existed. Thus,
task-size differences produced variations in yields between tappers 
and so affected their earnings differentials. The Union has attempted 
to negotiate a standard task-size and its equivalents for all tappers, 
but the estate is a complex unit: with wide differences in terrain
conditions, age of trees and its effects on thickness of bark, levels 
of tapping and size of tapping cuts, it is virtually impossible to 
'standardize' task-sizes perfectly. Differences in task-sizes, even 
within given category of fields, have therefore persisted.
While the method of computing the Latex Element has had some 
effects on levelling-off dispersions, the method itself could not take 
into account the wide differences in yields per acre within a given 
category of fields, and these have affected earnings differentials 
as well.
The amounts earned on the Scrap Element, though forming only 
a small proportion of the total daily earnings of a Time-Rates Tapper 
(averaging 10%), nevertheless had some effects as well. Similarly, not 
all had the opportunity of earning additional income through the appli­
cation of yield stimulants .
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A number of other factors, some not specifically provided
for in the Agreement, have had their effects too. Thus, a few tappers
were occasionally called upon to act as tapping-kanganies in place of
the regular ones who could be away on sick leave, while others were
engaged in 'ladder tapping' or 'long latex carrying', and so received
additional wages for that period in the month: these, too, were
negotiated with the Estate Union Committees. Others, at the lower
end of the scale, were penalised by a reduction in rates because of
excessive tree wounding or bark consumption during tapping (thereby
1reducing the life of the trees), or because of shallow tapping.
Three male tappers were employed simply on humanitarian grounds, and 
were paid below the rates negotiated in the Agreement.
The influence of tapping skill between tappers, when all 
other factors are constant, is still another factor causing the dis­
persion in earnings. Tapping skill is usually exhibited via the 
depth of tapping, the angle of the cut and the amount of bark con­
sumed per cut; differences in the amount of care and time taken 
during collection and delivery to the factory or the loading station, 
keeping tapping knives sharpened, spouts and cups clean, are also 
believed to have marginal influences on yields between tappers when 
all else is constant, and so have affected the spread in earnings.
It is in the context of all these that the explanation for 
the absence of any relationship between the Time-Rates Tapper's earn­
ings and his or her age and sex must be found. The Agreement, as noted, 
contains no provisions relating tappers ' pay to age or sex, in this
Shallow tapping arises because some tappers, for personal reasons, 
were in a hurry on certain days and so did shallow (instead of the 
full depth) tapping to save time. Shallow tapping results in loss 
of latex.
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contrasting sharply with the provisions for field workers. The field 
observations also showed that the Estate Union Committees have been 
successful in ensuring that the allocation of tasks to fields and of 
task-sizes were not on the basis of the tapper's age or sex but on 
the basis of his or her ability to complete any task in a given field. 
Thus, differentials were minimised. The marginal differentials that 
still existed arose from the fact that only males and those around the 
middle ages were usually asked to apply stimulants or engaged in 
'ladder tapping' and 'long latex carrying'.
2. Non-Member Estates
Similarly, to explain the facts observed in Tables 3.5 (p . 50) 
and 3.7 (p . 54) requires first an understanding of the method of
computation of the earnings of Time-Rates Tappers in these estates.
The method was more or less copied from that in the Agreement for the 
Member Estates but with some minor modifications.
It also comprised a Guaranteed Factor, the amount being 
$2.25 a day for male and $2.15 a day for female tappers for a similar 
price-zone and a similar Retail Price Index range as in the case of 
the Member Estates. The Guaranteed Factor was reduced by 20 cents a 
day worked for every complete 10 cents or part thereof by which the 
price of rubber fell below this level up to 40 cents a pound, nothing 
being stated as to what happened if the price fell below 40 cents, 
management implying that it was "obvious" then that the Guaranteed 
Factor would have to be reduced further. Also, on 'washout' days, the 
Guaranteed Factor was not paid but instead the tappers were paid on 
straight piece-rates, the total amounts earned however being kept 
below the amount of the Guaranteed Factor. The Scrap Element, the 
classification of fields and the Latex Element were all similar except 
that there was no Late Tapping Element in the last. The Price Bonus
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was differently computed, the amount being the equivalent of 20 
cents a day worked for every complete 10 cents by which the price of 
rubber exceeded 10 cents a pound. Nothing specific on 'ladder 
tapping' or 'long latex carrying' was laid down: the interviews
suggested that "sometimes" extra wages were paid, "at other times" 
the task-sizes were correspondingly reduced. Also, nothing specific 
on additional wages for the application of stimulants was mentioned. 
There were no formal Estate Union-Management Committees to discuss 
on the implementation aspects but management sometimes discussed 
some grievances with the Estate Union Committees set up on an ad hoc 
basis.
The general objective of this method was also similar to 
the extent that it sought to level-off dispersions in earnings, but 
the rates were kept lower than those prevailing in the Member Estates. 
The absence of the Age Differentials here can be explained on the 
same grounds as in the Member Estates but the marked Sex Differentials 
(in contrast to that in the Member Estates) arose out of the differ­
ences in the Guaranteed Factor and the practice of giving women smaller 
task-sizes.
The spread was also influenced by similar factors as those 
outlined in the case of the Time-Rates Tappers in the Member Estates, 
such as some acting as kanganies, some paid below the rates set (two 
men and four women) and task-size differences, except that no one was 
known to have earned additional wages from the application of stimu­
lants or because of 'ladder tapping' and 'long latex carrying'.
It is perhaps worth remarking here that the similarity of 
the wage-systems in the Member and Non-Member Estates is the clearest 
proof of the indirect influence of the Union on the Non-Member Estates' 
wage structure, a point mentioned at the beginning of the discussion
on the spread in the earnings of the Time-Rates Tappers.
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Piece-Rates Tappers
The Piece-Rates (or Contract) Tappers perform functions as 
important as those of the Time-Rates Tappers except, of course, that 
they form a much smaller proportion of the estates' labour-force.
On the rubber estates in West Malaysia they are organised in two 
ways: in one, the management makes an agreement with a contractor
to provide labour to tap a certain area and makes block payments to 
the contractor who then pays the individual tappers on a straight 
piece-rate basis; in the other, the management contracts directly 
with the individual tapper and pays him by results. The second type 
is much less common and, in the estates studied, only the first type 
prevailed. In this first type the contractor does the hiring, firing, 
setting task-sizes and allocation of tappers to fields (with the 
Estate Union Committees having little or no say), but the extent of 
his freedom in setting the rates is restricted, as can be seen in 
the discussion below.
On the Member Estates, the terms of the Wage Agreement of 
1964 dealing with Contract Tappers are very broad, specifying only 
that the block payment to be made to the contractor must be suffi­
cient "to enable him to observe the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement in respect of workers employed by him on the estate"
(Clause 5). This meant that the rate per pound must be so calculated 
that a Contract Tapper working the equivalent of a task for a Time- 
Rates Tapper on any field in the estate ought to be able to earn at 
least the equivalent of the Guaranteed Factor. The clause was in­
corporated, as the Union put it, to prevent the exploitation of 
Contract Tappers by management but, as the Association put it, to
IV
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prevent competition by unemployed workers seeking jobs in the 
estates at lower wages.
In practice, the problem of a minimum amount seldom arose 
because the method of setting piece-rates ensured that the average 
Contract Tapper earned more than the average Time-Rates Tapper under 
given conditions. Thus, one main principle taken into account in 
determining the rates per pound was that relative to the earnings 
of the Time-Rates Tapper under similar conditions, that of a Piece- 
Rates Tapper was always to be higher. But, however, it ought not 
to be too high so as to give the Union too strong a case for higher 
earnings for Checkroll Tappers at the next round of negotiations.
Attempts were also made to eliminate the influence of the 
difference in the productivities between fields from creating an 
unequitable spread in earnings in order to reduce grievances amongst 
tappers. Hence, the rates per pound were so set that they also 
varied with the productivities of the different fields, higher rates 
being set for the lower yielding areas and lower rates for the higher 
yielding areas. The survey, for instance, showed the following varia­
tions in the piece-rates to tappers in the Member Estates:
Minimum Maximum
Budded or Clonal Areas 14 cents per pound 21 cents per pound
Old Seedling Rubber Areas 18 cents per pound 25 cents per pound
But, as already seen earlier, the organisation of tapping 
tasks involved much more, and dispersions in earnings continued to arise 
for similar reasons elaborated earlier, such as because of differences 
in task-sizes (even within given fields), 'ladder tapping' or 'long 
latex carrying', penalties for excessive tree wounding and bark con­
sumption or shallow tapping, and differences in tapping skill and
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care in collection and delivery of latex to the factory or nearest 
loading station. The fact that there were no significant differen­
tials in earnings by sex or age was simply because such factors as those 
that affected dispersions were randomly spread, and not by age or 
sex.
On the Non-Member Estates, there is very little more to add 
by way of method of setting the rates and causes of the dispersions 
except that lesser attention is paid to the Union's minimum-wage 
concept or to its influence on restraining management from paying 
the better tappers higher daily earnings, thereby contributing to 
the much wider dispersions in earnings amongst Piece-Rates Tappers 
in these estates.
V
Race Differentials
In Malaysia, race enters into discussion of so many things 
that some comments on its alleged role in the rubber industry may be 
appropriate at this point. Allegations about the importance of race 
arises mainly in connection with the differences in earnings between 
the Time-Rates and the Piece-Rates Tappers since the Indians dominate 
in the former and the Chinese in the latter. Curiously, but presumably 
because they are so few in the larger estates, references to 'race 
differentials' in the estates usually ignore the existence of the 
Malays. Much has been said and written on these differentials with 
almost all agreeing that their causes were mainly related to racial 
discrimination. As illustrations, the following quotations will be 
of interest:
In a memorandum submitted by some Indian estate workers to 
the Representative of the Government of India in Malaya in 1948
after having organised themselves, their trade union wrote,
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'\Ve, in our humble way, organised this union to suit the 
circumstances now prevailing in order to obtain fair treatment from
the hands of the employers . .....  What we have achieved is that
we have inspired the members of the necessity of a union in the 
first place, and a single union for Indian workers in the second>
Many people tried to convince us that trade unions should be organised 
on a trade basis, and not on a communal basis. We are not convinced 
that this method of organizing on a trade basis will be beneficial to 
the Indians under the present existing conditions. The scale of 
wages to workers in Malaya is worked out on a racial basis. Until 
this differential treatment is abolished, it is most essential that 
the Indian workers should be separately organized. This differential 
treatment is a social injustice."
Later, writing on the conditions of labour on the Malayan 
estates, the Representative of the Government of India commented, 
inter alia, that:
"Though Indian and Chinese labourers have a similar status
in the country as immigrant people ..... The principle of equal
pay for equal work is not only ignored directly, but is further evaded 
by the denial of equal opportunity through a uniform system and prac­
tice of employment" (meaning that the Indian tappers were employed only 
on Time-Rates and denied the opportunity of being on Piece-Rates 
even if they wished to be).^
Almost twenty years later, the workers interviewed in this 
sample still complained of racial discrimination by employers in wage
^Quoted in Gamba, Charles, The National Union of Plantation Workers:
The History of the Plantation Workers of Malaya, 1946-1958, Donald 
Moore, Singapore, 1962, p.18 and pp.34-37.
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determination in the rubber estates. The number of Malays in the 
sample is too small to make it possible to consider whether any 
evidence of favouritism or otherwise towards them in the matter of 
earnings can be detected. (It will however be suggested in the next 
Chapter that, as a matter of policy, management have somewhat favoured 
them in respect of job opportunities or promotional prospects). The 
number of Chinese in the sample is much more significant, but since 
they are all, and no Indians are, on Piece-Rates, the issue of race 
discrimination essentially rests upon whether the higher earnings 
of these Piece-Rates Tappers represents a genuinely 'racial ' 
difference.
The survey data brought out clearly the fact of the differ­
ences in earnings (Table 3.5, p.50). Thus, on the Member Estates, 
the male Piece-Rates Tappers averaged 16% and the female 19% more than 
their Time-Rates counterparts, and on the Non-Member Estates (where 
the numbers are too small to make the exact differences very signifi­
cant) the differences were much larger, 30% and 68% respectively. 
Except for the occasional casual tappers employed temporarily who 
were not entitled to non-wage benefits, all the other tappers whether 
on Time- or Piece-Rates were eligible for similar fringe benefits in 
both the Member and the Non-Member Estates or were given their equi­
valents in cash (such as a housing allowance in lieu of accommoda­
tion). Thus, the differentials are genuine and are not cancelled off 
by non-wage disadvantages.
But against these differentials must be set the important 
facts that the Piece-Rates Tappers have larger task-sizes (so produced 
higher yields per tapper) and less job security. Thus, the task-sizes 
and yields per tapper of Piece-Rates Tappers in the Member Estates
averaged 435 and 33.4 pounds (latex), in the Non-Member Estates 527
87
and 31.4 pounds (latex), which exceeded those of the Time-Rates 
Tappers by 5%, 4%, 6% and 6% respectively. On job security, since 
Piece-Rates Tappers were generally employed via third-party contrac­
tors and not considered as part of the permanent labour-force their 
employment could be terminated at anytime, unlike the Time-Rates 
Tappers who were considered as part of the permanent labour-force 
and who also, if Union members, came directly under the Union's pro­
tection, for instance on matters pertaining to dismissals.'*' The 
total number of days worked in any one year, according to managers 
interviewed, probably was about equal and so had no significant 
influence on the differentials in earnings. These factors therefore 
make it difficult to determine exactly whether in terms of 'net 
advantages' the average Chinese tapper was really 'better off' than 
the average Indian tapper. Even the workers themselves sometimes 
seemed uncertain when questioned in depth.
However, such differences in their pay packets still gave 
rise to grievances and jealousies. One main complaint amongst the 
Indian tappers was that they were unfairly allocated lower task-sizes 
while the interviews suggested that most were actually unwilling to 
tap larger task-sizes, they also showed that a few were willing but 
were not given the opportunities to do so. Another was that Indians 
who wanted to be employed on Piece-Rates often found it impossible 
because the contractors preferred Chinese tappers. Such grievances 
suggest that some element of racial discrimination probably exists.
^Thus, one of the clauses in the Collective Agreements, 1964 (namely 
Clause 5 of the Agreement on Paid Holidays) states, It is hereby 
agreed that instead of dismissing a worker for misconduct, the 
Estate Management may agree to the forfeiture of part or even the 
whole of the accrued holiday due to him but, where the worker is 
a member of the Union (more Time-Rates Tappers are relative to 
Piece-Rates Tappers), such action shall be agreed with a Trade 
Union Official of not less status than that of a full-time 
official of the Union".
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But since purely economic considerations have gone quite 
far in explaining the 'racial' differences in earnings within this 
sample, the absence of any detailed specific analysis of racial dis­
crimination and of racial differences in these two chapters seems 
to be justified. But this is not to deny that the existence of 
the Piece-Rates Tappers as a distinct corps in the estate labour- 
force and as a distinct part of the wage structure does not stem 
from distinct differences in the culture and sociology of the 
different races in Malaysia or from discriminatory practices in 
the labour market. They do and some of these will become evident 
when the mobility and employment records of the sample are 
examined in the chapter following.
IV
This and the previous chapter have completed the descrip­
tion and discussion of the earnings structure in the estates studied. 
In the two following chapters the findings on mobility, employment 
and unemployment will be set out. A summary of conclusions reached 
here will be postponed until Chapter 7 when these additional data
have been presented.
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CHAPTER 5
LABOUR MOBILITY 
I
As related earlier, the objective of this study was to 
present a detailed account of the wage structure on the estates 
studied and much of the information obtained from the field, 
therefore, related to the current earnings of the sample of workers. 
Factual information, however, was also collected about the past 
histories of employment and unemployment of the workers inter­
viewed, and there was also some general discussion with the workers 
on their knowledge of labour market conditions and on their atti­
tudes towards changing jobs. This information is extremely rele­
vant to the discussion of the wage structure in the rubber estates 
and will also sharpen the picture of the labour market being 
examined. In view of this, the information will be discussed in 
some detail here. In the present chapter, the facts about the past 
mobility or otherwise of the sample will be given and analysed, 
while those about unemployment being reserved for that following.
Some preliminary comments and definitions will have to 
be first discussed. Work on the rubber estates has for long been 
influenced by seasonal and other fluctuations in the amount of 
employment available, brought about by changes in weather (and its 
effects on production) and changes in prices of rubber. Because 
of this, short periods of lay-offs and short periods of employment 
on different types of work in the estates are not very unusual.
This makes it almost impossible to collect and record conveniently 
any detailed account of employment records going back many years.
The questions asked in the present survey went back to 1946 in the
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case of those who were 15 in that year and to age 15 in the case of
those workers below 37 in 1967, 15 being the age at which it was
1assumed that they entered the work-force. For enquiries going back 
so far, rather simple and crude definitions had to be used. The 
data about employment histories has been analysed in terms of 
'Changes of Jobs' and 'Changes of Occupations', both terms being 
used in rather special senses here.
A 'Job' is taken to mean 12 or more days of employment in 
one month for a continuous period of 3 months or more, the 12 days 
being inserted partly to keep in line with the Ministry of Labour's 
practice in its annual Surveys on Wages and Employment in the rubber 
estates (pp. 14-15,Chap. 2) and partly, together with the 3 months' 
stipulation, to avoid considering odd jobs arising from part-time or 
casual work here and there done in-between changing their regular 
jobs. Thus, a 'Change of Job' means any change of employers, other 
than one caused by an estate changing hands, that is, it means a 
change of estate or entry into (or departures from) the rubber indus­
try. It does not include a change of occupation on any one estate.
An 'Occupation' is, within the rubber industry, any of the 
four grades of work on the estates which have been discussed earlier 
in Chapter 2, or any other clearly distinct types of employment on 
the estates or outside of them. A 'Change of Occupation', with the 
present sample, means primarily movements up and down the hierarchy 
whether by those who have been continuously employed in the same 
estate or by those who have changed jobs between estates but such
^Because of this, it will be convenient later to divide the sample 
and discuss the findings within these two main divisions.
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movements  m u s t  i n v o l v e  employmen t  i n  t h e  new j o b  f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  12 
d a y s  o r  more  i n  a m onth  f o r  a c o n t i n u o u s  p e r i o d  o f  3 m o n th s  o r  m ore .  
T h u s ,  t e m p o r a r y  u p - o r - d o w n  g r a d i n g  f o r  a month  o r  two d u r i n g  i n t e n s i ­
f i e d  t a p p i n g  p r i o r  t o  r e p l a n t i n g  o r  d u r i n g  w i n t e r i n g  ( a r o u n d  m i d -  
F e b r u a r y  t o  m i d - A p r i l )  a r e  n o t '  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  'C h a n g e s  o f  O c c u p a t i o n s .
'C h an g es  o f  J o b s '  w e r e  f u r t h e r  s u b - d i v i d e d  i n t o  ' V o l u n t a r y '  
and ' I n v o l u n t a r y '  c h a n g e s .  G e t t i n g  an  h o n e s t  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  
"Why d i d  you l e a v e  y o u r  p r e v i o u s  j o b ? "  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  
and i n t e r v i e w e r s  w e r e  s p e c i a l l y  i n s t r u c t e d  t o  do  e v e r y t h i n g  p o s s i b l e  
t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  w e r e  a s  a c c u r a t e  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  
s u c h  as  by r e c h e c k i n g  w i t h  t h e  w o r k e r s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e s  d u r i n g  
t h e  I n t e r v i e w  o r  a s k i n g  o t h e r s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s .  ' C h a n g e s  o f  O c c u p a ­
t i o n s '  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  q u a l i f i e d  f u r t h e r  by  ' v o l u n t a r y '  o r  ' i n v o l u n t a r y '  
t y p e s  s i n c e ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  a l l  i n i t i a t i v e s  on  s u c h  c h a n g e s  came f rom 
t h e  m anagemen t .
The r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  d i v i d e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
S e c t i o n  I I  p r e s e n t s  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  f i n d i n g s  s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  t h e  
I n d i a n s ,  t h e  C h i n e s e  and  t h e  M a l a y s ,  i n  e a c h  c a s e  J o b  C h an g es  b e i n g  
d e s c r i b e d  f i r s t  an d  t h e n  t h e  C h anges  o f  O c c u p a t i o n ,  m a k in g  t h e  minimum 
o f  comment on a l l  b u t  t h e  C h an g es  o f  O c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  and 
t h e  M a lay s  s i n c e  t h e s e  w i l l  n o t  be  d i s c u s s e d  an y  f u r t h e r  l a t e r  i n  
t h e  c h a p t e r .  Such a r a c i a l  s u b - d i v i s i o n  i s  made n e c e s s a r y  by  t h e  
m ark e d  d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  emer ged  b e t w e e n  t h e  em ploym en t  h i s t o r i e s  and 
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  g r o u p s .  O t h e r  b r e a k d o w n s ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  by  w o r k e r s  em p lo y ed  i n  t h e  Member and t h o s e  em ployed  i n  
t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s ,  showed no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  
them t h a t  c a n n o t  b e  g e n e r a l l y  d e d u c e d  f rom  t h i s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  f a c t s  by r a c i a l  g r o u p s .  S i n c e  t h e  I n d i a n s  d o m i n a t e d  t h e  s a m p l e ,
t h e y  w i l l  b e  ex am in ed  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r s .  S e c t i o n  I I I
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then takes up the task of interpreting these findings. A brief 
comment on the findings of this chapter is given later in Chapter 
7 .
II
Statistical Findings
The main facts on the Changes of Jobs and Changes of 
Occupations of the sample of workers interviewed are given in Table 
5.1, while Table 5.2 summarises these facts further in percentage 
terms for ease of comparison.
1. Mobility of Indian Workers
The sample comprised 352 Indians, over half of whom (189 : 
547o) had been in the estates' work-force since 1946. Yet out of 
this total, only 4 or slightly more than 1% were judged to have 
made Voluntary Changes of Jobs and only once each. All four of them 
were men and had some education in English primary schools. All 
the four Job Changes were made within the rubber estates, two 
resulting in promotions from field-workers to tappers on changing 
jobs, and the other two remained as tappers on changing jobs but 
indicated that they had improved on their wages. Further, all 
the four Job Changes were made before 1959.
A larger proport ion of the Indians, however, made Involun­
tary Changes of Job (19 : 57o) . All those who changed jobs involun­
tarily were field-workers, and women were somewhat over-represented 
amongst them (9% of their total, as against 4% of the men). None 
of them made any Changes of Occupation arising directly out of the 
Job Changes, all continuing to be employed as field-workers in their
new estates. All the 19 Involuntary Job Changes were made since 1959.
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TABLE 5.2
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS INVOLVED IN CHANGES OF 
JOB AND OCCUPATION
By Race
INDIANS CHINESE MALAYS
No. of 
Workers %
No. of 
Workers %
No. of 
Workers %
352 100 104 100 28 100
No. making Voluntary 
Job Changes:
None 348 99 63 61 24 86
Once or more 4 1 41 39 4 14
No. making Involuntary 
Job Changes:
None 333 95 47 45 24 86
Once or more 19 5 57 55 4 14
No. making Occupational 
Changes:
None 228 65 93 89 17 61
Once or more 124 35 11 11 11 39
Finally, the sample showed, as would be expected, far more 
Changes of Occupation amongst the Indian workers than Changes of Jobs 
though, surprisingly, fewer changes were made than expected. Only 
124 (35%) of the sample had changed occupations, 228 including 86 of 
those who had been in the estates' labour force for 21 years remaining 
the whole time in the grades they occupied in 1946. Of those who 
changed occupations, 12 did so four times, 30 did so thrice, 52 twice 
and 30 once; all these changes were made within the estate occupational 
structure (including the two referred to earlier under Job Changes), 
none having left the estates to return later and none entered the 
estates from outside employment. Hence these changes were all movements 
up and down the occupational hierarchy in the rubber estates.
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Naturally, most of the Occupational Changes were made by 
the older workers, 103 of the 189 (55%) workers who had been in 
employment since 1946 having recorded such changes as opposed to 
only 21 of the 163 (13%) workers who had entered the labour market 
since 1946. The unbalanced nature of the sample makes it hard to 
record the details of the Occupational Changes made in a significant 
manner. Table 5.3, however analyses some of the facts by sex, pre­
sent occupation, and, broadly, by age or length of service. The 
separation between men and women workers was necessary since the 
highest grade, kangany, was conventionally confined only to men 
irrespective of the years of service a woman worker had, whereas 
the separation between those under 37 and those over 36 was also 
necessary since obviously the former would not yet have had the 
career opportunities of the latter. The sample was not large enough 
to make a refined analysis, and still less to display the changes 
in the career structures that may well have been taking place in the 
period covered but together with certain other details obtained 
directly from the work-records, a rough picture of the career 
structures of Indian estate workers can nevertheless be obtained.
As would be expected, the kanganies showed proportionately 
the largest number of Occupational Changes made, averaging slightly 
over 3 changes per person. All of them were already, rubber estate 
workers in 1946 though none were then already kanganies, 11 of them 
being tappers, 2 factory workers and 14 field-workers. In between, 
each of them experienced a minimum of two changes each, occasionally 
re-posted to their old grades, before being appointed finally as 
kanganies which positions they now occupy.
Amongst the tappers, there was greater variety. It is 
noticeable that 33 of the 72 male tappers who were over 37 and 64
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of the 72 who were under 37 had never been anything else but tappers. 
The rest experienced occupational shifts but most of them were from 
those over 37 years old. There was nothing striking in the nature of 
the changes themselves, most being back-and-forth shifts, some being 
promotions from field-workers while a few others were demotions from 
kanganies to tappers when they were found unfit to continue in super­
visory roles. With the female tappers, most had never been anything 
else but tappers, though a small number were promoted from field- 
workers' grade and age seemed to have played little part in these 
promotions.
With the factory workers too, the histories do not show 
anything more interesting that is not already summarised in Table 5.3. 
Either they were appointed initially as factory workers, though only 
a ‘few were done so, or they were promoted from field-workers' grade 
to factory workers over the years.
The employment histories of the field-workers show some 
striking contrasts. On the one hand, a very large number of them have 
remained on this grade since their initial recruitment, both amongst 
those above or below 37, and on the other, a good proportion of "them 
above 37 years old have also experienced Changes of Occupation.
These, changes were all back-and-forth changes: some started off as
field-workers, then went up to factory or tapping work, and a few 
even up to the kanganies' grade, returning to their old grades as 
they were found unfit to continue working in the other grades.
2- Mobility of Chinese Workers
As Table 5.1 shows, almost all the Chinese were post-war 
entrants into the estate labour market (only 8 of the 104 in the 
sample being employed in the estates in 1946). Further, the Chinese
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were also much more mobile than the Indians in so far as changing jobs 
voluntarily between employers was concerned, 37 of those between 15-36 
having done so and 4 of those between 37-64 years old; together, they 
formed 41 workers or 39% of their total compared to only 1% amongst 
the Indians. They also made more Voluntary Job Changes per person, 
averaging slightly more than two as compared to only one per person 
amongst the Indians. Other characteristics of voluntary job-changing 
amongst the Chinese were: a larger proportion of the men changed
jobs voluntarily than the women, 59% of the former as opposed to 28% 
in the latter ; only those made by workers who were presently employed 
as kanganies involved Changes of Occupation as well, the rest being 
all lateral movements from tapping to tapping; finally, most of the 
Voluntary Job Changes were made since 1959 (71 out of the 84), and 
these took place within the industry between the estates (29) and 
from the other-industries in some of the smaller towns into the 
estates (55). As for Involuntary Job Changes, the Chinese accounted 
for a total of 115 changes, most (98). of them occurring during the 
Emergency period (1948-1959) and the rest (17) originated out of 
retrenchments in industries outside the rubber estates since 1960.
Sex or age seemed to have had no influence in the amount of involun­
tary job-changing done by the Chinese, both being affected about 
equally.
In contrast to the number of Job Changes, the Chinese made 
very few Changes of Occupation. In the estates, it is customary to 
employ the Chinese mainly as tappers on short-term contracts, though 
a few may be employed as kanganies and an insignificant number as 
field or factory workers. Thus, apart from a few Changes of Occupa­
tion made by those who eventually became kanganies and a fewer still
by those who changed from field or factory work to their customary
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mode of employment in the estates (tapping), occupational mobility 
amongst the Chinese estate workers in this sample was rare. Only 
17 changes were made by the 104 workers.
3. Mobility of Malay Workers
The Malays too were mostly post-war entrants into the estate 
labour market as can be seen in Table 5.1 (only 2 of the 28 in the 
sample were employed in the estates in 1946). Relatively, they made 
more Voluntary Job Changes than the Indians (14% of the Malays doing 
so), but lesser than the Chinese. All the 4 Malays who changed jobs 
voluntarily had some education in English primary schools. One of 
the 4 made three changes: from the smallholdings to the estates
(1949), back to smallholdings (1952), and then back to the estates 
(1953) ; the one who made two changes moved from the estates to the 
smallholdings (1952) and back again to the estates (1953); the two 
who made one change each moved from 'farming* to the estates (1963 
and 1965). As for the Involuntary Job Changes,, the Malays accounted 
for 4, all occurring towards the end of the 1950s and all were move­
ments from government service to the estates.
In terms of Changes of Occupation, the Malays changed the 
most and the fastest: 11 (39%) had changed occupations and all were 
under 37 years old. All these changes were promotions, all moving up 
from field-workers' grade to tapping, While the number is too small 
to be statistically convincing, it was suggested that some special 
efforts were made by managers to promote Malay field-workers as soon 
£s possible in order to retain them on the estates' payroll. However, 
none of the Malays in this sample believed that it was ever possible 
for them to become kangani^s: language problems and resistance by the
Indian or Chinese workers being suggested as two main reasons.
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Discussion
Job Changing by Indian Workers:
The figures given show an almost complete absence of volun­
tary mobility, and for that matter very little involuntary mobility 
too, amongst the Indian estate labour force. But care must be taken 
in interpreting this sample data since it records only the experiences 
of those employed in the labour force at the date of this enquiry and 
does not permit any direct inferences about those who may have left 
the estates, voluntarily and involuntarily, or be still on them 
unemployed. From the evidence to be presented in the next chapter, 
it will become clear that the figures given here on Involuntary Job 
Changes probably indicates the actual position while, on the other 
hand, the conclusion of extreme voluntary immobility stands. Thus, 
though there has been significant declines in the Indian estate popu­
lation and their employment levels in the estates studied (as will be 
seen in the next chapter), there was nothing to suggest that these 
declines were the result of voluntary movements out of the estates 
while there was everything to suggest that the declines were instead 
the results of ejections and dismissals from the estates with these 
people being now forced to look for jobs elsewhere.
This characteristic of extreme voluntary immobility strikes 
one all the more when comparisons are made between the findings of 
this study and those of a few other mobility studies conducted else­
where.1 Such comparisons, of course, have a number of limitations
III
This is apart from the fact that the estates selected were close to 
urban labour markets and much more mobility should have been expected.
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since labour markets..naturally differ between places, the definitions
for similar terms used in the different studies may vary, and the
time-intervals over which the employment histories of the various
samples of workers are examined could also vary, but a useful general
picture of the differences can still be obtained. Thus, Reynolds'
study of the employment experiences of workers in a New England factory
city showed that 24% of them could be categorised as voluntary job-
changers compared to only 1% amongst the Indians in this study and
this, despite the fact that Reynolds' study was concerned with Job-
Changes over only a two-year period from 1946-1948 relative to a much
longer period in this study. Another study by Jefferys on certain
aspects of the industrial mobility of workers in the Dagenham and
Battersea districts showed that 49% in the former and 517o in the latter
were voluntary job-changers, though Jefferys' study too was concerned
with a much shorter period from 1945-1951 (seven years) than this one.
Again, Myers, after an intensive examination of six mobility studies
conducted over different places, times and time-intervals concluded
that over 70% of the workers in these studies were voluntarily mobile in
the sense of having had more than one employer. Similar findings have.
been recorded in other studies as well, such as those by Myers and
1Maclaurin or by Palmer.
^Reynolds, The Structure of Labour Markets, p.20; Jefferys, Margot, 
Mobility in the Labour Market; Employment Changes in Battersea and 
Dagenham, Routledge &, Kegan Paul, London, 1954, pp.54-55; Myers,
Charles A., "Labor Mobility in Two Communities" in Bakke, E. Wight, 
et al., Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity, Massachusetts Insti­
tute of Technology, Mass., 1954, p.70; Myers, Charles A. and Maclaurin, 
W. Rupert, The Movement of Factory Workers: A Study of a New England 
Industrial Community, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mass.,
1943, Chapter 2; and Palmer, Gladys L., Labor Mobility in Six Cities:
A Report on the Survey of Patterns and -Factors in Labor Mobility, 
1940-1950, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1954,
Chapters 3 and 4.
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The interviews with the Indian workers suggested that in 
some vague sort of way many of them were convinced and aware of other 
jobs (on some occasions at least between 1946 and up to about the 
late 1950s) with better wage or non-wage benefits, or both, for their 
grade of labour in the other estates or industries within the 'local 
market' they were located in then. Further, these differentials were 
large enough to cover the transfer costs of job shifts and yet retain 
them an advantage. Thus, had these workers changed their jobs then, 
the actual amount of voluntary job-changing done by the Indian workers 
interviewed would have been much higher than the figures shown earlier. 
Their reasons for not changing jobs are discussed below.
One main reason found was the extent to which there were 
imperfections on the supply side of the labour market. Part of these 
imperfections were, of course, caused by the conditioning effects on 
the Indian workers' attitudes arising out of the imperfections on 
the demand side which will be discussed shortly, but there was little 
doubt from the impressions conveyed during the interviews that the 
supply imperfections exerted a strong independent influence as well.
For one thing, most of the Indian estate workers placed a 
high premium on the community life in the estates on which they had 
been brought up. Not that they did not want higher wages and would 
not consider changing jobs to get them but most of them would rather 
have such increases in their present estates than seek for them 
elsewhere. It is, of course, not unusual for some workers in a 
community to be attached to their employers or their customary 
surroundings, and it was not unexpected that the interviews would 
have revealed such attitudes. However, \fehat was unexpected was the 
extreme tenacity with which most of the Indian estate workers clung
to their own estates. As an illustration, for instance, the Malaysian
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Government has since 1966 encouraged estate workers from West Malaysia 
to migrate to Sabah in East Malaysia but without much success. Des­
pite assisted passages, disturbance allowances, a promise of land 
schemes for resettlement after two years, and an assurance that 
their real wages would be at least 20% higher than the prevalent ones 
in West Malaysia for similar work, very few Indian estate workers 
(relative to those of the other races) are known to have taken 
advantage of the scheme.
The present estate was to many of them very much more than 
a place of employment. Typically, the older Indian-born immigrant 
looked upon the estate as a sort of 'little India', a home away from 
home, a home he knew and understood. He was grateful to the estate 
for providing him a house to live in, a temple for his worship, a 
hospital in times of illness, and a school for his children, but more 
than that, his basic needs satisfied, he was happier living amongst 
his own kind, sharing a common culture and a common tradition that 
became transplanted with him from India to Malaya. Under these cir­
cumstances, many of them were extremely reluctant to part with all 
these for any possible gains in earnings elsewhere, and some saw no
purpose in making efforts to change their jobs to any other 'alien'
1environment elsewhere.
Besides, the estate employments were secure. Until the 
mid-1950s an Indian on the estates had been assured of jobs to 
himself, his family, and his kind in return for their loyalty to the
For a study on some sociological characteristics of the Indian 
estate workers, see Jain, R.K., Migrants, Proletarians, or 
Malayans? South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya, 
Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1966.
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estate. If management violated these 'traditional rights', he could 
protest, which he frequently did and occasionally very violently 
too. In the world outside, however, he saw no such protection. As 
one elderly kangany puts it when discussing these rights.
fIWhat matters is not whether the person applying from 
outside is more, or less, suitable for the job. What 
matters is what is the right thing to do and for gene­
rations now, the right thing to do has been to select the 
best man available from within this estate, irrespective 
of whether others better have applied for these jobs fran 
elsewhere."
That these rights were slowly being eroded away in the last five 
years or so naturally worried him but he was still hopeful of clinging 
on to them, and continued to be influenced by its effects on his 
immobility.
Other inhibitions also discouraged job-changing by Indian 
estate workers. It was considered 'improper' by some for women to 
work in establishments outside the estates. Others considered that 
younger male Indians 'ought' to stay in the estates and look after 
their older friends and relatives. Older folks thought it was 'wise' 
to stay on in the estates if only because here they were assured of 
a proper and religious burial when their time came. If in pursuit 
merely of more money one left the estates to work elsewhere, far 
away from one's home, it was considered 'disloyal' to one's family 
commitments. It is partly because of considerations such as these 
that have prevented the Indian estate workers from moving up the 
occupational ladder in the world outside. So far as is known by the 
writer, there" were hardly 20 university graduates in West Malaysia 
in 1969 who had descended from Indian families amongst the estate
population though their estate population has averaged around three-
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quarters of a million in the last few years.
The other main reason found was the influence of the im­
perfections on the demand side of the labour market.
The workers had encountered or were convinced tlhey would 
encounter barriers on the demand side of the labour market that 
'locked them' (or would lock them) into their present estates.
Within the rubber industry, for instance, most employers had main­
tained up to about the late 1950s an old unwritten hiring practice 
that distinctly discouraged, if not disallowed, voluntary job-changing 
by the Indian estate workers. The practice was simply the refusal to 
'employ Indian estate workers who moved from one estate to another 
for wage-differential or similar considerations'.'*' This practice 
had grown in the early days when the Indian estate labour was in 
short supply relative to the demand for them, and continued! till very 
recent times when Indian estate labour became increasingly surplus 
relative to its demand (see Chapter 6 later). Thus, during the period 
when Indian estate labourers were 'imported' from India they were 
'contracted' to specific estates. This, in effect, meant that the 
labourers were bonded to serve in their 'first' estates for a period 
ranging from three to five years on arrival in Malaya. This bondage 
became an accepted practice in the early recruitment of Indian estate 
labour and was later reinforced, during subsequent periods of acute 
labour shortages, by 'gentlemen's agreements' amongst most estate
^Some details on the early recruitment systems and the contractual 
obligations of the estate workers to their employers can be found 
in Parmer, J.N., Colonial Labor Policy and Administration; A 
History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, 
1910-1941, Cornell Univ. Press, Cornell, 1957, Thompson, V.., Labor 
Problems in South-East Asia, Yale, 1947 and Lasker, B., Huiman 
Bondage in South-East Asia, University of North Carolina, 1L950.
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managers not to 'crimp' labourers from each other. Mutual restraint 
from stealing away another's labourers was considered good practice, 
and to rationalise its continuation, other devices were developed.
The chief amongst these was that word was spread round that 'only 
undesirable Indians who had been sacked from their previous estates 
would look around for jobs elsewhere'. Or, that prospective Indian 
job-changers were usually 'troublesome fellows who created chaos in 
the labour lines'. Over the years these attitudes and practices 
hardened so that the concept of voluntary job-changing amongst Indian 
estate workers just did not exist. There were, of course, some 
exceptions to these practices such as movements arising out of 
marriages or from other personal or family reasons which were 'allowed' 
for but, in the main, these exceptions were rarely made to encourage 
voluntary job-changing in response to wage differentials.
Outside the rubber industry, in the other markets into which 
the Indian estate labourers could hope to enter, were other barriers 
equally formidable. First, many of the alternatives that were open 
to most of them outside were insufficiently or only marginally 
attractive to draw them out of their estate jobs. Thus, for the men, 
the alternatives here included jobs such as unskilled labourers, 
cleaners, drain-sweepers or grass-cutters in the various government 
or statutory bodies ; and for women, it was more restricted in scope 
with possibilities only such as domestic servants, hospital cleaners 
or labourers. Such limited scope was partly due to the low level of 
general education provided for them in the rubber estates which 
hardly equipped them for better jobs elsewhere and partly because 
it became 'an accepted practice' that Southern Indians with primary 
school education from the vernacular schools, whether from the 
estates or elsewhere, were the ones generally considered most suited
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for these jobs and, therefore, these jobs were 'reserved' for them. 
Secondly, a few amongst this sample who acquired some vocational 
training or some secondary education, were qualified for 'better 
alternatives' outside. Thus, such alternatives, for men, included 
jobs such as assistants to cooks, or barbers, or tailors in Indian- 
owned shops; as drivers, office bbys, postal delivery-boys; as 
assistants to Indian priests in temples; and possibly as Tamil 
school teachers; for women, the alternatives could be as assistant 
nurses, salesgirls in Indian-owned shops, and Tamil school teachers. 
Unfortunately, those workers in this sample who tried these possi­
bilities found too many built-in barriers outside the industry that 
handicapped their efforts from moving out of their 'native' sector.
For instance, either many of these markets preferred 'urban-dwellers', 
or the estate workers were handicapped by the main method of securing 
the jobs in these markets which required 'contacts' through friends 
or relatives which most of them did not have outside of the industry, 
and the few that had were amongst those who were apparently not 
influential enough to secure these jobs for them.'*" Thirdly, some 
of them wanted to venture out into small-time businesses, such as 
cattle-rearing, milk-veiidoring, poultry-farming, selling Indian 
clothes and trinkets to workers in outlying areas, becoming self- 
employed 'dhobis' (laundrymen) or small stall-holders and so on, 
but they said that they could not go out because they lacked capital. 
Finally, many of them knew of a number of 'better opportunities' in 
the other industries in the private sector such as in manufacturing,
In almost all cases, the workers interviewed secured their jobs 
through their friends and relatives who approached the managers 
on their behalf; this was true of markets outside the industry 
too.
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mining, buildings and construction, hardware shops, service stations, 
transportation, in Chinese retail and wholesale shops, such as those 
dealing with textiles, groceries, furniture, electrical goods and so 
on, but they said that, conventionally, these jobs were 'reserved' 
mostly for the Chinese; similarly, many of them also seemed to 
know of 'better' alternatives in some other sectors of the government 
services, such as as privates in the police, the army and the navy, 
but said that these were, by government policy, 'reserved' mostly for 
the Malays.
Apart from this preference among employers for giving jobs 
to their 'own' men rather than to 'strangers', which persists even 
today, the problem of a scarcity of jobs in recent years has been 
an additional barrier. A prerequisite of voluntary job-changing 
is, after all, the availability of at least equally suitable, if 
not better, alternatives. There was little doubt in the workers' 
minds interviewed that such opportunities were becoming increasingly 
rare in recent years and workers therefore preferred to hold on to 
what they already had than to attempt any job-changes. The evidence 
on unemployment to be presented later in Chapter 6 confirms why such 
fears were most prevalent amongst the Indian estate workers.
Occupational Changes by Indian Workers
Stuck willingly or unwillingly to his or her estate, the 
sedentary class of Indians have as their only chance of progress in 
their careers movements up the occupational hierarchy. The limita­
tions of this possibility are disguised in the sample by the 
different proportions obtained of the different grades (see again 
Table 2.3) but after allowing for the stratification of the sample, 
the percentage distributions of Indian men and women between the
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1four main occupations were as follows:
MEN WOMEN
Kanganies 4 -
Tappers 52 68
Factory Workers 5 2
Field Workers 39 30
100 100
Thus, there is obviously very little scope for a normal 
'career structure' in such a distribution, with only a very small 
proportion (and that too only amongst the men) ever hoping to become 
kanganies. Further, since many start as tappers and factory workers 
(the decision to appoint them as such made by management after trying 
all new appointees at various jobs during a short probationary period), 
even field-workers cannot be at all certain of becoming tappers or 
factory workers later during their working-life.
What then influenced the Occupational Changes recorded?
The main factors were related to management's assessments of the 
ability of different workers to perform different tasks in the estates 
and to the actual number of vacancies available at any time at each 
grade. Since the numbers considered suitable and available usually
Figures on the total labour-force in the estates studied are not 
available by any other more detailed breakdown than those already 
shown in Table 2.3. The total number of Indian workers by occupa­
tional grades by sex had, therefore, to be approximately estimated 
to arrive at the above distribution. The estimates were made as 
follows: (a) total numbers by occupational grades available (b)
the numbers of Malays and Chinese eliminated from each grade in 
the same proportions they formed in the sample (c) the remaining 
numbers were assumed to be Indians and the numbers of men and 
women in each grade were worked out in the same proportions they 
formed in the sample.
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exceeded the numbers required at the different grades, other factors 
such as a common ethnic background between supervisors and workers 
(example whether both were Tamils or both were Telegus),^ whether 
the workers concerned were the "nice and obedient types and deserved 
promotions'' (or vice-versa in other cases) also entered in manage­
ments' decision in initiating Occupational Changes for the workers 
in their estates. Seniority per se, except in the promotion of 
workers to kanganies' grade or except that it allowed management 
some time to assess the workers' ability, played only a small part. 
Thus, the initial recruitment and the subsequent Occupational Changes 
made were intended to obtain the workers considered most suitable 
for each grade, confirming some points made earlier in which it was 
stated that the hierarchy of Occupational Differentials also 
reflected differences in skills and abilities between the workers 
in the different grades.
Job-Changing by Chinese Workers
By way of contrast, the figures in Table 5.1 had shown that 
the Chinese did a very much larger amount of job-changing, both 
voluntary and involuntary, than either the Indians or the Malays.
The Involuntary Job-Changes mostly took place in the Emergency period 
They arose mostly because many of the rural Chinese were suspected 
of being Communist sympathisers and were forcibly resettled into 
New Villages away from their previous places of employment and 
possibly away from any direct contacts with the Communist guerillas. 
The few that occurred since 1960 were however the results of retrench 
ments in the industries outside the rubber estates or due to the
^-Indian workers in the estates were further distinguished as Tamils, 
Telegus or Malayalees.
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termination of their short-term contracts within the estates.
As for the Voluntary Job-Changes, at first it was presumed 
that this striking contrast between the Chinese and the Indians could 
be due to the much larger proportion of the Chinese under 37 (92%) 
compared to the Indians (46%) since it is not uncommon for younger 
workers to be more mobile voluntarily in the early years of their 
employment careers before they had accumulated seniority or settled 
down to a career more to their liking, but the figures in Table 5.1 
suggest that this was not the main explanation. Thus, even within 
each of the two main age-divisions, the Chinese were much more 
mobile relatively (their approximate proportions were 50% and 39%, 
to 1.2% and 1.1% for the Indians for those above 36 and those below 
37 respectively). Further, interviews with both the managers and 
the workers themselves conveyed clearly the conclusion that the 
average Chinese estate worker was a very much more mobile worker 
voluntarily than either the average Indian or Malay estate worker.
The main factors responsible for this are described below.
On the supply side of the labour market, the Chinese had 
fewer inhibitions than the Indians about moving about in response to 
better opportunities elsewhere. Thus, the average Chinese worker 
interviewed was as detached as was possible to his estate or the 
estate community, occasionally even resenting the idea of being 
emotionally tied to it, and looking upon it primarily as a place of 
employment and nothing else. If there was another place that offered 
better opportunities and he saw a probability of obtaining this 
opportunity, he would most likely move; if there was none as yet, 
he would probably continue to seek for the highest bidder for his 
services in the market. The Chinese were also much less prone to 
discourage voluntary job shifts by their women-folks, or their
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younge r  men w o r k e r s ;  in d e e d ,  t h e  e l d e r s  f r e q u e n t l y  enc ou ra ge d  o t h e r s  
i n  t h e i r  community t o  move a round  i n  s e a r c h  o f  b e t t e r  f o r t u n e s  w herever  
t h e s e  c o u l d  be found.
On t h e  demand s i d e  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t ,  t h e r e  were imper ­
f e c t i o n s  t o o  b u t  t h e y  worked more i n  f a v o u r  o f  e n c o u r a g in g  v o l u n t a r y  
j o b - c h a n g i n g  by them r a t h e r  t h a n  a g a i n s t  i t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  l a s t  
t e n  y e a r s  o r  s o .  Thus,  none o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  r e s t r i c t i v e  h i r i n g  p r a c ­
t i c e s  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  t h e  I n d i a n s  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  C h i n e s e .  The C h in e s e  
were  e s s e n t i a l l y  ' l a t e  e n t r a n t s '  i n t o  t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  w o r k - f o r c e  and 
t h e r e f o r e  l a y  o u t s i d e  t h e  o l d  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d i t i o n s  i n  h i r i n g  p r a c ­
t i c e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  C h i n e s e  l a b o u r - f o r c e  
i n t o  t h e  e s t a t e s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  has  become an a c t  o f  p o l i c y .  Thus, 
most  managers  i n t e r v i e w e d  had become c o n v in c e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  o f  
t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  some s o r t  o f  a ' r a c i a l  b a l a n c e '  i n  
numbers  amongst t h e i r  w o r k - f o r c e ,  which  i m p l i e d  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  some 
p r o p o r t i o n s  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  f rom each  r a c i a l  g roup  sho u ld  be r e c r u i t e d  
i n t o  t h e  e s t a t e s '  w o r k - f o r c e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  ' e f f i c i e n c y '  c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n s .  As one manager  p u t s  i t ,
"We have found t h i s  p o l i c y  u s e f u l  on o t h e r  g r o u n d s ,  even 
i f  no t  on e f f i c i e n c y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  
I n d i a n s  have  become t o o  u n i o n i s e d  and we would l i k e  t o  
d i l u t e  t h e  U n i o n ' s  s t r e n g t h  b e f o r e  i t  d i l u t e s  u s ;  t h e  
C h i n e s e  a r e  u s e f u l  a s  a n t i - U n i o n  e l e m e n t s  bu t  when t h e y  
a r e  i n  l a r g e  numbers t h e y  become too  demanding;  and 
f i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  good p o l i t i c s  t o  employ a few 
Malays b e f o r e  we a r e  a c t u a l l y  f o r c e d  t o  do so by t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t . "
T h e re  i s  t h e n  t h e  u n i q u e  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  C h in e s e  e s t a t e  
w o r k e r ' s  method of  employment .  As a l r e a d y  n o t e d ,  a l l  t h e  C h i n e s e  
w o r k e r s  i n  t h i s  sample were employed as  ' C o n t r a c t '  l a b o u r .  None of
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the Indians were, the latter being all employed as 'Checkroll' 
labour and resided on the estates. This difference in the method 
of employment had accounted largely for the more frequent job-shifts 
of the Chinese. Under this system of employment, workers were not 
expected to be employed for more than a few years in one estate; 
they were not considered as 'permanent' employees of an estate but 
rather as 'short-term' employees on contract, employed for specific 
purposes such as during intensified tapping, or for tapping specific 
fields. Management considered it useful to have some labour on 
short-term because of the flexibility it allowed. Dismissals of 
such workers were also easier if the labour-force had to be temporarily 
or permanently curtailed, and they came on terms that were not 
covered by arrangements with the Union on dismissals.(p.87). Also, since 
almost all contract workers were non-resident labour, employers 
were not obliged to increase their fixed costs by building quarters 
or other facilities for those in the estates.
Finally, since 1960 when the general scarcity of jobs 
within the industry has become acute, the Indians and the Chinese 
have been differently affected. As the data given in Chapter 6 
later will show, the unemployment rate amongst the Chinese is lower 
than amongst the Indians, making it more difficult for the latter 
to move than for the former.
Job-Changing by Malay Workers
On voluntary job-changing, the average Malay estate worker 
was mid-way between the Indians and the Chinese. He was not as 
mobile as the Chinese but nor was he so attached to the estate 
community as the Indian, most being neither born nor resident on 
the estates. His attachments were more to his Kampong and so long
as he could return to it daily he was prepared to shift jobs about
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be tw een  em ploye rs  w i t h i n  a l i m i t e d  g e o g r a p h i c a l  r a n g e ,  a s  a few 
v o l u n t a r y  j o b - c h a n g e r s  amongst  them h e r e  d i d .
On t h e  demand s i d e ,  he d i d  n o t  f a c e  t h e  r e s t r i c t i v e  h i r i n g  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  t h a t  a f f e c t e d  th e  I n d i a n s .  I n s t e a d ,  he 
was f a v o u r e d  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  and now even  more t h a n  t h e  C h i n e s e .
T h i s  was p a r t l y  b e c a u s e ,  l i k e  t h e  C h i n e s e ,  some of  them were  a l s o  
C o n t r a c t  l a b o u r  and p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  government  p r e s s u r e s ,  t h e  
e s t a t e  management  f e l t  t h e y  o u g h t  t o  have  some Malays on t h e i r  
p a y r o l l s .  The two who made such  c h a n g e s  s i n c e  t h e  1960s to o k  
a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  s p e c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e .
The f o u r  i n v o l u n t a r y  j o b  ch a n g es  r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  sample 
were  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b e f o r e  coming t o  t h e  r u b b e r  
e s t a t e s  t h e  men c o n c e r n e d  were  s p e c i a l  c o n s t a b l e s  who were  r e t r e n c h e d  
a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  Emergency.
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CHAPTER 6
UNEMPLOYMENT
I
F i n d i n g s  From W o r k e r s  I n t e r v i e w e d
F o r  r e a s o n s  a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  l a s t  
c h a p t e r ,  i t  w ou ld  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  p r a c t i c a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  d e t a i l e d  
r e c o r d s  o f  t h e  une m ploym en t  e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d .  
O n ly  two s u c h  c a t e g o r i e s  w e r e  t h e r e f o r e  m e a s u r e d ,  and b o t h  i n v o l v e d  
d i s r e g a r d i n g  much t i m e  w h i c h  on more  c o n v e n t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  w ou ld  
c e r t a i n l y  h a v e  b e e n  i n c l u d e d  u n d e r  u n e m p l o y m e n t . The two t y p e s  
m e a s u r e d  w e r e :  ' u n e m p lo y m en t  a m o n g s t  p o s t - w a r  e n t r a n t s  on  f i r s t
e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t ' ,  an d  ' u n e m p lo y m e n t  a f t e r  t h e i r  f i r s t  
j o b s  o r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  w o r k e r s  o v e r  37 ,  s i n c e  1 9 4 6 ' .  B o t h  w e re  
l i m i t e d  t o  p e r i o d s  o f  6 m o n t h s  o r  more  w i t h o u t  a J o b ,  a J o b  b e i n g  
d e f i n e d  a s  i n  C h a p t e r  5 .
The summary f i g u r e s  on t h e  f i r s t  t y p e  o f  unem p lo y m en t  a r e  
g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  6 . 1 .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  w i d e  d i f f e r e n c e s  n o t e d  b e t w e e n  
them ,  t h e  f i g u r e s  a r e  shown s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  e a c h  r a c i a l  g r o u p .
I n d i a n  W o r k e r s
Of t h e  163 p o s t - w a r  e n t r a n t s  a m o n g s t  t h e  I n d i a n  w o r k e r s  
i n  t h e  s a m p l e ,  78 (48%) w e r e  u n e m p lo y e d  on f i r s t  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  
l a b o u r  m a r k e t .  A l l  78  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  h ad  made e f f o r t s  p e r ­
s o n a l l y  o r  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  f r i e n d s  and r e l a t i v e s  t o  s e e k  j o b s  i n  t h e  
r u b b e r  e s t a t e s  i n  t h e  l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  a f t e r  t h e y  had  l e f t  
s c h o o l s ,  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  p h y s i c a l l y  a b l e  t o  work and w e r e  w i l l i n g  
t o  do s o  on  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  w a g e s  and w o r k i n g ,  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e n
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TABLE 6.1
PROPORTIONS INITIALLY UNEMPLOYED AMONGST POST­
WAR ENTRANTS,
By Race and Year in Which Jobs Obtained
Year in Which No.of Entrants No.Initially % Initially
Jobs Obtained into Market Unemployed Unemployed
I N D I A N S
1946 - 1951 33 3 9
1952 - 1957 35 6 17
1958 - 1962 68 47 69
1963 - 1967 27 22 81
Total 163 78 48
C H I N E S E
1946 - 1951 35 2 6
1952 - 1957 34 4 12
1958 - 1962 14 4 29
1963 - 1967 13 5 39
Total 96 15 16
M A L A Y S
1946 - 1951 16 - -
1952 - 1957 2 - -
1958 - 1962 4 2 50
1963 - 1967 4 2 50
Total 26 4 15
existing. Table 6.1 shows that the proportions initially unemployed 
increased significantly since 1958.
Though the figures are not recorded in this table, the 
work-histories also showed that workers in the Member Estates were 
affected relatively more than those in the Non-Member Estates, only 
30% of the new entrants being initially unemployed in the latter
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( 1 7 / 2 7 )  com p ar ed  t o  52% i n  t h e  f o r m e r  ( 7 1 / 1 3 6 ) .  On t h e  s u r f a c e ,  
t h i s  i m p l i e d  t h a t  un em p lo y m en t  was more  s e r i o u s  i n  t h e  Member 
E s t a t e s .  The r e a s o n ,  a s  w i l l  b e  s e e n  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  was 
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  f a s t e r  r a t e  o f  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r e s i d e n t  I n d i a n  po p u ­
l a t i o n  i n  t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .
An i n t e r e s t i n g  p o i n t  t h a t  em erged  was t h a t  a l l  a l o n g  t h e  
n ew er  e n t r a n t s  i n t o  t h e  m a r k e t  h ad  more  y e a r s  o f  s c h o o l i n g ,  a s  c a n  
b e  s e e n  i n  T a b l e  6 . 2 .  T h i s  e x p l a i n s  t h e  o f t e n - r e p e a t e d  comments
TABLE 6 . 2
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF INITIALLY UNEMPLOYED 
INDIAN WORKERS
By Y e a r  i n  Which J o b s  O b t a i n e d
No
S c h o o l i n g
Lower
P r i m a r y
S c h o o l i n g
U p p e r
P r i m a r y
S c h o o l i n g
Lower
S e c o n d a r y
S c h o o l i n g
T o t a  1
1946 -  1951 2 1 - - 3
1952 -  1957 2 3 1 - 6
1958 -  1962 3 5 31 8 47
1963 -  1967 - 4 14 4 22
T o t a l 7 13 46 12 78
made by  t h e  w o r k e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  t h a t  e d u c a t i o n  was "no u s e "  i n  
e n h a n c i n g  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ' s  j o b  p r o s p e c t s ,  an  o p i n i o n  i n  d i r e c t  
c o n t r a s t  t o  t h a t  f o u n d  b y  R e y n o l d s  and S h i s t e r  when d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  
o c c u p a t i o n a l  m o b i l i t y  o f  t h e  w o r k e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  i n  t h e i r  s t u d y . ^  
From t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i ew  o f  t h e  u n em p lo y ed  w o r k e r s  t h e m s e l v e s ,
1
R e y n o l d s ,  L l o y d  G. and S h i s t e r ,  J o s e p h ,  J o b  H o r i z o n s , H a r p e r ,  
New York ,  1949,  p . 7 9 .
118
d i m i n i s h i n g  employment  p r o s p e c t s  d e s p i t e  l o n g e r  y e a r s  o f  s c h o o l i n g  
( a n d  w i t h  i t  h i g h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n s )  w e r e  n a t u r a l l y  m o s t  f r u s t r a t i n g .
C h i n e s e  and Malay W o r k e r s
The n um bers  u n em p lo y ed  a m o n g s t  t h e  C h i n e s e  and t h e  Malay 
w o r k e r s  on  i n i t i a l  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  w e r e  t o o  s m a l l  t o  
p e r m i t  d e t a i l e d  c o n c l u s i o n s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  T a b l e  6 . 1  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s  i n i t i a l l y  u n e m p lo y e d  am ongs t  them w e r e  v e r y  much 
s m a l l e r  t h a n  am ong s t  t h e  I n d i a n s .  I t  i s  h o w ev er  w o r t h  n o t i n g  t h a t  
a l m o s t  a l l  t h e  C h i n e s e  who w e r e  i n i t i a l l y  un em p lo y ed  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
t h e y  f i r s t  made e f f o r t s  t o  s e e k  j o b s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i e s ,  s u c h  
a s  i n  t i n - m i n i n g  o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  b e f o r e  e n d i n g  up i n  t h e  e s t a t e s ;  
t h e  M a l a y s ,  on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a t t e m p t e d  t o  o b t a i n  j o b s  i n  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e  f i r s t  b e f o r e  coming t o  t h e  e s t a t e s .
Th e g e n e r a l  p i c t u r e  c o n v e y e d  by T a b l e  6 . 1  i s  s u p p o r t e d  
by e v i d e n c e  a b o u t  unem ploym en t  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  j o b  o r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  w o r k e r s  o v e r  3 7 ,  s i n c e  1946.  T a b l e  6 . 3  g i v e s  t h e  f i g u r e s  on 
t h e s e  f o r  t h e  I n d i a n s .  None was r e c o r d e d  e i t h e r  f o r  t h e  C h i n e s e  
o r  t h e  M a l a y s ,  t h e  f o r m e r  b e i n g  more  m o b i l e  s o o n  fo u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  
i n t o  some c o n t r a c t o r ’ s team  o r  o t h e r  w h e n e v e r  1 a i d - o f f  i n  any 
e s t a t e ,  and t h e  l a t t e r  u s u a l l y  a b l e  t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  Kampongs 
t o  t i l l  t h e i r  f a m i l y  l a n d  o r  w e r e  a b s o r b e d  e l s e w h e r e  b e c a u s e  o f  
’s p e c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ’ . I t  t h u s  seems c e r t a i n  t h a t  i n  t h i s  s a m p l e  
un em p lo y m en t  o f  b o t h  k i n d s  was more c r i t i c a l  a m o n g s t  t h e  I n d i a n s  
t h a n  am o n g s t  t h e  C h i n e s e  o r  Malay e s t a t e  w o r k e r s ,  and t h a t  i t  had 
b e e n  r i s i n g  r a p i d l y  s i n c e  195 8.
I I
F i n d i n g s  From t h e  E s t a t e s  S t u d i e d
The a b o v e  f i g u r e s  how ever  do n o t  p r o v i d e  an  o v e r a l l
m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  unem ploym en t  o n  t h e  e s t a t e s  s i n c e  t h e  s a m p l e  s u r v e y
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dealt only with the workers presently employed. To obtain a more 
general picture other evidence has to be sought as well. There were
TABLE 6.3
INCIDENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST INDIANS
Years in 
which un­
employment 
occurred
Number of 
Workers 
in Market 
at end of 
Period
Number of 
Unemployment 
Periods Recorded
Incidence of 
Unemployment
1946-1951 216 - -
1952-1957 283 - -
1958-1962 330 41 12
1963-1967 352 63 28
however no official, and only very few unofficial, figures specifi­
cally on unemployment in the rubber estate sector to rely upon; 
further the unofficial figures too were somewhat scrappy. Con­
firmation of the trends suggested by this survey has therefore to 
be obtained indirectly. Some figures on the employment trends and 
resident population of Indian labour since 1961 are available for 
the estates from which the present sample has been drawn. The 
figures were obtained from returns made by the estates to their 
Agency House.^ No separate figures for the Chinese or the Malays 
were available. This information will be analysed in the rest of 
this section; other data will be reviewed in Sections III and IV.
The figures for the estates examined are shown in Table 
6.4. They cover not only the four main grades of occupations taken
^Agency Houses usually manage only estates owned by overseas 
investors but a few of the locally-owned estates were also being 
managed by an Agency House in Kuala Lumpur, from which these 
three Non-Member Estates were selected.
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TABLE 6 . 4
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS AND RESIDENT INDIAN POPULATION 
ON SAMPLE OF ESTATES, 1961 AND 1967
Age
J u l y 3 1 s t  1961 J u l y 3 1 s t  1967 D i f f e r e n c e ( 1 9 6 7 - 1961)
Em­
p lo y e d
R e s i d e n t  
Popu-  
l a t i o n
Em­
p lo y e d
R e s i d e n t  
Popu-  
1 3 1 i o  n
Employed
R e s i d e n t  
P o p u l a t i o n
A b s . % Abs . %
M E M B E F E S T A T E S
<  15 N i l 1381 N i l 1671 N i l N i l +290 + 2 1 . 0
15- 54 1997 3408 1689 3497 - 3 0 8 - 1 5 . 4 + 89 + 2 . 6
>  54 236 898 127 727 -1 0 9 - 4 6 . 2 - 1 7 1 - 1 9 . 0
T o t a l 2233 5687 1816 5862 -4 1 7 - 1 8 . 7 +175 + 3 . 1
N O N - M E M B E R E S T A T E S
<  15 N i l 406 N i l 445 N i l N i l + 39 + 9 . 6
15 -5 4 743 1137 605 1155 - 1 3 8 - 1 8 . 6 + 18 + 1 . 8
>  54 48 202 11 141 -  37 - 7 7 . 1 -  61 - 3 0 . 2
T o t a l 791 1745 616 1774 - 1 7 5 - 2 2 . 1 + 29 + 0 . 2
A L L E S T A T E S
<  15 N i l 1787 N i l 2116 N i l N i l +329 + 1 8 . 4
1 5 -5 4 2740 4545 2294 4652 - 4 4 6 - 1 6 . 3 +107 + 2 . 4
>  54 284 1100 138 868 - 1 4 6 - 5 1 . 4 - 2 3 2 - 2 1 . 1
T o t a l 3024 7432 2432 7636 -5 9 2 - 1 9 . 6 +204 + 2 . 7
f o r  t h i s  samp le  b u t  a l s o  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  m i s c e l l a n e o u s  g r a d e s  employed  
in  t h e  e s t a t e s .  No d e t a i l e d  breakdowns by s e x  and o c c u p a t i o n a l  
g r a d e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e ,  nor are  d e t a i l s  a v a i l a b l e  on b i r t h - r a t e s ,  
d e a t h - r a t e s ,  e m i g r a t i o n  ( v o l u n t a r y  or  o t h e r w i s e )  and i m m i g r a t i o n .  
Thus o n l y  a v e r y  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  p o s s i b l e .
Employment f o r  a l l  th e  e s t a t e s  combined had f a l l e n  from 
3 , 0 2 4  t o  2 , 4 3 2  o r  a l m o s t  207o i n  f i v e  y e a r s .  More im p o r t a n t ,  t h i s
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f a l l  was  n o t  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  o l d e r  men and women b u t  i t  a l s o  a f f e c t e d  
t h o s e  who w e r e  s t i l l  o f  w o r k i n g - a g e .  The r e s i d e n t  p o p u l a t i o n  i n  
t h e  same p e r i o d  i n c r e a s e d  s l i g h t l y ,  a l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  t a k i n g  p l a c e  
a m o n g s t  t h o s e  b e l o w  15 and a s m a l l  o n e  i n  t h e  1 5 - 5 4  r a n g e  b u t  n o t  
b e i n g  q u i t e  o v e r b a l a n c e d  by a l a r g e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  o v e r  5 4 s .  The 
i n t e r v i e w s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was i n  f a c t  a much l a r g e r  i n c r e a s e  
a m o n g s t  t h o s e  b e lo w  15 ( a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  h i g h  b i r t h - r a t e s  i n  t h e  
e s t a t e s  i n  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s ' ^ )  and a l s o  a m o n g s t  t h o s e  
b e t w e e n  1 5 - 5 4  b u t  many o f  them h a d  b e e n  f o r c e d  t o  l e a v e  t o  s e e k  
j o b s  e l s e w h e r e  b e c a u s e  o f  l a c k  o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  on t h e  e s t a t e s .  
Am on gst  t h o s e  o v e r  54 ,  much o f  t h e  l a r g e  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e s i d e n t  
p o p u l a t i o n  was due t o  t h e  o l d e r  men and women r e t u r n i n g  t o  I n d i a .  
T o g e t h e r ,  t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  f a l l i n g  em ploym en t  l e v e l s ,  i n c r e a s e d  
p o p u l a t i o n  l e v e l s  am o n g s t  t h o s e  b e lo w  15 and e s p e c i a l l y  am o n g s t  
t h o s e  o f  w o r k i n g - a g e  ( a s  o p p o s e d  t o  t h o s e  o v e r  5 4 )  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
a c t u a l  and p o t e n t i a l  u n em p lo y m en t  m u s t  b e  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  t h e s e  
e s t a t e s .
B e t w e e n  t h e  two t y p e s  o f  e s t a t e s ,  i t  i s  n o t i c e a b l e  t h a t  
t h e  f a l l  i n  t h e  employmen t  l e v e l s  was a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  b o t h  f o r  
t h o s e  b e t w e e n  1 5 - 5 4  and t h o s e  o v e r  54 i n  t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s .  
T h u s ,  u n em p l o y m e n t  i n  t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s  c o u l d  h a v e  i n c r e a s e d  
a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  t h a n  i n  t h e  Member E s t a t e s ,  b u t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  f rom  
t h e  s a m p l e  s u r v e y  on p r o p o r t i o n s  i n i t i a l l y  u n em p lo y ed  o n  e n t r y  i n t o
^ P o p u l a t i o n  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e s e  e s t a t e s  i n  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s  
a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e .  Some i d e a  h o w e v e r  c a n  be  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  
o v e r a l l  f i g u r e s  f o r  Malaya g i v e n  i n  t h e  C e n s u s  R e p o r t  o f  1957 
w h i c h  r e c o r d s  t h a t  b e t w e e n  1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 2  t h e r e  was a n e t  n a t u r a l  
i n c r e a s e  o f  2 7 . 1  p e r  1 , 0 0 0  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  p o p u l a t i o n  and t h a t  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  was h i g h e s t  am o n g s t  t h e  I n d i a n s .  ( D e p a r t m e n t  o f  
S t a t i s t i c s ,  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  M alaya C e n s u s  R e p o r t ,  1957,  K u a la  Lumpur,  
1 9 60 ,  p p . 2 - 3 ) .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  m o s t  I n d i a n s  i n  Malaya  a r e  f o u n d  
i n  t h e  p l a n t a t i o n s ,  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  a r e  o b v i o u s  and  s u p p o r t  t h e  
i m p r e s s i o n s  o b t a i n e d  f r om  i n t e r v i e w s .
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the labour market discussed earlier did not support this interpre­
tation. The apparent contradiction stems from the fact that the 
increase in the resident population in the Non-Member Estates was 
at a very much slower rate than that in the Member Estates and this, 
as revealed by the interviews, was due to the higher rate of evic­
tion of resident Indian labour from the Non-Member Estates. The 
interviews suggested that both the Member and the Non-Member Estates 
had a population explosion on their labour lines but whereas the 
Non-Member Estates, (which were all locally-owned in this sample) 
could deal with this problem for themselves by forcing the surplus 
labour out of their estates, the Member Estates (which were all 
expatriate-owned in this sample) found it impolitic to act so 
drastically. Some of the reasons for this difference in their 
positions will become clear in Part II.
When the percentages of employed to total residents in 
the over 15 age-groups at the two dates are set out in a tabular 
form (Table 6.5), an increase in unemployment may be taken as 
demonstrated, there being nothing to suggest any decline in willing­
ness to seek employment.
Ill
Information on Trends in The Rubber Estates
Some information is also available on the employment and 
unemployment position in the rubber estates of West Malaysia and 
these further confirm the trends suggested by the sample survey.
One source is the official statistics on the employment 
trends in the rubber estates of West Malaysia. The figures are 
collected by the Ministry of Labour in conjunction with the Depart­
ment of Statistics in July of each year. Table 6.6 summarises
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TABLE 6 . 5
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYMENT TO TOTAL RESIDENTS 
1961 AND 1967
J u l y  3 1 s t  1961 J u l y  3 1 s t  1967
Member E s t a t e s :
15 -  54 56 48
>  54 26 18
Non-Member E s t a t e s :
15 -  54 65 52
> 54 24 8
A l l  E s t a t e s :
15 -  54 60 49
>  54 26 16
t h e s e  f i g u r e s  s i n c e  1955 w h i l e  F i g u r e  6 . 1  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  t r e n d s  
g r a p h i c a l l y . ^  I t  i s  c l e a r  f r o m  t h e  t a b l e  and t h e  g r a p h  t h a t  a f t e r  
a p e r i o d  o f  l i t t l e  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  t o t a l  em ploym en t  l e v e l s  b e t w e e n  
1955 and  1963,  a r a p i d  f a l l  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e  s i n c e .
The i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  t h e  e s t a t e  m a n a g e r s ,  t h e  P l a n t i n g  
A d v i s e r s ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  o f  t h e  E m p l o y e r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n  and o f  t h e  
U n i o n  r e v e a l e d  t h a t  a m a j o r i t y  o f  t h o s e  a f f e c t e d  w e r e  w e l l  w i t h i n  
t h e  w o r k i n g - a g e  l i m i t s .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  d i d  n o t  a r i s e  o u t  o f  
v o l u n t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  o f  l a b o u r  t o  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy.
T h e r e  i s  h o w e v e r  no q u a n t i t a t i v e  e v i d e n c e  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
w h i c h  t h o s e  r e t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s  c o u l d  h a v e  f o u n d  j o b s
^ N o t e  t h a t  t h e  I n d i a n s  f o r m  a s m a l l e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  
e s t a t e  l a b o u r - f o r c e  t h a n  t h e  N o n - I n d i a n s ,  and y e t  t h e  s a m p l e  o f  
w o r k e r s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  i n t e r v i e w s  was  d o m i n a t e d  b y  I n d i a n s .  The 
r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  w e r e  e x p l a i n e d  i n  C h a p t e r  2 ( p p . 3 2 - 3 3 ) .
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TABLE 6 . 6
EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS AND NON-INDIANS ON 
RUBBER ESTATES IN WEST MALAYSIA 
1 9 5 5 -1 9 6 7
INDIANS NON-INDIANS T O T A L
Abs .
( n e a r e s t
100)
Index
(1955=
100)
Abs .
( n e a r e s t
100)
Index
(1955=
100)
Abs .
( n e a r e s t
100)
Index
(1955=
100)
1955 1 4 6 ,4 0 0 100 1 3 1 ,8 0 0 100 2 7 8 ,2 0 0 100
1956 1 4 3 ,8 0 0 98 1 3 6 ,4 0 0 104 2 8 0 ,2 0 0 100
1957 1 4 2 ,6 0 0 97 1 3 4 ,2 0 0 102 2 7 6 ,8 0 0 99
1958 1 4 4 ,1 0 0 98 1 3 7 ,8 0 0 105 2 8 1 ,9 0 0 101
1959 1 3 9 ,8 0 0 96 1 4 2 ,7 0 0 108 2 8 2 ,5 0 0 102
1960 1 3 8 ,2 0 0 94 1 4 7 ,1 0 0 112 2 8 5 ,3 0 0 103
1961 1 3 5 ,4 0 0 92 1 5 0 ,2 0 0 114 2 8 5 ,6 0 0 103
1962 1 3 6 ,7 0 0 93 1 4 9 ,5 0 0 113 2 8 6 ,2 0 0 103
1963 1 3 6 ,1 0 0 93 1 5 0 ,2 0 0 114 2 8 6 ,3 0 0 103
1964 1 3 0 ,7 0 0 89 1 4 4 ,7 0 0 110 2 7 5 ,4 0 0 99
1965 1 2 7 ,5 0 0 87 1 4 2 ,6 0 0 108 2 7 0 ,1 0 0 97
1966 1 1 1 ,8 0 0 76 1 3 7 ,7 0 0 105 2 4 9 ,5 0 0 90
1967 1 0 5 ,5 0 0 72 1 2 6 ,4 0 0 96 2 3 1 ,9 0 0 83
S o u r c e :  D epartm ent o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Rubber S t a t i s t i c s  Handbook, 1 9 5 5 -
1 9 6 7 .
e l s e w h e r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t a t e  p r e c i s e l y  th e  numbers unem ployed a s  a 
r e s u l t  o f  t h e s e  f a l l s  i n  th e  employment l e v e l s .  But some q u a l i t a ­
t i v e  s u g g e s t i o n s  w ere  made d u r in g  th e  i n t e r v i e w s .  Thus, i t  appeared  
t h a t  m ost o f  t h o s e  r e t r e n c h e d  s i n c e  1963 c o u ld  n o t  have  found j o b s  e l s e ­
w here  s i n c e  t h e r e  was g e n e r a l  unemploym ent in  t h e  e s t a t e s  and e l s e ­
w h ere  in  th e  econom y, th e  e v i d e n c e  f o r  w h ich  i s  p r e s e n t e d  l a t e r  in
t h i s  c h a p t e r .
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FIGURE 6.1
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS OF INDIANS AND NON-INDIANS ON THE RUBBER ESTATES
IN WEST MALAYSIA
1955 - 1967
140 -
Non-Indians
Indians
1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967
Y E A R
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A p o i n t  made e a r l i e r  i n  C h ap te r  5 t h a t  f o r  sometime  now 
t h e  e s t a t e  managers were i n t r o d u c i n g  a l a r g e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Non- 
I n d i a n  la bo u r  i n t o  t h e i r  w o r k - f o r c e  i s  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  f i g u r e s  
shown i n  T a b l e  6 . 6  ( s e e  a l s o  t h e  t r e n d s  i n  F i g u r e  6.1).  Thus,  as b e t ­
ween I n d i a n s  and th e  o t h e r s ,  t h e  fo rm er  were  b e i n g  r e t r e n c h e d  from 
as  e a r l y  as  1955 ( w i t h  th e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  but  one y e a r  i n  1 9 5 8 ) ,  w h i l e  
t h e  l a t t e r  were b e i n g  unemployed i n  g r e a t e r  numbers up t o  1963.  
F u r t h e r ,  when g e n e r a l  r e t r e n c h m e n t s  began  i n  1963 ,  t h e  I n d ia n s  
w e re  a f f e c t e d  a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r s :  t h u s ,  b e tw een
1 9 6 3 - 1 9 6 7 ,  23% o f  th e  I n d i a n s  we re  r e t r e n c h e d  a s  a g a i n s t  o n l y  16% 
f o r  th e  o t h e r  r a c e s .
Anoth er  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  on unemployment i n  th e  
e s t a t e s  i s  a s u r v e y  co n d u c ted  by t h e  Malayan A g r i c u l t u r a l  P r o d u c e r s ' 
A s s o c i a t i o n  i n  May 1968 on a l l  i t s  Member E s t a t e s  ' t o  o b t a i n  p a r t i ­
c u l a r s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  and c o n t i n g e n t  l e v e l s  o f  unemployment among 
p e r s o n s  who a r e  r e s i d e n t  on r u b b e r ,  o i l  palm and c o c o n u t  e s t a t e s ' 1 .
The r e t u r n s  o b t a i n e d  from t h e  e s t a t e s  c o v e r e d  about  1 , 1 7 7 , 0 0 0  
a c r e s ,  fo rm ing  85% o f  th e  a c r e a g e  under i t s  membership and s l i g h t l y  
o v e r  60% o f  t h e  t o t a l  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  i n  West M a la y s ia  f o r  ru b ber ,  
o i l  palm and c o c o n u t s .  The main u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  f i g u r e s  from t h i s  
s u r v e y  a r e  t h a t  t h e y  show a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  unemployment e x i s t e d  not  
o n l y  in  th e  ru bbe r e s t a t e s  b u t  a l s o  i n  t h e  o i l  palm and co c o n u t  
e s t a t e s .  Thus,  t h o s e  r e t r e n c h e d  i n  t h e  former c o u l d  have h a r d l y  
hoped t o  o b t a i n  a l t e r n a t i v e  employment  i n  t h e  l a t t e r .
The r e s u l t s  o f  MAPA's s u r v e y  can be summarised in  a few 
w o r d s .  I t  showed t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  r e s i d e n t  l a b o u r - f o r c e  ( t h o s e  employed
1MAPA, P r e s e n t  and C o n t i n g e n t  L e v e l s  o f  Unemployment o f  R e s i d e n t s  
on E s t a t e s , ( C i r c u l a r  No. 1 1 / 6 8 ) ,  MAPA, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.
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ordinarily or casually and those still seeking jobs) was 163,791 
on the estates making the returns, of which 57,819 (35%) were 
unemployed, and amongst these about 55% were between the ages 
12-16 and the rest between 17-54. The interviews suggested that 
these percentages were about equal for both the rubber and the 
other estates. Further, the survey showed that there was a high 
level of 'potentially' unemployed workers in these estates, 3,476 
tappers and 1,686 field-workers being actually redundant if task- 
sizes and other duties were increased to the optimum desired by 
management, and 4,343 additional tappers and field-workers would 
become redundant if fields considered actually uneconomic by manage­
ment were closed. Management however refrained from doing both 
mainly on political and on welfare considerations, that is, to 
avoid creating industrial unrest in the estates and to provide 
employment to bread-earners amongst the resident population.
Finally, some qualitative information obtained from inter­
views with the Planting Advisers in the Agency Houses and the 
managers on the estates confirm these indications. Thus, most of 
them frequently referred to the increasing numbers of job appli­
cants amongst the Indian estate population relative to the decreasing 
numbers of jobs in recent years compared with a few years back.
Indeed one does not have to stay long in most of the estates to 
see large numbers of idle men and women, nor does one need to 
stay long in most of them to observe that despite big No Vacancy 
notices in Malay and the other vernacular languages at the entrance 
to the estates and in front of the Estate Office buildings, hopeful 
applicants were still coming in search of jobs. Workers, too, 
during the interviews, expressed greater fears for the security of
their jobs than they said they felt some years back.
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A question that could arise is whether this availability 
in terms of numbers means also availability in terms of the required 
skills. In the case of the Indians, it almost certainly does. They 
could be presumed to have sufficient knowledge of some type of 
estate work to be employed immediately, if required, without any 
further training. It was, after all, a normal thing for most school 
children on the estates to assist their parents in their jobs after 
school-hours.
IV
Information on Trends in West Malaysia
There is also the evidence of two nation-wide sample
surveys of Employment and Unemployment conducted by the Department
of Statistics in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour in 1962 and
1967/68. These gave, among much other information not relevant here,
figures and percentages of unemployed in the labour-force by area,
1sex and age. The results considered most relevant for this study 
are summarised in Table 6.7.
The table shows that the overall rate of unemployment was 
fairly high in 1962 at 6.01% of the total labour force; by 1967, 
this rate increased to 6 .76%. In absolute terms, there was an 
increase in numbers unemployed by over 33,000 persons. The table 
also shows that unemployment rose in both the rural and the urban
For detailed results, see Department of Statistics, Federation of 
Malaya Report on Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment, 1962, 
and Malaysia Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households 1967/68: 
Provisional Data on Employment and Unemployment in West Malaysia, 
1967/68 (Restricted Circulation), Kuala Lumpur. Two other surveys 
were also carried out in 1964 and 1965 but the sample selected was 
confined to the five largest towns in West Malaysia: see Department
of Statistics, Report on Employment and Unemployment in Metropolitan 
Towns, States of Malaya, 1965, Kuala Lumpur (which also incorporates 
the results of the 1964 Survey).
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sectors of the economy. The increase was higher in the latter but 
because of the much larger labour force in the former (averaging 
about two-and-a-half times that in the urban areas), over 60% of 
the numbers unemployed were found in the rural areas.
TABLE 6.7
UNEMPLOYMENT IN WEST MALAYSIA, 1962 AND 1967
1962 1967
Numbers
Unem­
ployed
Labour
Force
% of Lab. 
force un­
employed
Numbers
Unem­
ployed
Labour 
Fore e
% of Lab. 
force un­
employed
Rural Areas:
Men 53,871 1,214,595 4.44 56,142 1,199,675 4.68
Women 37,124 603,903 6.15 42,939 645,840 6.65
All 90,995 1,818,498 5 .00 99,081 1,845,515 5.37
Urban Areas: 
(Population 
= or >10,000)
Men 33,642 478,088 7.04 44,319 587,142 7.55
Women 22,924 156,710 14.63 36,967 242,963 15.22
All 56,566 634,798 8.91 81,286 830,105 9.79
All Areas:
Men 87,513 1,692,683 5.17 100,461 1,786,817 5.62
Women 60,048 760,613 7.89 80,406 888,803 9.05
All 147,561 2,453,296 6.01 180,867 2,675,620 6.76
Sources: Department of Statistics, Employment and Unemployment Survey, 
1962 and Socio-Economic Survey, 1967/1968 (Restricted 
Circulation).
Apart from the above, the two surveys also threw out other 
points of relevance for this study:
First, these surveys revealed that unemployment was rising 
at a very fast rate amongst new entrants into the labour market and 
supported the trends indicated by the Worker Interviews. Thus in
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1962 some 63% of the total numbers unemployed came from the age- 
group 15-24, from whom most of the new entrants into the labour 
market are found, though this age-group accounted for only 30% of 
the total labour-force in that year; by 1967, 76% of the numbers 
employed came from this age-group though they formed only 32% of 
the total labour-force. This trend was true both for the rural 
and the urban sectors.1
Secondly, the surveys showed that while the unemployment
rate in terms of the total labour-force for each of the major races
was about the same in 1962, by 1967 this pattern had changed and the
increase in unemployment was mostly concentrated amongst the Indians.
Thus, the unemployment rate for the Malays fell from 6.1 to 5.8%
while that for the Chinese went up from 6.0 to 6 .9% and that for
the Indians from 6.0 to 10.3%. Thus, unemployment was not only
growing steadily in the economy but was hitting the Indians the 
ohardest.
It is possible that the absolute levels of unemployment 
were higher in the economy for both Surveys had it not been for the 
very rigid definition adopted in measuring unemployment. An un-
1Department of Statistics, Socio-Economic Survey, 1967/68 (Restricted 
Circulation), Tables 3.1 to 3.4.
2It is worth recording that the final results of the 1967/68 Survey 
were made public after this thesis was already in the typing stages. 
See, The Sunday Times, March 7, 1971, p. 6, The Sunday Mail, March 
7, 1971, p. 2, both of the Straits Times Press, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Department of Statistics, Socio-Economic Sample Survey - Malaysia, 
1967-68, October 1970, P- 110. This last report came to the writer's 
attention only in March 1971 and seemed to contain a wealth of 
statistical information on employment/unemployment in West Malaysia 
but no further analysis of the data was possible at this late stage. 
However, that the broad results should tally so closely with the 
findings from the Worker Interviews supports the statement made 
in Chapter 2 that this sample was 'representative' of a large sector 
of the economy.
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em ploy ed  w o r k e r  was d e f i n e d  a s  o n e  who was n o t  g a i n f u l l y  a t  work  on 
an y  day d u r i n g  t h e  week p r e c e d i n g  t h e  e n u m e r a t i o n  b u t  who was  a c t u a l l y  
s e e k i n g  employmen t  and c a p a b l e  o f  t a k i n g  a j o b  i f  o f f e r e d  o n e /  The 
w r i t e r  was p e r s o n a l l y  i n v o l v e d  a s  a n  e n u m e r a t o r  i n  t h e  1962 Employ­
men t  and Unemployment  S u r v e y  and had come a c r o s s  a number  o f  c a s e s  
o f  p e r s o n s  who g e n u i n e l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  be  u n em p lo y ed  and 
w e r e  a c t i v e l y  s e e k i n g  j o b s  b u t  b e c a u s e  i n  t h e  m ean t im e  t h e y  k e p t  
t h e m s e l v e s  b u s y  w i t h  some odd j o b s  h e r e  and t h e r e ,  t h e  s u r v e y  t r e a t e d  
them as  b e i n g  e m p lo y e d .
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  unem p lo y m en t  l e v e l s  was p r o b a b l y  
h i g h e r  b e t w e e n  1962 and 1967 t h a n  t h a t  shown i n  T a b l e  6 . 7 .  T h i s  
was b e c a u s e  i n  t h e  1962 S u r v e y ,  t h e  l a b o u r - f o r c e  i n c l u d e d  a l l  t h o s e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  a g e s  o f  15 and 70 i n  t h e  m a r k e t ;  i n  1967,  o n l y  t h o s e  
b e t w e e n  1 5 -6 5  w e r e  i n c l u d e d .  S i n c e  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  unem ploym en t  
i s  g e n e r a l l y  g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  6 5 - 7 0  a g e - g r o u p  t h a n  w i t h  m o s t  o t h e r  a g e -  
g r o u p s ,  t h e i r  e l i m i n a t i o n  r e d u c e s  t h e  o v e r a l l  i n c i d e n c e  o f  u n e m p l o y ­
m en t  i n  1967.
Thus  t h e r e  seems s u f f i c i e n t  e v i d e n c e  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  u n e m p l o y ­
ment  i n  t h e  economy a s  a w h o le  t o  make i t  c e r t a i n  t h a t  i t  m u s t  a l s o  
h a v e  b e e n  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  t h e  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s  o f  West  M a l a y s i a ,  d e s p i t e  
t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  an y  d i r e c t  m e a s u r e  o f  o v e r a l l  unem p lo y m en t  i n  t h i s  
s e c t o r .
' G a i n f u l l y  a t  w o r k '  was i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  c o v e r  a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  G r o s s  N a t i o n a l  P r o d u c t  a s  g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  g a i n f u l  
em p lo y m en t .  H ence ,  h o u s e w i v e s  and s t u d e n t s  w e r e  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  as  
g a i n f u l l y  em ployed  u n l e s s  t h e y  had  a s e c o n d a r y  o c c u p a t i o n  o r  w e r e  i n  
t h e  l a b o u r - f o r c e  (b y  a c t i v e l y  s e e k i n g  e m p l o y m e n t ) .  S i c k  p e r s o n s ,  
t h o s e  on v a c a t i o n  and t h o s e  on i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
p e r i o d  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  a s  em ployed  i f  t h e i r  names w e r e  s t i l l  on  t h e i r  
e m p l o y e r s '  p a y r o l l s .  ' A c t i v e l y  l o o k i n g  f o r  w o r k '  was i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  
mean had  r e g i s t e r e d  a t  an  Employmen t  E x c h a n g e ,  a n s w e r e d  j o b  a d v e r t i s e ­
m e n t s ,  a s k e d  an  e m p l o y e r  ( v e r b a l l y  o r  i n  w r i t i n g )  f o r  w ork ,  o r  ev e n  
a s k e d  f r i e n d s  t o  ' k e e p  an  e y e  o p e n '  f o r  j o b s .  A p a r t  f r om  t h e  r i g i d ­
i t y  b e i n g  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o t h e r w i s e  seems v e r y  s o u n d .
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING PART I
W i th  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e  o n  u n e m p lo y m en t  com­
p l e t e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  d a t a  
f r o m  t h e  s a m p l e  s u r v e y  a l s o  e n d s .  A summary o f  t h e  m a in  f i n d i n g s  
o f  P a r t  I c a n  t h e r e f o r e  be  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e .
The s t u d y  s e t  o u t  t o  d e s c r i b e  and e x p l a i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  d a i l y  e a r n i n g s  i n  t h e  m o n th  o f  J u l y  1967 f o r  484 
w o r k e r s  on a s a m p l e  o f  n i n e  e s t a t e s  (C hap .  2 ,  p . 2 8  and C h ap .  2 ,  S e c t i o n  
I I I ) .  The s a m p le  o f  w o r k e r s  c o v e r e d  t h e  m a in  o c c u p a t i o n a l  g r a d e s  
i n  t h e s e  e s t a t e s  and c o m p r i s e d  more  t h a n  80% o f  t h e i r  t o t a l  l a b o u r -  
f o r c e  (C hap .  2 ,  p p . 2 7 - 2 9 ) .  The e s t a t e s  w e r e  a l l  f rom  S e l a n g o r  
and b e l i e v e d  t o  be  r e a s o n a b l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  and  t h e  
ab o v e  a v e r a g e  e f f i c i e n t  e s t a t e s  (a n d  t h o s e  e m p l o y i n g  a l a r g e r  p r o ­
p o r t i o n  o f  I n d i a n  l a b o u r )  , i n  t h e  S t a t e s  on  t h e  w e s t  c o a s t  o f  West  
M a l a y s i a  (C h ap .  2 ,  p p . 1 8 - 2 6 ) .
The d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  e a r n i n g s  d a t a  r e v e a l e d  a c l e a r  
t h r e e - l e v e l  h i e r a r c h i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  t h e  k a n g a n i e s  e a r n i n g  t h e  
h i g h e s t  a v e r a g e  d a i l y  e a r n i n g s ,  t h e  t a p p e r s  an d  t h e  f a c t o r y  w o r k e r s  
n e x t ,  and t h e  f i e l d - w o r k e r s  t h e  l o w e s t  (C h ap .  3 ,  p p . 4 3 - 4 6 ) .  B e t ­
ween  t h e  two t y p e s  o f  e s t a t e s ,  t h e  Members and t h e  Non-Members  ( t h e  
f i r s t  bound  by t h e  U n i o n - n e g o t i a t e d  A g r e e m e n t s  and t h e  s e c o n d  n o t ) ,  
t h e  e a r n i n g s  w e r e  h i g h e r  f o r  a l l  t h e  g r a d e s  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  ( C h ap .  3 ,  
p p .  4 6 - 4 9 ) .  Sex D i f f e r e n t i a l s  w e r e  o f  some b u t  l i m i t e d  i m p o r t a n c e ,  
s i n c e  k a n g a n i e s  w e r e  a l l  men,  and o n l y  f e m a l e  f i e l d  and f a c t o r y  
w o r k e r s  w e r e  p a i d  l o w e r  r a t e s  t h a n  t h e i r  m a l e  c o u n t e r p a r t s ;  b u t  
w i t h  t h e  t a p p e r s  (who f o r m e d  t h e  l a r g e s t  s i n g l e  g r o u p  and t h e
m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s '  w o r k - f o r c e ) ,  w o m en ' s  r a t e s  w e r e  t h e  same
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a s  m e n ' s  i n  t h e  Member E s t a t e s  and a l m o s t  t h e  same i n  t h e  Non- 
Member E s t a t e s  (Chap.  3 ,  p p . 4 9 - 5 1 ) .  Age h a s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  
on  p e r s o n a l  e a r n i n g s  (Chap .  3 ,  p p .  5 1 - 5 5 ) .
Though  t h i s  s t u d y  h a s  n o t  a c h i e v e d  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  e x p l a n a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  e a r n i n g s  s t r u c t u r e  on t h e  e s t a t e s  ex a m in e d  ( i t  b e i n g  n o t  
d e s i g n e d  t o  a c h i e v e ,  a s  s t a t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  1 ) ,  t h e  r e l a t i v i t i e s  
t h e m s e l v e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  g r a d e s  w e r e  r e a s o n a b l y  e x p l i c a b l e  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and s k i l l s  (C hap .  3,  pp .  5 8 -  
6 5 ) .  W i t h i n  e a c h  s u b - g r o u p  d e f i n e d  by  e s t a t e ,  g r a d e  and s e x ,  t h e  
q u i t e  w i d e  d i s p e r s i o n s  o f  pay o c c u r r e d  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  e f f o r t  p u t  i n  by w o r k e r s  v i a  o v e r t i m e  h o u r s  and t a s k - s i z e s ,  and 
b e c a u s e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e a r n i n g s  o b t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  o u t p u t  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  t o  f a v o u r i t i s m  by m a n a g e r s  i n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  o v e r t i m e  
h o u r s ,  t a s k - s i z e s  and i n  s e t t i n g  p e r s o n a l  r a t e s  (Chap.  4 ) .
The s t r u c t u r e  and i t s  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h u s  f a r  r e v e a l s  l i t t l e  
t h a t  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n f a m i l i a r  t o  t h o s e  i n f o r m e d  on t h e  i n d u s t r y ' s  
l a b o u r  m a r k e t ,  b u t  t h e  d e t a i l e d  a n n o t a t i o n  and m e a s u r e m e n t  h a s  b e e n  
p r e s e n t e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e .  One s t r i k i n g  f a c t  ho w e v e r  em er g ed ,  
n a m e l y ,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  U n i o n - n e g o t i a t e d  Wage 
A g r e e m e n t  o f  1964 on t h e  e a r n i n g s  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  e s t a t e s  e x a m i n e d .  
T h u s ,  t h i s  A g re em en t  seemed  m a i n l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  Member and t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s  (C hap .  3 ,  pp.  5 5 - 5 8 ) ;  
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  w e r e  e s p e c i a l l y  n o t a b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
b o t h  t h e s e  two t y p e s  o f  e s t a t e s  w e r e  a s  homogeneous  a s  was p o s s i b l e  
i n  m o s t  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s  ( C h ap .  2 ,  pp .  1 8 - 2 3 ) .  The same Wage A g r e e ­
men t  was  a l s o  m a i n l y  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  f o r  
e f f e c t i v e l y  m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  w i d e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p e r s o n a l  e a r n i n g s  
t h a t  m i g h t  h a v e  o t h e r w i s e  b e e n  due t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  p e r s o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s u c h  a s  ag e  o r  s e x ,  o r  t o  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  t h e
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differences in the age and the quality of the trees, yields per 
acre and yields per tapper. Together, these demonstrated the 
proximate influence of the National Union of Plantation Workers 
on the rates and conditions of work of employees in the Member 
Estates (and indirectly also on the Non-Member Estates).
The data presented on mobility brought out clearly the 
extreme immobility in terms of Voluntary Job-changing of the Indians 
(Table 5.1, p. 93) who, as already noted, formed the largest single 
group in the estates’ work-force (Chap. 2, pp. 32-33). This 
suggested that mobility was of little significance in influencing 
an important aspect of the estate wage structure, namely the differen­
tials in their earnings between those in the Member and those in the 
Non-Member Estates: for instance, see the differentials in earnings
of Time-Rates Tappers (Table 3.4, p. 48). It supported the impor­
tance of institutional factors in wage determination in the estates, 
a point suggested above.
The extreme immobility of the Indians contrasts sharply 
with that of the Chinese and to a lesser extent that of the Malays, 
suggesting initially a possibility that economic factors could: have 
relatively more influence on the earnings differentials of the 
Chinese and the Malays between these two types of estates. But when 
it is considered that the rates of all the estate workers in all the 
different grades were tied in one way or another to those of the 
Indians (Time-Rates Tappers), this initial possibility gives way to 
another more likely one which suggests that indirectly the institu­
tional factors have also played an important part in the earnings 
structure of workers from the other races.
In broad terms the mobility evidence again represents 
fairly familiar facts, but the numerical evidence presented here
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i s  t h e  f i r s t  o f  i t s  k i n d  i n  M a l a y s i a .  The e x t e n t  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  r a c i a l  g r o u p s  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  come a s  s t a r t l i n g .  The 
f a c t  o f  t h e  M alay  e s t a t e  l a b o u r  b e i n g  much more  m o b i l e  t h a n  t h e  I n d i a n  
w i l l  p r o b a b l y  a l s o  s u r p r i s e  some;  s i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  e n t r y  o f  t h e  Non-  
I n d i a n s  i n t o  t h e  e s t a t e s  i n  s u c h  l a r g e  num bers  s i n c e  t h e  1950s  and 
now f o r m i n g  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  w o r k - f o r c e  on t h e  e s t a t e s  i n  West  
M a l a y s i a ,  f r e q u e n t l y  s t i l l  r e f e r r e d  a s  b e i n g  I n d i a n - d o m i n a t e d ,  w i l l  
a l s o  come a s  a s u r p r i s e  t o  o t h e r s .  T h e s e  f a c t s  a r e  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  
t h e m s e l v e s  b u t  i t  i s  t h e  r e l e v a n c e ,  e v e n  i f  o n l y  n e g a t i v e l y ,  o f  t h e  
m o b i l i t y  d a t a  t o  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  wage s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  
i s  o f  i m m e d i a t e  c o n c e r n  h e r e .
The f i g u r e s  p r e s e n t e d  on t h e  employment  r e c o r d s  o f  t h e  
s a m p l e  o f  w o r k e r s  i n d i c a t e d  a r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  unem ploym en t  i n  t h e  
e s t a t e s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  am o n g s t  t h e  I n d i a n s  ( C h a p . 6,  
T a b l e  6 . 1 ,  p .  116,  T a b l e  6 . 3 ,  p .  1 1 9 ) .  The r a p i d  f a l l  i n  t h e  
em pl oy m en t  l e v e l s  on t h e  e s t a t e s  (Chap .  6 ,  T a b l e  6 . 4 ,  p .  120 an d  
T a b l e  6 . 5 ,  p . 1 2 3 ) ,  and t h e  g e n e r a l  r i s e  i n  u nem ploym en t  i n  r e c e n t  
y e a r s  (C h ap .  6 ,  T a b l e  6 . 7 ,  p . 1 2 9  and  p . 1 3 0 ) ,  o f  w h ich  
s e p a r a t e  e v i d e n c e  was g i v e n ,  showed t h a t  t h i s  s u r v e y  i n d i r e c t l y  
c o n f i r m e d  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  em ploym en t  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  
T o g e t h e r ,  t h e  e v i d e n c e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s u p p l y  an d  demand f o r c e s  c o u l d  
h a v e  h a r d l y  b e e n  i n f l u e n t i a l  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  e s t a t e  wage s t r u c ­
t u r e  i n  1967 and by i m p l i c a t i o n  c o n f i r m e d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  o t h e r  
f a c t o r s ,  o f  an  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  n a t u r e ,  i n  wage d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i n  t h i s  
i n d u s t r y .
T h e s e  f i n d i n g s  t h u s  r a i s e  some q u e s t i o n s  on t h e  r o l e  o f  
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  e s t a t e  wage s t r u c t u r e  
and t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  s u c h  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e
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rubber estate labour market. The questions and the probable answers 
are matters reserved for Part II.
PART II
THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONISATION
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CHAPTER 8
INTRODUCING PART II
Part I has described the wage structure in a sample of 
estates at one point of time and has largely presented a static 
picture. In bringing out the superiority of conditions on the 
Member Estates in July 1967 and the dominant role of the Union's 
Wage Agreement of 1964 with the Association in determining the 
details of their earnings structure, an obvious suggestion was 
made that the Union's pressure has been a prime factor in raising, 
over time, the average level of earnings of the employees on the 
Member Estates. To what extent this is a fact is an issue that 
is obviously relevant to the present investigation of the estate 
wage structure. It is therefore discussed in some length in Part 
II .
Further, in presenting evidence to show almost conclusively 
(though no doubt without the precise measurement that would have 
been desirable) that unemployment among the estate population has 
been increasing in a very serious way, another suggestion was implied, 
namely that in terms of elementary economic theory the Union's policy 
of raising the price of labour has reduced the profitability of the 
estates and was chiefly responsible for increasing unemployment in 
them by diminishing their employment levels. It is argueable whether 
the matter is strictly a part of wage structure investigation but the 
implications of such a conclusion in this particular case are serious, 
and the issue therefore needs some discussion. This is particularly 
so since, in the writer's judgement, the conclusion is misleading.
In the following pages, an attempt is therefore also made to show
why the conclusion is almost wholly false.
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The a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  P a r t  I I  i s  a s
f o l l o w s  :
C h a p t e r  9 d e s c r i b e s  b r o a d l y  t h e  h i s t o r i e s  o f  t h e  two 
n e g o t i a t i n g  p a r t i e s  whose  C o l l e c t i v e  A g r e e m e n t s  hav e  p r o x i m a t e l y  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  l e v e l  and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  w ages  i n  much o f  t h e  
e s t a t e  s e c t o r  i n  West  M a l a y s i a .  I t  a l s o  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  f o r m a l  r o l e  
o f  t h e  S t a t e  i n  t h e i r  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  C h a p t e r  10 s u m m a r i s e s  t h e  
a c t u a l  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t h a t  t o o k  p l a c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  two p a r t i e s  and 
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s u c c e s s i v e  A g r e e m e n t s  s i n c e  1954 when t h e  NUPW 
was f o r m a l l y  i n a u g u r a t e d .  Th e i n f o r m a l  r o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  t h e i r  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  i s  a l s o  b r o u g h t  o u t  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
T h e s e  two c h a p t e r s  t h e r e f o r e  k e e p  c l o s e  t o  t h e  d e t a i l s  
o f  wage d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and m a t t e r s  i m m e d i a t e l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  i t .  The 
d i s c u s s i o n  i s  k e p t  v e r y  g e n e r a l  ( t h e  m a i n  p u r p o s e  b e i n g  t o  p r e s e n t  
some b a c k g r o u n d  m a t e r i a l s ) ,  and some o v e r l a p p i n g  a t  t i m e s  seems 
u n a v o i d a b l e .  W h i l e  t h e  e v e n t s  s i n c e  t h e  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  1964 Wage 
A g r e e m e n t  had no i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  l e a d i n g  t o  i t ,  i t  
i s  s t i l l  u s e f u l  t o  i n c l u d e  b r i e f  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  them i n  t h e s e  two 
c h a p t e r s  ( a n d  i n  t h e  n e x t  o n e )  b e c a u s e  t h e y  p r o v i d e  a w i d e r  p e r s p e c ­
t i v e  t o  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  a s  a w h o l e .
C h a p t e r  11 t h e n  g o e s  more  w i d e l y  i n t o  t h e  s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l  
f o r c e s  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  wage n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  and t h e  
e c o n o m ic  b a c k g r o u n d  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d .  
Th e c h a p t e r  shows t h a t  s o  many o t h e r  l a r g e  and c o m p l e x  i n f l u e n c e s  
h a v e  b e e n  a t  w ork  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  e s t a t e  s e c t o r  t h a t  
i t  w o u ld  b e  q u i t e  i m p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  
t o  s o r t  o u t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  w ork  o f  one  o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s  p o l i c y .  
F i n a l l y ,  C h a p t e r  12 c o n c l u d e s  t h e  s t u d y  by a m p l i f y i n g  o n  some o f  
t h e  t e n t a t i v e  j u d g e m e n t s  made e a r l i e r  on  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s
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activities on the level and structure of wages in the Member Estates 
and its influence on the unemployment situation in them.
Some of the discussion in Chapters 11 and 12 is suggestive 
rather than definitive because detailed information on many matters 
which would be essential for a thorough analysis is not publicly 
available and would take years to assemble from primary sources.
The issues about which judgements are offered in these two chapters 
are issues in which not only the politics of a complex multi-racial 
society (such as Malaysia is) but also the economics of a complicated 
and highly dynamic industry (such as the rubber industry is) are 
involved. In writing a thesis primarily concerned with wage matters, 
and in the writing of which most time has necessarily been devoted 
to the collection of primary data about earnings, it has not been 
possible to go into great detail with the extremely difficult (and 
so far only partly analysed) problems which lie in the background.
But it would be even more wrong to ignore them altogether here and
some discussion at this stage seems preferable to none.
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CHAPTER 9
THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES 
I
The National Union of Plantation Workers
Early in 1968 when this study began, the National Union of 
Plantation Workers (NUPW) had a paid-up membership of 137,100 out of 
a total of 231,900 employees in the rubber estates in West Malaysia (Table 
9.1, p.150). This membership figure was by far the largest for any 
trade union in West Malaysia and accounted for approximately 38% of 
the total union membership in the country, though there were over 
300 other workers'trade unions organised at this time.^ In terms of 
degree of unionisation, that is, the union membership figures as a 
percentage of the employment figures, it was 59% in the former and 
14% in the latter. The contrast was obvious.
More than this contrast, it is also interesting to know 
that the actual numbers supporting the Union's cause in the rubber 
estates were much more than these figures suggested. The figures 
here referred only to the paid-up membership figures and there were 
known to be a few thousand members who were still in arrears, 
apparently a common phenomenon at a time when the prices of rubber 
are on a sudden downswing as was the case here late in 1967 (Table 11.2, p. 
207) and also early in 1968. Further, estate employment was to a 
very large extent the family-unit type of employment in which father, 
mother, sons and daughters could all be employed in the same estate
Ministry of Labour, Registry of Trade Unions, 1968, Kuala Lumpur.1
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and, with such cases, only one or two in the household actually 
became paid-up members of the Union even though the rest supported 
the Union's cause. Thus, in the national strike called by the 
Union in 1964 (to be discussed in Chapter 10), more than 90% of the 
resident workers in the Member Estates, and more than half from the 
Non-Member Estates, participated even though not all of them were 
paid-up members of the Union.
The Union's financial position in 1968 was also very 
strong, with assets at cost less depreciation exceeding M$2 million 
(at market value estimated to exceed M$3.2 million), and an average 
cash-position in hand or in banks nearing M$^ million. The largest 
of the other unions in West Malaysia had hardly a quarter of this 
Union's assets or cash.'1' It also appeared to be a very well-organised 
Union with over 100 full-time paid clerical and senior staff carrying 
out its varied activities in seven different departments at the 
National Headquarters ranging from the Department of Industrial 
Relations to the Department of International Relations, and in the 
eight branch-offices in the different parts of the country dealing 
specifically with problems at the regional level. In addition, it 
had organised recently a Youth Section which was growing rapidly, 
and a Women's Section, both of which were meant to cater especially 
for the needs of these two groups.2
The Union was also unique in a variety of other ways:
Its concern for the education of its officials and its 
members' children has been extraordinary. For almost ten years now,
^National Union of Plantation Workers, General Report, 1965-1968, 
Plantation House, (NUPW Headquarters), Petaling Jaya, pp.87 arid 
93-104, and Ministry of Labour, Registry of Trade Unions, 1968.
2National Union of Plantation Workers, General Report, 1965-1968, 
pp.1-55.
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scholarships have been awarded to deserving cases in primary and 
secondary schools in Malaysia and more recently also to those able 
to further their studies in colleges or universities at home and 
overseas. In addition, two hostels together costing nearly M$| 
million with accommodation facilities for more than 200 students 
have also been built, one in the east coast state of Kelantan and 
the other in Petaling Jaya in Selangor to provide subsidised board 
and accommodation to deserving cases from the rural areas so as they 
can further their education in the better schools in the towns.
Apart from this, it also organises courses for its officials at the 
headquarters and at the local levels, or sends them for overseas 
training to countries such as India, Thailand, Philippines, Formosa,
1Hong Kong, Switzerland, Ceylon, England, Australia, Japan and Israel.
Further, some of its other activities also extended far
beyond those conventionally confined to trade unions. Thus, it
has launched two very important enterprises to encourage ownership
of estates and participation in other investment opportunities by
its members and their families. The first of these was called the
Great Aloniers Trading Corporation with an authorised capital of
M$30 million; it had just purchased a large estate costing more
than M$3 million. The second was a Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society
2which was just beginning to function.
Finally, few officials of the other trade unions in West 
Malaysia have had such distinguished careers in public life as its 
General Secretary, P.P. Narayanan or its President, S.P.S. Nathan.
National Union of Plantation Workers, General Report, 1962-1965, 
pp.40-44, and General Report, 1965-1968, pp.54-55, pp.86-92.
oNational Union of Plantation Workers, General Report, 1965-1968, 
p .4.
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The former has held, on various occasions in the past, positions 
such as the President of the Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC), 
Member of the Federal Legislative Council during the Colonial 
Government, and Vice-President of the Asian Regional Organisation of 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ARO-ICFTU). He 
was also the first joint recipient in Malaysia of the Magsaysay Award, 
given by the Philippines Government for distinguished public services 
in the region, the second and the only other Malaysian recipient 
being Malaysia's Prime Minister from 1957 to 1970, Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
Currently, he was holding amongst a number of other offices the follow 
ing positions: President of the ARO-ICFTU, Chairman of the Social
and Economic Committee of the ICFTU World Body, Member of the 
Employees’ Provident Fund Board (Malaysia) and the National Family 
Planning Associations Board (Malaysia), and was also the longest 
serving Member on the Board of Management of the National Electricity 
Board (Malaysia). It is interesting to note that even under the con­
ditions of authoritarian rule in Malaysia, arising out of the racial 
riots in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969, the General Secretary sits as an 
independent representa.tive on the National Consultative Council, an
ad hoc body set up by the government to pave the nation back to
1parliamentary democracy. The President of the Union, on the other
Violent racial riots broke out in Kuala Lumpur after the results 
of the General Elections held on May 10th, 1969 were announced.
To prevent these from developing into a civil war, the government 
suspended parliamentary democracy and set up an authoritarian type 
of body called the National Operations Council to deal with the 
problem. In place of Parliament, the National Operations Council 
set up a National Consultative Council to advise it and to pave 
the nation back to parliamentary democracy.
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hand, was then holding, amongst others, the post of a nominated 
Senator in the Upper House of the Malaysian Parliament.
In short, the NUFW was and remained in 1968 an organisa­
tion of some standing in the country. The path it had taken to 
reach this position was however not an easy one, being marked by 
numerous difficulties. Its history may now be traced briefly here, 
divided into two main periods, 1946-1954 and 1955-1967.
The first law providing for the registration and the con­
trol of trade unions, and the conferring of legal status on them, 
was introduced in Malaya only in 1940, namely the Trade Unions 
Enactment, 1940.1 For a variety of reasons, however, such as the 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya from 1941-1945, no trade unions were 
registered under this Ordinance. After the war, this legislation was 
superseded by the Trade Unions Ordinance of 1946,  ^ the provisions of 
which remained basically the same as those in the earlier legislation. 
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had earlier fought together 
with the British resistance movement against the Japanese and was by 
now a well-organised body, emerged out of the jungles and began to 
organise trade unions under this legislation all over the country.
^Federation of Malaya, Trade Unions Enactment, No.11 of 1940, Government 
Printer, Kuala Lumpur. For an account of the early legislation and the 
origins of the trade union movement in Malaya, see Awberry, S.S. and 
Dailey, F.W., Labour and Trade Union Organisation in the Federation 
of Malaya and Singapore, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1948, and 
Gamba, Charles, Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, Donald Moore, 
Singapore, 1962. For an analysis of some issues on the present law 
governing trade unions in West Malaysia, see Nijhar, K.S., MThe 
Registration and Control of Trade Unions in West Malaysia", Ekonomi, 
(Journal of the Economics Society of the University of Malaya ) ,Vol.
VII, No . 1, December, 1966, pp.65-74.
oFederation of Malaya, Trade Unions Ordinance, No.12 of 1946,
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
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Most of the unions it organised were called General Labour Unions 
in that the membership of any one union came not from a single 
occupation, trade or industry but from a variety of trades, occu­
pations and industries. Most of these were Chinese-led and member­
ship was predominantly Chinese; a small number with membership 
being predominantly Indians, were Indian-led, but none were known 
to be Malay-led or with membership being predominantly Malays. The 
membership of most of them was however open to workers of all races. 
The objectives of these Communist-led unions were mainly political, 
namely, to create industrial unrest and thereby wrest the control of 
the country for the Communists. The period therefore witnessed un­
precedented labour unrest until in June 1948 the Colonial Government 
banned the MCP, suspended all civil liberties, and put the country 
under Emergency rule. This resulted in an immediate decline in the 
influence of the MCP over the trade union movement in West Malaysia.
In the meantime, even before the banning of the MCP, a few 
trade unions were known to exist that were not Communist-led. These 
were mainly Indian-led with membership being predominantly Indians, 
though most were actually open to workers of all races. By June 
1948 there were about 20 such trade unions in the plantation indus­
tries and they were competing with the Communist-led unions for the 
loyalty of the plantation workers. With the banning of the MCP, the 
field was left open for the non-Communist-led unions to emerge more 
easily into the front-line. A large number of these were in the 
plantation industries and they began organising themselves for the 
purposes of bargaining with the employers. In this process they 
were assisted by one very sympathetic Trade Union Adviser in the 
Department of Labour, who had been sent earlier especially by the
new Labour Government in the United Kingdom to assist in the growth
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o f  r e s p o n s i b l e  u n i o n i s m  i n  M a l a y a .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  com bined  
e f f o r t s  p r o d u c e d  an i n f o r m a l  body  l a t e  i n  1948 c a l l e d  t h e  N e g o t i a t i n g  
C o m m i t t e e  f o r  t h e  Rubber  W o r k e r s '  U n i o n s  (NCRWU), c o m p r i s i n g  t h e  s i x  
l a r g e s t  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  a t  t h a t  s t a g e .
The NCRWU was o n l y  an  ad hoc body  and d i d  n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e  
w i t h i n  i t  a number  o f  o t h e r  f a i r l y  l a r g e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  
and t h u s  had i t s  w e a k n e s s e s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  
w o r k e r s .  I n  t h e  m e a n w h i l e ,  one  p a r t i c u l a r  u n i o n  was p u s h i n g  i t s  way 
v i g o r o u s l y  t o  t h e  f o r e .  The u n i o n  had  b e e n  o r g a n i s e d  i n  J a n u a r y  1946 
i n  S e r e m b a n ,  r en am ed  t w i c e ,  an d  t h e n  c a l l e d  t h e  P l a n t a t i o n  W o r k e r s '  
U n io n  o f  N e g r i  S e m b i l a n  (PWUNS) e a r l y  i n  1950 .  I t  had b e e n  d o i n g  w e l l  
f o r  i t s  member s  i n  N e g r i  S e m b i l a n ,  and had  e f f e c t i v e l y  w e a t h e r e d  t h e  
p r e s s u r e s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t - l e d  u n i o n s  i n  i t s  a r e a  b e t w e e n  1946 and 
1 9 48 .  I t s  G e n e r a l  S e c r e t a r y ,  P . P .  N a r a y a n a n  ( b . 1 5 . 2 . 2 3 ) ,  who was 
t h e n  a l s o  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  NCRWU, was b ec o m in g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e s t i v e  
w i t h  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  a m o n g s t  t h e  t r a d e  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  T o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  T r a d e  U n io n  A d v i s e r ,  he  s u c c e e d e d  i n  
e n l a r g i n g  t h e  NCRWU o f  s i x  u n i o n s  t o  a new bo d y  i n  O c t o b e r  1950 c a l l e d  
t h e  N e g o t i a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  P a n - M a l a y a n  R u b b e r  W o r k e r s ' U n ion  
(NCPMRWU), c o m p r i s i n g  t w e n t y - s i x  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  
W h i l e  d o i n g  t h a t ,  he  was  a l s o  e n l a r g i n g  h i s  own u n i o n  i n  N e g r i  S e m b i ­
l a n  so  t h a t  b y  1953 i t  became t h e  l a r g e s t  t r a d e  u n i o n  i n  M a l a y a .  In  
k e e p i n g  w i t h  i t s  g r o w t h ,  h e  c h a n g e d  i t s  name a g a i n ,  t h i s  t i m e  t o  t h e  
P l a n t a t i o n  W o r k e r s '  U n io n  o f  Malaya(PWUM). On a much s m a l l e r  s c a l e ,  
o t h e r  u n i o n s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  w e r e  a l s o  e n l a r g i n g  t h e i r  m em b er sh ip  
u n t i l  by  e a r l y  1954 o n l y  a few r e a l l y  l a r g e  u n i o n s  w e r e  l e f t  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  and  N a r a y a n a n  b e g a n  t o  t a l k  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  m e r g e r .
By November  1954 ,  t h e  m e r g e r  was  a c c o m p l i s h e d  u n d e r  h i s  l e a d e r s h i p .
The new o r g a n i s a t i o n  was  r e c h r i s t e n e d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  U n io n  o f  P l a n t a t i o n  
W o r k e r s  and h a s  r e m a i n e d  s i n c e  t h e n  i n  an  o v e r w h e l m i n g  p r e d o m i n a n t
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position in the union affairs of the industry. A few unions continued 
to exist independently and resisted the new organisation's growth but 
were one by one absorbed by the National Union of Plantation Workers 
or wound up. The left-wing influence provided the most resistance.
Once the new Union was established, its immediate tasks 
were to consolidate its administrative structure and expand its 
membership. The problems encountered were numerous, including those 
normally faced in any amalgamation of a number of unions into one 
larger body, and opposition from existing rival unions or anti­
unionists. Among the former were issues about the consolidation and 
distribution of the existing funds held separately by each union, the 
sharing of posts and regrouping of existing staff, the personality 
conflicts arising in a rapidly growing organisation, and inexperience 
in handling matters for such a large trade union in the Malayan context. 
Among the latter were rival unions led by other non-Communist leaders 
who had stayed out of the new organisation and who continued to resist 
the expansion of the National Union of Plantation Workers into their 
areas. There were also the underground Communist leaders who still 
continued to harass the Union's expansion because of old rivalries 
and ideological conflicts. Then again, the National Union of Planta­
tion Workers, having its origins under Indian-leadership with pre­
dominantly Indian members, found great difficulties in the initial 
years in persuading Chinese or Malay workers to join with them 
collectively in bargaining for better terms and conditions of 
employment: the Chinese in fact attempted to organise a separate
union for Chinese workers whereas the Malays, after witnessing the 
activities of the Communist-led General Labour Unions between 1946- 
1948 still tended to look upon trade unions as 'anti-national' 
organisations. Added to all these were the activities of the secret
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societies who posed problems by demanding 'protection money' from 
the Union's officials for organising workers in their 'jurisdiction'.
There were of course other problems too some of which have 
continued till today. For instance, workers had to be educated on 
the objectives of unionisation, and thus began various educational 
publications in different languages in Tamil, Malay, Chinese, Telegu 
and English; publicity campaigns for public consumption in the 
Union Herald (a monthly organ of the NUPW, 1961-) were also carried 
out; communication between the leadership and the rank-and-file be­
came a serious problem as the Union's area widened because of 
increasing membership and this had to be mitigated by the purchase 
of a fleet of nearly forty cars; the recruitment and training of 
an able and efficient staff to run the Union's affairs had to be 
begun; and finance had to be obtained for the building of a National 
Headquarters and the branch buildings.
But despite all these, the Union grew. The membership 
figures might have fluctuated over the years, influenced partly by 
changes in the price of rubber, partly by the numbers actually em­
ployed in the rubber estates of West Malaysia, and partly because of 
intensive recruiting immediately before and after the signing of 
new Agreements. But on the whole, in the second decade, the Union 
has maintained membership of between half and two-thirds of the 
estate labour-force, a great achievement in the circumstances of a 
country like Malaysia. (For details, see Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1).
More important, the Union gained experience and became more 
confident with time, expanding its activities over a wide field to 
serve the interests of its members. Thus, apart from negotiating 
for better wages and terms of conditions for its members and their
families, it also concerned itself with issues such as unemployment
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and land settlement schemes tor estate workers, citizenship acqui­
sitions, repatriation of non-citizen estate workers to their homeland,
TABLE 9.1
AVERAGEPAID-UP UNION MEMBERS AND DEGREE 
OF UNIONISATION IN THE RUBBER ESTATES, 1954-1968
Year Paid-up Union Members (nearest 100) Degree of Unionisation^*^
1954 35,700 13
1955 82,300 30
1956 114,800 41
1957 136,200 49
1958 147,700 52
1959 115,700 41
1960 113,000 40
1961 129,600 45
1962 136,600 48
1963 135,200 47
1964 137,100 50
1965 168,400 62
1966 140,300 56
1967 132,400 57
1968 137,100 59
Notes: (*) 1954 average figures were for November and December,
1954; 1955-1968 average figures were for January
and July of each year.
(+) Paid-up membership figures as a percentage of total 
labour-force employed in rubber estates.
Sources: a. Gamba, Charles, The National Union of Plantation
Workers: The History of the Plantation Workers of
Malaya, 1946-1958, Donald Moore, Singapore, 1959, 
pp.91-92 .
b. From Kumaran, K.K., Research Officer, National Union 
of Plantation Workers.
adult educational programmes including the provision of library 
services in the estates, encouragement of sports in the estates, the
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e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  ' t o d d y '  d r i n k i n g  (palm wine)  and ’sa m su ’ d r i n k i n g  
( C h in e s e  r i c e - s p i r i t )  and,  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  e n c o u r a g i n g  e s t a t e  
w o r k e r s  t o  own e s t a t e s  and t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  o t h e r  i n v e s t m e n t  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  M u l t i - P u r p o s e  C o o p e r a t i v e  S o c i e t y  o r  t h e  
G r e a t  A l o n i e r s  T r a d i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  b o t h  o f  which i t  s e t  up ( p . 1 4 3 ) .
What were  t h e  main f a c t o r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i t s  g row th  t o  
i t s  p r e s e n t  s i z e ?  Though s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  a r e  somewhat a v e r s e  
f rom a t t r i b u t i n g  much c a u s a l  i n f l u e n c e  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  i n  t h i s  c a s e  
i t  seems c e r t a i n  t h a t  much was due t o  P . P .  N arayanan .  G i f t e d  w i t h  
t r em endous  e n e rg y ,  a p l e a s i n g  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  an o u t s t a n d i n g  o r a t o r  
i n  Tamil  and E n g l i s h  and,  t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t  i n  Malay,  and w i t h  a 
deep u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  and sympathy  f o r  human p rob le m s ,  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  
s t a n d s  o u t  most  c l e a r l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  a l l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  I t  was he 
who was m a i n ly  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  p e r s u a d i n g  e s t a t e  w o rk e rs  and o t h e r  
r i v a l  u n i o n  l e a d e r s  t o  merge t h e m s e l v e s  i n t o  one s t r o n g  Union  and 
who s u b s e q u e n t l y  ove rcame t h e  i n t e r n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  new 
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  I t  was he who won t h e  e a r l y  sympathy o f  t h e  C o l o n i a l  
Government ,  t h e  ICFTU, t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  Malayan P l a n t i n g  I n d u s t r i e s  
E m p lo y e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n  i n  r e c o g n i s i n g  h i s  as  t h e  s o l e  b a r g a i n i n g  u n i t  
f o r  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s ,  and l a t e r  t h e  sympathy  o f  t h e  l o c a l  government  
and o t h e r  p o l i t i c i a n s  f o r  h i s  g e n e r a l l y  n o n - v i o l e n t  m o d e r a t e  a p p ro a c h  
t o  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o b le m s ,  and f o r  h i s  p e r s o n a l  commitment  t o  an a n t i ­
communist  l i n e  and n e u t r a l i t y  i n  l o c a l  p o l i t i c s  ( u n l i k e  t h e  h a rd  l i n e  
o f  t h e  e a r l y  m i l i t a n t s ) .  I t  was a l s o  he  who i n s i s t e d  on  t h e  a b s o l u t e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  h a v i n g  q u a l i f i e d  and e f f i c i e n t  s t a f f  a t  boUh t h e  Head­
q u a r t e r s  and t h e  b r a n c h e s  and p e r i o d i c  t r a i n i n g  programmes f o r  them 
t o  b r i n g  them u p - t o - d a t e .  T h i s  was t o  a l a r g e  m easu re  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  U n i o n ' s  s u c c e s s  i n  d e l i v e r i n g  many Of t h e  goods t o  i t s  
members.  F u r t h e r ,  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  t i m e ,  he c a r r i e d  w i t h  him a
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history of involvement in union and other national and international 
problems that lent him added prestige which he used for the develop­
ment of his Union.
A second reason for the Union's strength was that the Union 
also served 'felt needs' among the estate workers who had no other 
effective avenues to channel their grievances to the employers or 
the government, at least until very recent times when the National 
Land Finance Cooperative Society Limited was set up (a Cooperative 
Society established in May 1960 by a senior Indian Minister in the 
Malaysian Cabinet to encourage estate workers to jointly own rubber 
estates). Thus, apart from arguing their case during negotiations 
or before arbitration boards, the Union also assisted the members, 
their families and friends on a variety of othejr matters such as 
their problems at the district hospitals, police stations or court 
cases not to mention those already discussed earlier (pp.149-150).
All these bound the membership more and more closely to their Union.
Thirdly, the relative homogeneity of a majority of the 
work-force in the estates also played a part in the early stages of 
the Union's organisation though it presented other disadvantages 
later. The majority of the work-force in the estates were Indians 
who shared a common bond in culture, language and. religion, who 
formed a closed and isolated community from the rest of the country, 
and who had a common aim to better themselves and preserve estate 
employment for their posterity; most of them were therefore fairly 
easily persuaded to join the Union, particularly since it was also 
Indian-led. This gave the Union the initial membership and sources 
of finance to build and consolidate itself. The disadvantage became 
apparent later when Non-Indian workers were not as easily persuaded 
to join with the Indians in putting up a united front against
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employers. Serious efforts were made, and still are, to overcome 
this handicap and some results are being seen in recent years with 
more Chinese and Malays joining the Union than at any time in the 
past.
Finally, luck helped a little too. In November 1954, when 
the National Union of Plantation Workers was formally inaugurated, 
the price of rubber was at 82 cents per pound; in December it went 
up to 86 cents, and beginning with 99 cents in January 1955, the 
price kept up at a high level all through, averaging 114 cents a 
pound in 1955 and 97 cents in 1956, before taking a downward plunge 
in 1957 and 1958 (Table 11.2). The Union’s formative years were 
therefore amongst the 'better years' in the history of price fluc­
tuations in the industry and workers identified their gains with the 
Union's efforts, thus increasing their confidence in union organisa­
tion .
II
The Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association
The Malayan Planting Industries Employers ' Association 
(MPIEA) was the employers’ counterpart of the National Union of 
Plantation Workers in the rubber estates. While the latter was the 
largest trade union on the employees' side, the former was the 
largest Employers' Association in Malaysia until after the formation 
of, and its replacement by, the Malayan Agricultural Producers' 
Association in November 1966. Thus, in 1966, the MPIEA represented 
employers who together owned 67% of the total acreage under rubber 
estates in West Malaysia and employed approximately 69% of the estates'
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total labour-force.^ It is obvious from its sheer size that it 
had, potentially, enormous financial strength. It also had a very 
good standing in the community, with well-qualified economists and 
lawyers amongst its senior staff, and with well-established formal 
and informal contacts with other influential organisations in the 
country. Thus, its Executive Vice-President/Secretary acted as 
Convenor/Secretary to the Employers' Group in the National Joint 
Labour Advisory Council, a council set up by the government in 1957 
(and still in existence) with representatives from workers and em­
ployers to advise the Minister of Labour on all aspects of indus-
Otrial relations matters in the nation. Because of its size, the 
Association was also the leading group and had a relatively greater 
say in the Malayan Council of Employers' Organisations, the apex 
of the employers’ associations in Malaysia. In short, the Associa­
tion too was an influential organisation in the country.
The activities of the Association have not been as varied 
as those of the Union. They have been confined mainly to industrial 
relations issues. Other problems of the rubber industry have been
"^Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1965/66, Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association, Natural Rubber 
Building, Kuala Lumpur, p.5, and Department of Statistics, Rubber 
Statistics Handbook, 1966, p .19. The number of workers employed in 
the Member Estates is not given in these reports, except for factory 
workers. The estimate above was obtained as follows: the ratio of
planted acreage to total labour-force in the estates in 1966 was 
7.3 and assuming this was applicable to the Association's Estates as 
well, the numbers employed in these estates were approximately esti­
mated. The actual numbers were probably higher since the ratio was 
generally believed to be smaller in the Member than in the Non-Member 
Estates .
oMalayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1965/66, p.8.
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l e f t  t o  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  such  a s  t h e  Rubbe r  P r o d u c e r s ’ C o u n c i l ,  t h e  
Malayan E s t a t e s  Owners '  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  and t h e  U n i t e d  P l a n t i n g  A sso ­
c i a t i o n  o f  Malaya.  On i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  i t s e l f ,  i t  h a s  c o n f i n e d  
i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  m a in ly  t o  two f i e l d s :  f i r s t ,  t o  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h
t h e  Union and a s s i s t a n c e  t o  i t ' s  Member E s t a t e s  i n  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
o f  C o l l e c t i v e  A greem en ts ,  s e t t l i n g  g r i e v a n c e s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e s e  
Agreements  o r  f rom o t h e r  s o u r c e s ,  and r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  Members i n  
any d i s p u t e s  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  any l a b o u r  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  c u r r e n t l y  i n  f o r c e ,  such  as  t h e  Employment O r d i n a n c e ;  
s e c o n d l y ,  t o  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  J o i n t  Labour  A d v i s o r y  
C o u n c i l ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labour  O r g a n i s a t i o n  and o t h e r  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
i n  M a la y s i a  d i s c u s s i n g  l a b o u r  l e g i s l a t i o n .
U n l ik e  t h e  Union,  i t s  h i s t o r y  has  n o t  been  one o f  c o n t i n u o u s  
g ro w th .  U n t i l  1946, t h e r e  was no e m p l o y e r s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  i n  t h e  
i n d u s t r y  r e g i s t e r e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  w i t h  
t h e  w o r k e r s '  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  on wages and o t h e r  t e r m s  o f  employment .
An o r g a n i s a t i o n  c a l l e d  t h e  U n i t e d  P l a n t i n g  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  Malaya e x i s t e d  
(and s t i l l  d o e s )  amongs t  t h e  p l a n t e r s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  i n  1946 and 
t h i s  f r e q u e n t l y  p r o v i d e d  t h e  forum f o r  i n f o r m a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  on wages 
and ,  o c c a s i o n a l l y  by m u tu a l  c o n s e n t  amongst  some o f  t h e  p l a n t e r s ,  s e t  
down t h e  r a t e s  and c o n d i t i o n s  o f  employment  f o r  t h e  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s  
w i t h i n  i t s  mem bersh ip .  At  t h a t  t im e  t h i s  seemed t o  work w e l l ,  and t h e  
e m p lo y e rs  saw no n e c e s s i t y  o f  o r g a n i s i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  i n t o  a f o rm a l  
t r a d e  u n io n  f o r  w a g e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  p u r p o s e s . ^  Bu t  w i t h  t h e  sudden  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  w o r k e r s '  u n i o n s  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  War, t h e
Malayan  P l a n t i n g  I n d u s t r i e s  E m p l o y e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  Annual  R e p o r t ,  
1 9 4 7 / 4 8 , p . l .  (A p o i n t  t o  n o t e  i s  t h a t  i n  M a l a y s i a ,  an e m p l o y e r s '  
a s s o c i a t i o n  t h a t  f o r m a l l y  b a r g a i n s  w i t h  w o r k e r s '  u n i o n s  has  t o  
r e g i s t e r  i t s e l f  a s  a t r a d e  u n i o n  u n d e r  t h e  c u r r e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  
f o r c e  o r  i t  c a n n o t  f o r m a l l y  n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  t h e  w o r k e r s ) .
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unstable political climate that resulted at this time from the 
growth of the Communist-inspired trade unions, the demands for high 
wages by these unions motivated partly by political reasons and 
partly from the acute shortage of labour and foodstuffs, the United 
Planting Association of Malaya found it was hopelessly incapable of 
putting up a united front for the employers against the workers' 
unions. To remedy this situation, the United Planting Association 
of Malaya initiated moves to formalise an employers' association that 
could be registered as a trade union for the purpose of bargaining 
with the workers' unions. In consultation with two other groups, 
namely, the Rubber Growers' Association, representing the British 
owners, and the Malayan Estate Owners Association, representing the 
local owners, a Committee was formed to draft the rules of the pro­
posed association, and by October 20th, 1947, a new association 
called the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association was 
registered as a trade union.^
However, from the beginning, the Malayan Planting Indus­
tries Employers' Association was mainly European-dominated with very 
few local members, as a glance at the list of the main office-bearers 
published in the various annual reports up to 1966 will show. The 
reasons for this were various. First, about three-quarters of the 
total estate acreage was in any case European-owned till the early 
1950s. Secondly, the constitution of the Association was so drawn 
that it ensured that the Executive Council would comprise mainly 
those members owning the larger estates and this meant that mostly 
Europeans could become the executive members as they were the large
^Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1947/48, pp.1-2.
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e s t a t e  o w n e r s ,  w h i l e  t h e  l o c a l  e m p l o y e r s  who w e r e  m a i n l y  medium and 
s m a l l  e s t a t e  o w n e rs  w ou ld  b e  e x c l u d e d  f r om  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  body o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n .  T h i r d l y ,  i n  t h e  w a g e -  
p o l i c y  f o r m u l a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s ,  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  g a v e  t h e  e s t a t e  
p l a n t e r s  ( m a n a g e r s )  a b i g  s a y .  T h i s  was i n e v i t a b l e  w i t h  m o s t  o f  
t h e  E u r o p e a n - o w n e d  e s t a t e s  w ho se  o w n e r s  w e r e  i n  E n g l a n d ,  b u t  t h e  
l o c a l  o w n e rs  who w e r e  on t h e  s p o t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  fo u n d  t h i s  u n a c c e p ­
t a b l e .  F i n a l l y ,  many o f  t h e  l o c a l  o w n e r s  w e r e  s t i l l  u n f a m i l i a r  w i t h  
t h e  new t r e n d  i n  M al ay a o f  n e g o t i a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  e m p l o y e e s '  t r a d e  
u n i o n s  and p r e f e r r e d  t h e  o l d  s y s t e m  o f  u n i l a t e r a l l y  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e i r  
own r a t e s  o f  em ploymen t  f o r  t h e i r  own e m p l o y e e s . .
None o f  t h e s e  w e a k n e s s e s  h o w e v e r  w o r r i e d  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
t h e n  a s  i t  grew s t e a d i l y  an d  a b l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  i t s  Members v i s - a - v i s  
t h e  w o r k e r s '  u n i o n s  u n t i l  1954 .  W h i l e  s p e c i f i c  f i g u r e s  p r i o r  t o  
t h i s  y e a r  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  i m p r e s s i o n  c o n v e y e d  i n  i t s  
A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  was  t h a t  t h e  m e m b e r s h i p  f i g u r e s  
b o t h  i n  t e r m s  o f  number  o f  e s t a t e s  and i n  t e r m s  o f  a c r e a g e  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  t o t a l ,  c o n t i n u e d  t o  r i s e  s t e a d i l y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  a l s o  im proved  and i t  was  a b l e  t o  r e c r u i t  e a r l y  some v e r y  
w e l l - q u a l i f i e d  s t a f f .  I n  1 9 53 ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i t  a l r e a d y  had a s  i t s  
C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  a f o r m e r  C o m m i s s i o n e r  o f  L a b o u r  f o r  M a lay a ,  
t h e r e b y  a s s u r i n g  i t s e l f  o f  s t r o n g  i n f o r m a l  c o n t a c t s  w i t h  many i n f l u e n ­
t i a l  g r o u p i n g s  i n  t h e  C o l o n i a l  C i v i l  S e r v i c e .
I t s  e a r l y  g r o w t h  y e a r s  w e r e  a l s o  a s s i s t e d  by a v a r i e t y  o f  
o t h e r  f a c t o r s .  The bon d b e t w e e n  members  was s t r e n g t h e n e d  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  common f e a r s  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i s t - i n s p i r e d  t r a d e  u n i o n  p r e s s u r e s  
an d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  h o l d  w ages  down u n d e r  s t r o n g  p r e s s u r e s  
a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  K o r e a n  War p r i c e  boom p e r i o d .  L a t e r ,  when t h e s e
s u b s i d e d ,  t h e r e  w e r e  t h e  o t h e r  o b v i o u s  a d v a n t a g e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  p u t t i n g
159
up a common front against the unions as they became more and more 
adept in bargaining. Finally, while not much is known about the 
internal history of the Association, whatever information was obtained 
from interviews suggested that internal conflicts were minimal partly 
because of a common background (European) and partly because stresses 
from external sources were still minimal (such as prices of rubber 
were on the average still favourable and the Colonial Government was 
generally sympathetic to the expatriate owners).
Since 1957 however things began to change for the Associa­
tion. Continued expatriate domination in the country's economy was 
disliked and such views were aired more openly by local politicians. 
Further, expatriates' influence in governmental circles was also on 
the decline. Consequently, the thoroughly-expatriate look of the 
Association was becoming a weakness during its negotiations with the 
Union. True, the Union's members were also mainly non-indigeneous 
in character, but at least they were less foreign relative to the 
European expatriates. Apart from its image, the prices of rubber were 
also generally falling in this period, particularly since 1961 though 
not with some exceptional years in-between (Table 11.2). This, 
together with the upward trend of wage-costs arising out of increasing 
wage levels and fringe benefits, as will be described later in Chapter 
10, produced growing dissensions amongst the Association's membership 
on the extent to which it ought to make concessions to the Union.
Such dissensions produced unrest within the Association. With the 
decline in the total acreage under rubber estates that took place in 
this period, as will be seen later in Chapter 11, there was also a 
decline in the European share in the ownership of estates, from 70%
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in 1955 to 56% in 1967.  ^ All these, together with the frustrations 
of those owners who complained of the injustice to them in being 
'compelled' to pay higher rates than the Non-Member Estates, caused 
a decline in the membership of the Association. This fell gradually 
at first but very strikingly in 1966 (Table 9.2). By the end of
TABLE 9.2
RUBBER ESTATE ACREAGE IN MEMBERSHIP OF THE MPIEA AND 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ESTATE ACREAGE,* WEST 
MALAYSIA, 1955-1966
Year Acreage in MPIEA Estates(nearest 100 acres) % of Total Estate AcreaSe
1955 1,602,700 80
1956 1,605,000 80
1957 1,649,900 82
1958 1,580,100 80
1959 1,548,000 80
1960 1,533,000 79
1961 1,485,300 77
1962 1,484,800 77
1963 1,491,000 78
1964 1,493,400 79
1965 1,482,800 79
1966 1,222,500 67
*MPIEA
estate
acreage
Estate Acreage figures as on March 31st 
acreage as on July 31st of each year.
, mature and immature).
of each year. Total 
(Acreage = Planted
Sources : a. Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association,
Annual Reports, 1955-1966.
b. Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook,
1955-1966.
Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1955/56, p.15, Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 
1955 and 1967, and Thomas and Fong, Rubber Industry Statistics,
Table 19.
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1966, the Association was not able to present a united front for 
estate employers in bargaining with the Union, and it ceased to be 
effective in its negotiations.
This posed threats to the continuation of industry-wide 
collective bargaining in the rubber estates. The Union, fearing 
this, closed ranks with the Association and joined forces with its 
existing Members to pressure the government into introducing an 
Extension of Collective Agreement legislation which would impose upon 
Non-Member Estates a legal responsibility to abide by Agreements 
reached with the Member Estates.^ The National Joint Labour Advi­
sory Council approved the draft bill and the government agreed in
2principle to introduce it in parliament. Many of the Non-Member 
Estates, confronted with this possibility, and the Association, 
beset with its own weaknesses, saw a marriage between them as a way 
out of the dilemma, the former hoping to gain from the latter the 
benefits of its experience and the latter hoping to gain from the 
former an alliance with local counterparts who it was hoped would 
forestall further concessions to the Union. The draft bill was not 
introduced into parliament but it provided sufficient impetus for a 
new organisation, the Malayan Agricultural Producers’ Association,to 
be inaugurated and with this came the demise of the Malayan Planting
3Industries Employers' Association. A local, who was a Senator in the
"^National Union of Plantation Workers, Resolutions Adopted, 5th Dele­
gates' Conference, December 1965,.pp.3-4.
2Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1964/65, p .9.
3 rNijhar, K.S., "The Emergence of Malayan Agricultural Producers' 
Association," in the forthcoming monograph, Employers' Organisations 
in Asia, International Labour Organisation, Geneva (1971).
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Upper House of the Malaysian Parliament (Senator Gan Teck Yeow), 
was elected as its first President. Another local, formerly a 
senior civil servant in the Prime Minister's Department (Mr W. 
Fernando), was appointed as its first Chief Executive Officer.
Locals were also allowed a greater say than before in the Council.
The new association was a much larger organisation than the MPIEA, 
representing more than 80% of the total estate acreage in the indus­
try. The temporary closing of ranks between the Union and the 
employers ended when the new association was formally established, 
and negotiations began between them on a new set of agreements.
These negotiations proved the hardest for the Union so far and, as 
will be seen in Chapter 11, took more than years to complete.
Ill
Role of the State
The state provided the necessary legislation within which 
the wage negotiations in this, as well as in the other industries, 
could be carried out.
Until May 1965, the main legislation affecting wage nego­
tiations were the Industrial Courts Ordinance, 1948 and the Trade 
Disputes Ordinance 1949.1 Together, these provided for what has been
^Federation of Malaya, Industrial Courts Ordinance, No.37 of 1948 
and Trade Disputes Ordinance, No.4 of 1949; Government Printer,
Kuala Lumpur. Other legislation were also in force, but these were 
of no significance in the rubber estates. For a brief survey, see 
Ungku Aziz, "Government and Industrial Relations in Malaysia," paper 
presented at the Second International Conference on Industrial Rela- 
tions in Tokyo, March 1967 and two Graduation Exercises supervised 
by the writer: Kwok Hon Wun, Labour Legislation in Malaya, and
Moorthy, Krishna, A Comparative Study of International Labour Organi­
sation Conventions and Malayan Labour Laws (1948-1964), Faculty of 
Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1966/1967.
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commonly termed as a voluntary system of industrial relations. In 
so far as the wage negotiations in the rubber estates were concerned, 
this meant that the Association and the Union were free to choose to 
negotiate (or not) with each other on wages and other terms of condi­
tions. The Association, for instance, could refuse to recognize the 
Union and instead set its own rates for those workers within its 
membership. The agreements reached were also of a voluntary nature 
carrying no legal force. Further, there were no restrictions on
the rights of estate workers to strike (or estate employers to lock- 
1out) , nor any provisions for compulsory arbitration. The only 
restrictions were against the incorporation of any provisions in 
the collective agreements which would otherwise be illegal under any 
other legislation currently in force.
The state however provided supplementary machinery and 
services for resolving wage disputes when direct negotiations between 
the parties concerned had broken down and before either side embarked 
on industrial action as a means of settling the disputes. These too 
were all of a voluntary nature (the parties not being compelled to 
use them) and included conciliation and arbitration procedures or 
any others mutually agreed upon by both the parties and consented to 
by the Minister of Labour. But the recommendations made by the third- 
parties were not binding on the two disputants. The only coercion 
the state could apply, as provided for in the legislation, was that 
the Minister of Labour could appoint a formal Court of Inquiry (or a 
less formal committee of investigation) to inquire into the causes
^The only restrictions on strikes until May 1965 were on those in 
the public health and public utility services, strikes being pro­
hibited in the former and 14 days' notice of intention to strike 
being required in the latter: Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949
(Clauses 5 and 7).
164
and circumstances of any dispute, whether referred to him or not,
though this body had neither the power to make an award nor enforce 
1a settlement, the coercion being applied by establishing the facts 
of the dispute and bringing public pressure to bear on the parties 
coneerned.
Since May 1965, legislation has been introduced into 
Malaysia establishing a more compulsory system of industrial rela­
tions. Thus, in May 1965 itself, two sets of regulations were promul-
2gated under the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act of 1964 granted to
the government by parliament to meet serious threats to the nation's
security or economy. The first set of regulations, the Essential
3(Arbitration in the Essential Services) Regulations 1965, applied
only to the private sector and introduced compulsory arbitration into
Malaysia for the first time. Under these regulations, the Minister
of Labour was given powers to refer any dispute in the 'essential
services' for settlement by compulsory arbitration (if they were not
already settled between the parties themselves) before a new body
called the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal, whose awards were final
and binding. The rubber industry was amongst the list of the
'essential services'. The second set of regulations, the Essential
(Prohibition of Strikes and Proscribed Industrial Action) Regulations, 
41965, applied to the public sector, and banned workers from taking
Federation of Malaya, Industrial Courts Ordinance 1948, (Clauses 4 
and 5).
oMalaysia, Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, No.3 of 1964, Govern­
ment Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
O Malaysia, Essential (Arbitration in the Essential Services) Regula­
tions, 1965, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
4
Malaysia, Essential (Prohibition of Strikes and Proscribed Industrial 
Actions) Regulations, 1965, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
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part in any strikes or proscribed industrial action, the latter 
defined to mean as "coercion by means of dilatoriness in the per­
formance or execution of duties, or refusal or4 failure to comply 
with directions issued by superiors in regard to the manner or 
performance of the duties of his employment." This set, of course, 
did not affect the negotiations between the Association and the 
Union in the rubber estates.
The immediate reasons for the introduction of these regula­
tions were related to the threats attributed to Malaysia's security 
and economy by the Indonesian Confrontation (1963-1966), and the 
growing unrest over conditions of service in the public sector in 
the early months of 1965.1 But the regulations aroused strong 
protests from trade unionists in Malaysia. In September 1965, they
were repealed and replaced by another one, the Essential (Trade
oDisputes) Regulations, 1965, which applied to both the private and 
the public sectors. On the surface, this new legislation restored 
the workers' right to strike in the public sector but introduced 
'compulsory postponement' of strikes. Thus, the Minister of Labour 
could only refer a dispute in the public sector to the Industrial 
Arbitration Tribunal if the consent of H.M. the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong (King) was obtained; if this consent was withheld, strikes 
could be postponed indefinitely. In the private sector (including 
the rubber industry) the Minister of Labour still retained his right
See, Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual 
Report, 1965-1966, p.7, and National Union of Plantation Workers, 
General Report, 1965-1968, p.28.
2Malaysia, Essential (Trade Disputes in the Essential Services) 
Regulations, 1965, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
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to refer the dispute to the Industrial Arbitration Tribunal if he 
felt it was in the national interest to do so.
This situation existed until the Industrial Relations Act, 
19671 was passed in August that year. The Act repeated all existing 
legislation on industrial relations and brought in, under conditions 
laid down in it, compulsory union recognition and compulsory bar­
gaining in the private sector, binding agreements, restrictions on 
strikes, compulsory postponement of strikes for an indefinite period 
in the public services and in certain other 'essential services' in 
the private sector, and compulsory arbitration where the Minister of 
Labour deemed it fit. The Act also prohibited closed-shop provisions 
and union organisation in the employers' establishment during working 
hours.
In short, until the signing of the 1964 Agreements, the 
voluntary system of industrial relations operated in Malaysia, at 
least on the surface. In reality however, as will be seen in 
the next chapter, the state participated very actively in the nego­
tiations between the Association and the Union. Thus, the choice 
for the Association to negotiate was more on paper than in practice. 
It was obvious to the Association that refusal to bargain with the 
Union would have certainly forced the latter to go on strike and if 
the strike lasted for more than two or three days the Ministry of 
Labour was bound to intervene, considering the enormous significance 
of the industry to the nation's economy. State intervention under 
such circumstances would then have been on terms less favourable to
^Malaysia, Industrial Relations Act, No.35 of 1967, Government 
Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
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the Association than to the Union, since strikes arising over union 
recognition or union's right to bargain were usually frowned upon 
by the officials in the Ministry of Labour, and especially if these 
arose in a large industry with a union leadership considered by 
them to be moderate and responsible.
Further, it was also a usual practice with the Ministry 
of Labour to follow very closely the wage negotiations in the rubber 
industry. So long as these resulted in direct agreement, as they 
did in 1954 and 1955, the Ministry stayed out of it. If however 
the negotiations broke down and industrial action was threatened, 
as was the case on each occasion since 1956, the Ministry discreetly 
applied pressures on the parties concerned to invite it (or other­
wise lose its favour) as a participant in their negotiations. But 
more on the history of the negotiations will be discussed in the
chapter following.
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CHAPTER 10
HISTORY AND RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS 
I
1954 - 1956
Soon after its inauguration, the National Union of Planta­
tion Workers held its first round of negotiations and its first 
Wage Agreement with the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' 
Association was signed on November 27th 1954.1 The negotiations 
went smoothly, being "carried out in an atmosphere of the utmost
goodwill," and agreement was reached in a matter of days with no
2third-party assistance. The rates negotiated are shown in Table 
10.1. The Agreement also provided that the Association would 
"recommend to its members that the rates and earnings of the other 
categories of workers (kanganies and factory workers came under
this group) ___  shall be adjusted proportionately until such time
as separate wage structures and earnings levels have been agreed for 
such workers," (Clause 11). This was done in order to maintain as 
far as was possible the existing relativities in earnings between 
the various grades. The Agreement also provided that tappers should 
be allocated task-sizes that would enable them to earn at least as 
much as male adult field-workers, (Clause 4). Thus, the earnings
^National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, An Agreement made between the Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers'Association and the National Union 
of Plantation Workers, November 1954, Plantation House.
2Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1955/56, p .9.
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TABLE 10.1
DAILY RATES3 IN AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 1954 
(in Malayan cents)
Price-Zone*5 FieldWorkers0
Contract
Tappers^
Checkroll
Tapperse
50- 60 125 175 150
60- 70 125 190 160
70- 80 130 205 170
80- 90 135 220 180
90-100 140 235 190
Notes: a. Excludes cost of living allowance which is 80 cents
per day when the official Retail Price Index is in 
the range 105-125. The Agreement provides that the 
allowance should increase or decrease by 10 cents for 
every 10 points or part thereof by which the Index 
rises above 125 or falls below 105. Between 1954-56, 
the Retail Price Index remained in the range 105-125.
b. Based on rubber price in the market. Price-zone has 
to be agreed mutually towards the end of each quarter 
in a year.
c. Adult male workers only. Rates are for an eight-hour 
working day. The Agreement provides that existing 
practices with regard to Age and Sex Differentials in 
the different estates should continue to operate.
d. Based on task-size 450 trees, \ circumference, renewed 
bark with 90 trees to an acre, on flat land or its 
equivalent as laid down in the Agreement of June 1951 
between the Association and the Union's predecessors, 
taking into account modifications made at Estate Union- 
Management Committee levels. The Agreement provides 
task-size differentials of 10 cents for about every 25 
trees .
e. As in (a) above but Checkroll tappers below 16 years 
old are paid lower rates as under existing practices 
in the different estates.
of tappers should not be less, but equal if not more, than those of 
field-workers. There were no provisions about fringe benefits; in 
practice, however, workers were provided with free or subsidised 
accommodation if available, free medical consultation for minor
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illnesses, fourteen days hospitalisation at half-pay, and three paid 
holidays a year.^
The second round of negotiations began early in August 
1955 and was more difficult. Strong differences of opinion were 
expressed by the parties concerned on a number of issues: the
Association wanted price in the various zones to refer to net and 
not gross price (gross price of rubber in the Singapore stock market 
less export duty) which the Union rejected; the Union insisted that 
workers be entitled to a day of rest after six days' work and work 
on the seventh day was to be at time and a half, which the Associa­
tion rejected; and the Union demanded an increase in the existing
2number of paid holidays, which the Association also rejected. Des­
pite these differences, agreement was still reached in a relatively
short time of two weeks, again without outside assistance.
3The rates negotiated in this Wage Agreement are shown in 
Table 10.2. Because of some differences in the price-zones over 
which the rates in the 1954 and the 1955 Wage Agreements were nego­
tiated, it is not possible to make a straight comparison between their 
results. Marginal gains were made by the Union in the lowest price- 
zone, the rates remaining similar in both the Agreements though the 
lower level of the price-zone in the latter Agreement was below that 
in the former. No gains were made in the price-zones from 60 to 100
■^National Union of Plantation Workers, Black and White Book: Gist of 
Wages and Other Terms of Employment, 1946-1965, 1967, p .8.
2Kumaran, History of Wage Negotiations in the Planting Industry, 
(mimeographed: up to 1962), Plantation House, 1964.
^National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, An Agreement made between the Malayan Planting 
Industries Employers' Association and the National Union of Planta­
tion Workers, August 1955, Plantation House.
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TABLE 10.2
DAILY RATES IN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 1955 
(in Malayan cents)
Price-Zone FieldWorkers
Contract
Tappers
Checkroll
Tappers
40- 60 125 175 150
60- 70 125 190 160
70- 80 130 205 170
80- 90 135 220 180
90-100 140 235 190
100-110 150 255 205
110-120 160 275 220
120-130 170 295 235
130-140 180 315 250
140-150 195 340 270
Notes: Similar to those mentioned under Table 10.1.
cents and those above are not comparable since they were introduced 
only for the first time in 1955. The provisions for the 'other 
categories of workers' and that tappers should earn at least as 
much as (if not more than) field-workers remained the same. The 
Union obtained no concessions from the Association on the seventh 
day of rest and on the increased number of paid holidays, but conti­
nued to press for these two after the Wage Agreement was signed in 
August. In September 1955, the Association conceded in a supplemen­
tary Agreement^- that workers would be eligible for a day of rest 
after six consecutive days of work and would be paid overtime rates 
only if they were requested to work by management.
■^National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers ' Association, Agreement on a Day of Rest between the Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers ' Association and the National Union of 
Plantation Workers, September 1955, Plantation House.
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On the whole, the Union was unhappy with the immediate 
results of the negotiations. However, since the price of rubber 
remained high for a few months after August 1955 (Table 11.2), its 
members were reasonably content with their higher take-home pay.
But the implementation of the Seventh Day of Rest Agreement caused 
a few troubles: some managers interpreted 'six consecutive days of
work' to exclude paid holidays; others simply refused to request 
the services of those who had accumulated six consecutive days of 
work until they offered themselves for work, which then made them 
ineligible for overtime rates; still others equated rainy days, 
when no work was possible, with rest days.
The 1955 Agreements did not last long. In March 1956, 
the Union served one month's notice of cancellation of these Agree­
ments as provided for in the Wage Agreement (Clause 14), and sub­
mitted proposals for new negotiations on the following points:
(a) A minimum daily wage which was to be entirely free of rubber 
price fluctuations, (b) Over and above this, additional earnings 
based on output and price changes, (c) A request for an increase 
in the number of paid holidays, and (d) Improvements in methods of 
implementation of the seventh day of rest. During the course of the 
negotiations, the Union also asked for the abolition of the differen­
tials between the Checkroll and the Contract Tappers, the elimination 
of the Age and Sex Differentials for field-workers, and the Age 
Differentials for Checkroll Tappers.1
After a number of meetings between them, the Association 
rejected the Union's proposals and suggested arbitration. The Union
^Kumaran, Collective Bargaining in the Rubber Industry, (mimeographed 
up to 1964), Plantation House, 1967, pp.8-9.
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was l e f t  w i t h  t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s :  ( a )  a c c e p t  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  (b)
r e q u e s t  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  t o  go t o  c o n c i l i a t i o n  by  L a b o u r  D e p a r t m e n t  
O f f i c i a l s ,  o r  ( c )  p r o c e e d  w i t h  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i o n  a s  a means  o f  
r e s o l v i n g  t h e  d i s p u t e .  F u r t h e r  m e e t i n g s  w e r e  h e l d  w i t h  t h e  A s s o c i a ­
t i o n  b u t  i t  r e f u s e d  t o  c o n c e d e  a n y t h i n g  new.  M e a n w h i l e ,  t h e  member­
s h i p  became r e s t l e s s  as  t h e  U n io n  f a i l e d  t o  make an y  headway on i t s  
p r o p o s a l s ,  and a s  some r i v a l  u n i o n s  s t i l l  i n  e x i s t e n c e  (p .  146)  
d e c r i e d  i t s  a b i l i t y .  I n  t h i s  a t m o s p h e r e ,  t h e  U n i o n ' s  E x e c u t i v e  
C o u n c i l  m e t  on A p r i l  2 4 t h  1956 and d e c i d e d  o n  w h a t  i t  t e r m e d  a 
' G o - S l o w ' . 1
The 'G o - S l o w '  was  t o  i n v o l v e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  ( a )  One d a y ' s
v o l u n t a r y  r e s t  o f  t h e  members on e v e r y  F r i d a y  b e g i n n i n g  May 1 0 t h ,
1956 ( i f  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  was r e a c h e d  by  t h e n ,  and u n t i l  
a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  was f o u n d  t o  i t s  d e m a n d s ) ,  (b )  Members t o  
r e f r a i n  f r o m  o v e r t i m e  w o r k ,  d o u b l e  t a p p i n g  an d  l a t e  t a p p i n g ,  an d  
( c )  T a p p e r s  t o  e n g a g e  i n  s h a l l o w  t a p p i n g  t o  r e d u c e  o u t p u t s .  The 
an n o u n c em en t  was f o l l o w e d  by l a s t - m i n u t e  o f f e r s  f r om  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
on  May 7 t h  and 8 t h  w h ic h  t h e  U n ion  r e j e c t e d  on  May 9 t h .  The 'G o - S l o w '  
t h e n  s t a r t e d .  From t h e  U n i o n ' s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e  f i r s t  day o f  t h e  
'Go-Slow ' t u r n e d  o u t  t o  b e  a g r e a t  s u c c e s s . T u r n o u t s  i n  t h e  Member 
E s t a t e s  w e r e  v e r y  h i g h ,  and e f f e c t s  on p r o d u c t i o n  l e v e l s  c l e a r l y  
f e l t  by  t h e  e s t a t e s .  Even w o r k e r s  i n  many Non-Member E s t a t e s  p a r t i ­
c i p a t e d .  The U n i o n ' s  s u c c e s s  was met  w i t h  r e t a l i a t o r y  m e a s u r e s  f rom 
a number o f  t h e  Member E s t a t e s ,  who r e d u c e d  t h e  r a t e s  o f  some w o r k e r s  
on s t r i k e ,  d i s m i s s e d  o t h e r s ,  and e v i c t e d  s t i l l  o t h e r s  f rom  t h e  
w o r k e r s '  q u a r t e r s .  In  a few e s t a t e s ,  w a t e r  and e l e c t r i c i t y  s u p p l i e s
^Gamba, N a t i o n a l  U n io n  o f  P l a n t a t i o n  W o r k e r s ,  p p . 1 6 3 - 1 7 5 .
174
to workers' houses were also cut off. This went on until the fourth 
consecutive Friday and by then violence erupted in some of the 
estates. Meanwhile, the Union lashed out against the Association 
using politically-emotive terms such as "colonial exploitation", 
"high-handedness of expatriates," and "the plight of the local citi­
zens", in order to rally mass support for its cause. The country had 
just attained self-government (1955), was to receive Independence soon 
(1957), and such terms won the support of many local politicians.
The Acting Minister of Labour, also a local, reacted strongly 
to the retaliatory measures taken by the estate owners against the 
workers, and called for a halt to such practices. The Association, 
having been long used to the special protection accorded to it during 
the Colonial Rule, had not expected this harsh reaction and was glad 
to re-open negotiations with the Union away from the public limelight 
when the Ministry of Labour intervened and made proposals for conci­
liation. The proposals were initially rejected by the Association, 
but after further negotiations with the Union, three separate Agree­
ments on Wage Rates, Paid Holidays and Seventh Day of Rest (all fairly
closely similar in content to the Ministry's earlier proposals) were
osigned in June 1956. For the first time, the negotiations in the 
industry had taken a long time, over three months.
The results of the 1956 Agreements were clearly a substan­
tial gain for the Union. Except on the issue of a minimum daily wage
1
■''National Union of Plantation Workers, First Biennial Report, 1954-56, 
p.6, and Gamba, National Union of Plantation Workers, pp.163-175.
2National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, Agreements made between the Malayan Planting 
Industries Employers' Association and the National Union of Planta­
tion Workers, June 1956, Plantation House.
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free of rubber price fluctuations, it obtained concessions on all 
its other demands. Thus, paid holidays were increased from three 
to ten in a year; the terms of the seventh day of rest were also 
more specifically laid down with holidays being counted as days 
worked, rainy days not counted as rest days, and with workers entitled 
to overtime rates at time and a half.1 But the most tangible gains 
made were on wage rates, the results being summarised in Table 10.3.
TABLE 10.3
DAILY RATES IN AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1956 
(in Malayan cents)
Price-Zone FieldWorkers
Contract
Tappers
Checkroll
Tappers
40- 60 135 175 175
60- 80 180 220 220
80-100 210 250 250
100-120 245 285 285
120-140 285 325 325
140-160 320 360 360
Notes: Similar to those mentioned in Table 10.1 except for the
elimination of the Age Differentials for Checkroll Tappers, 
and the laying down of more specific rates for female 
field-workers which are discussed later in the text.
A straight comparison of rates in the Wage Agreements of August 
1955 and June 1956 is not possible because of differences in the 
size of the price-zones negotiated but, with some rearrangement as 
made below in Table 10.4, the gains become obvious and need no further 
comment.
^National Union of Plantation Workers, First Biennial Report, 1954- 
56, p.6 .
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TABLE 10.4
DAILY RATES IN AGREEMENTS OF AUGUST 1955 AND 
JUNE 1956 OVER SIMILAR PRICE-ZONES
(in Malayan cents)
Price-Zones
Field
1955 
Agt.
Workers
1956 
Agt.
Contract
1955
Agt.
Tappers
1956
Agt.
Checkroll
1955 
Agt.
Tappers
1956 
Agt.
40- 60 125 135 175 175 150 175
60- 70 125 180 190 220 160 220
70- 80 130 180 205 220 170 220
80- 90 135 210 220 250 180 250
90-100 140 210 235 250 190 250
100-110 150 245 255 285 205 285
110-120 160 245 275 285 220 285
120-130 170 285 295 325 235 325
130-140 180 285 315 325 250 325
140-150 195 320 340 360 270 360
150-160 - 320 - 360 - 360
Other gains made by the Union in this round of negotiations 
were related to the equality it established in rates between Checkroll 
and Contract Tappers for given task-sizes (in practice this had little 
influence on the take-home pay since Checkroll Tappers almost always 
tapped smaller task-sizes than Contract Tappers), and the elimination 
of the Age Differentials for Checkroll Tappers. The Age and Sex 
Differentials for field-workers continued on but more details were 
laid down for those by sex, females now receiving 4/5ths of the rates 
set for males. The provisions for the 'other categories of workers' 
however remain unchanged.
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II
1957 - 1962
The Agreements signed in June 1956 created much discontent 
within the Association. Some Member Estates reacted by arbitrarily 
reducing the take-home pay of active Union members through cutting 
down field-workers' daily working hours and arguing that they should 
be paid lower rates accordingly, or cutting down Checkroll Tappers' 
task-sizes and allocating higher task-sizes to the Contract Tappers 
(who were mostly non-Unionists); others deliberately misinterpreted 
the Seventh Day of Rest Agreement by still refusing to accept paid 
holidays as days worked."^ The Union took up these problems with 
the Association by correspondence and through Joint Consultative 
Council2 meetings, and resolved some of them.
Meanwhile time passed, and on January 31st 1958 the Union 
submitted fresh proposals for a new set of agreements on (a) a 
minimum guaranteed daily wage free of rubber price fluctuations 
as the key issue, (b) further increases in the number of paid
^Gamba, National Union of Plantation Workers, p.183, pp.187-192; 
National Union of Plantation Workers to Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, Ref. No.3 in 103/56, June 31st 1956; Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers ' Association to National Union of 
Plantation Workers, July 2nd 1956; and National Union of Plantation 
Workers, Minutes of Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association- 
National Union of Plantation Workers Main Consultative Council Meeting, 
September 19th 1956.
2Joint Consultative Councils to resolve grievances arising out of 
implementation of the Agreements or from other sources were set up 
at the State Levels and at the National Level by arrangement between 
the Association and the Union in March 1955. They have remained in 
existence since then. Estate Union-Management Committees were also 
set up in most of the Member Estates since then in order to deal 
with problems arising at the estate level, such as on allocation of 
task-sizes, rates of kanganies and factory workers, overtime and so on. 
Gamba, National Union of Plantation Workers, pp.81-88, Malayan Planting 
Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 1954/55, pp.36-47, 
and National Union of Plantation Workers, First Biennial Report, 
1954-56, p.5.
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holidays and (c) a fixed weekly day of rest in place of the seventh 
day of rest.1
The Association, still sore from the results of the previous
Agreements, adopted a very hard line on the Union's proposals by
refusing to bargain with it on all issues except that on tappers'
wages, and even this only to the extent that they matched producti- 
2vity changes. But after some lengthy correspondence with the Union, 
the Association suggested the composition of an informal joint working 
party to find an agreed basis for formal negotiations, No satis­
factory compromise was reached despite a number of meetings. By 
mid-May 1958, the atmosphere worsened as a number of local branches 
of the Union struck on their own in a few of the larger Member Estates, 
apparently with their Headquarters' blessings, and as the Union's 
Executive Council met to consider embarking on a national strike.
The Minister of Labour intervened in the meantime, invited both 
parties to an informal tea-party at his residence and suggested pro­
posals for a compromise which were accepted by the Union but rejected 
by the Association. The Union therefore decided to strike on an 
industry-wide basis but deferred action as the Minister of Labour 
brought the two parties together again to re-open negotiations with 
his Commissioner for Industrial Relations acting as conciliator. 
Agreements based partly on the Commissioner's proposals were finally
^Kumaran, History of Wage Negotiations...., p.13, and National Union 
of Plantation Workers, Memorandum on Wage Proposals to Malayan Plan­
ting Industries Employers' Association, January 31st 1958.
2 ,Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1958/59, p.8, and Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, 
Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association to National Union 
of Plantation Workers, February 28th 1958.
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reached early in February 1959,^ about twelve months after the 
commencement of negotiations.
This time the results of the Agreements were not so clearly 
favourable to the Union. No advances were made on the number of paid 
holidays, on the fixed weekly day of rest, and in the rates of field- 
workers, factory workers or kanganies. A minor gain on paper was however 
obtained because of a change introduced in the influence of the Retail 
Price Index on the daily rates. In the past, the range was 102-125, but 
in the new Agreement, it was changed to 90-125; thus, the cost of living 
allowance remained at 80 cents a day even if the range fell below 105 up 
to 90. The method of changing the rates of the 'other categories of 
workers' remained the same. Marginal improvements were also made in the 
implementation of the Seventh Day of Rest Agreement in that workers who 
worked on these days were now entitled to overtime rates. Also, a new 
item, 'wash-outs’ (p.74) was introduced into the Agreement though the 
amounts paid were left entirely to management which generally meant a 
a take-home pay less than the basic wage. Another new item, dismissals 
of Union members for misconduct, was also brought in for the first time, 
management being now required to discuss such dismissals with a full­
time Union Official to see if the alternative of forfeiting part or whole 
of the worker's accrued leave was not a more appropriate action than 
outright dismissal (p.87).
The Union Officials nevertheless seemed satisfied with the 
outcome of the negotiations since it brought in an entirely new scheme 
of wage-fixation with regard to Checkroll Tappers' rates (unfortunately 
making comparisons with the old rates impossible)^. This new system
^National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries Employ­
ers' Association, Agreements made between the Malayan Planting Employers' 
Association and the National Union of Plantation Workers, February 1959, 
Plantation House.2Nothing was stated on rates for Contract Tappers.
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forms the foundation of the one described in Chapter 4. In place 
of an all-in wage which fluctuated wholly with the price of rubber, 
the Retail Price Index and the task-sizes, the wages to be earned 
in this new Agreement were to be derived from two main sources.:
1. A Guaranteed Factor which was made up of a Basic Element 
and a Price Element. The Basic Element was $2.00 a day when the 
monthly average price of rubber for any month was between 50 and 60 
cents a pound, and $2.20 when the price of rubber was 60 cents and 
above. The amount also increased or decreased by 10 cents for 
every 10 points or part thereof by which the Retail Price Index rose 
above 125 or fell below 90. The Price Element was 14 cents a day
for every complete 10 cents by which the monthly average price of 
rubber exceeded 60 cents a pound up to a maximum of 160 cents a 
pound.
2. An Output Factor which was made up of a Scrap Element
and a Latex Element. The Scrap Element was 4 cents a pound of scrap 
(wet weight) brought in by each tapper. The Latex Element arose 
out of the rate per pound paid to a tapper for each pound of rubber 
brought in by him in excess of an assessed yield for each category 
of fields, termed 'excess yield' in Chapter 4. For this purpose, 
all the fields in an estate, other than those newly brought into 
tapping,1 were initially classified into three main groups (A, B, 
and C) according to the year of planting of the trees, the materials 
planted, and their average yields per acre per annum. The rate per 
pound and the assessed yield varied between these fields: 6, 8, 10
•'■For these fields, until they are classified into Category A, tappers 
were paid at daily or piece-rates, but the amounts earned ought to 
be about equal to the average daily earnings of tappers in Category 
A fields.
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cents a pound and 15, 11, 6 pounds respectively for A, B and C 
fields. Provision was also made for subsequent changes in the 
classification of fields, arising out of changes in their yields 
per acre during the life of the Agreement.
It was this new wage-system which was a gain to the Union. 
The Union, as already seen, was seeking since 1956 a minimum wage 
free of rubber price fluctuations over and above which there would 
be scope for additional earnings based on price and output changes. 
Under the old wage-system, it was difficult to bargain for higher 
wage levels and yet simultaneously attain this objective. The gain 
in this new Agreement was that the separation of the total wages 
earned by tappers into four different elements provided a foundation 
upon which the Union could now work more effectively in the future 
to achieve this double objective simultaneously. True, the Basic 
Element was still somewhat influenced by the price of rubber, that 
is, the price of rubber had to be 50 cents a pound or above, but the 
Union hoped that this could be eventually remedied.
Another issue is also of interest here. The introduction 
of the Latex Element was considered necessary so that tappers could 
in future share through additional earnings the trends towards 
increased productivity in the estates, which will be described in 
the next chapter. However, it also meant that the dispersions in 
the tappers' earnings could now become wider than they had been in 
the past and not dependent solely on effort variations arising out of 
task-size differentials but also upon chance factors or favouritism 
in the allocation of tasks by management to fields with different 
productivities. To prevent such influences from causing grievances 
amongst workers, the Latex Element was tied to the classification of 
fields system with differences in assessed yields and rates for
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'excess yields’ between the fields, the intention being to 'level- 
off' the dispersions as much as was possible. On the whole, the 
Union officials were therefore reasonably satisfied with the 
immediate outcome of the 1959 negotiations.
The membership however was more concerned with the take- 
home pay. When the implementation of the Wage Agreement showed that 
these remained more or less at the pre-negotiations level, they 
became restless. Added to this were complaints of insufficient 
provisions for sick pay leave in the Agreements so far.
On April 27 1961, the Union therefore submitted proposals 
for new agreements. The proposals retained the wage-system already 
devised but suggested, amongst others, higher rates in the Guaran­
teed and the Output Factors, increases in the number of paid holi-
1days and sick pay leave. After three and a half months of corres­
pondence, discussions in formal and informal meetings, the nego­
tiations ended up a deadlock, and threats of strikes at local and 
national levels were again being made. The Commissioner of Indus­
trial Relations then stepped in and persuaded both parties to re­
open informal discussions with a view to finding some mutually accep­
table basis for the resumption of formal negotiations. These too 
came to a deadlock. The Commissioner then approached the two parties 
separately on a number of occasions, and in consultation with the
Acting Minister of Labour, put forward various 'feelers' and 'formulae'
2to settle their differences. Eventually, one of these was accepted
^National Union of Plantation Workers, National Union of Plantation 
Workers, to Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, 
Proposals for Variations in the 1959 Agreements, Plantation House.
2Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 
1961/62, p.7.
1 S3
by both the parties and the Agreements were signed in February 1962, 
ten months after the commencement of this round of negotiations.
The results of these Agreements brought appreciable overall 
improvements in the working conditions of workers in the Member 
Estates. For tappers, the Basic Element was raised by 5 cents; 
the Price Element by 1 cent for every 10 cents increase in the price 
of rubber; the Latex Element by 6, 16 and 10 cents for A, B and C 
fields through reducing the assessed yields by 1, 2 and 1 pounds in 
A, B and C fields but the Scrap Element remained the same. For 
field-workers, the rates were raised from 25 to 35 cents depending 
upon the price-zones. Advances were also made in the following areas 
(a) a 'wash-out' would now be considered as a day worked and the 
full amount of the Basic and Price elements would be paid instead of 
the amount being left solely to management's discretion; (b) the 
Late Tapping Element was introduced for the first time, that is, 
when tapping (other than double tapping) is ordered to commence after 
10.00 a.m., the rates per pound on the 'excess yield' would be 
increased by 2, 3 and 4 cents per pound in Categories A, B and C 
fields respectively, (c) for the first time, tappers required to 
apply stimulants would also be paid for such work, (d) eligibility 
for paid holidays were increased from ten to sixteen days a year, and 
(e) sick pay leave increased from fourteen days at half-pay to sixty 
days at half-pay a year. All other provisions such as on rates for 
the'other daily workers' and the seventh day of rest remained sub-
-^National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, Rubber Industry Wages Agreement, 1962/63, 
Plantation House.
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stantially the same as in the previous Agreements.
Ill
1963 - 1967
The results of the 1962 Agreements left many of the Asso­
ciation Members dissatisfied. The Union, on the other hand, became 
more confident of its ability to bargain for its members. Its success 
prompted it to make further demands.
On August 9th 1963 the Union submitted to the Association
another memorandum of claims for negotiations which, besides asking
for all-round improvements on the older proposals and more specific
details on the rates for the 'other categories of daily-rated workers,
also introduced new proposals on housing allowances for those not
provided with housing, conversion from daily-rated to monthly-pay
workers, annual bonuses, and retirement benefits.^ Eleven days
later, the proposals were rejected by the Association on the grounds
2that "they were unreasonable, uneconomical and exorbitant. Later, 
two formal and three informal meetings were held (each of which took 
the better part of a day) to discuss the Association's counter­
proposals but these were rejected by the Union. The employers then 
suggested the dispute be referred to arbitration but the Union pre­
ferred conciliation, which the Association had eventually to agree.
On December 11th 1963, the Commissioner for Industrial Relations was 
invited by both the parties to settle their dispute by conciliation.
■^National Union of Plantation Workers, Wage Memorandum to Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers' Association, August 9th 1963, Plan­
tation House.
2Kumaran, Collective Bargaining in the Rubber Industry, p.21; Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Report, 1963/64, 
also describes the proposals as being "extravagant to the point of 
fantasy,M p.9.
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Meetings after meetings were held between the Commissioner 
and the parties, individually and collectively, during which time 
the views of others on the dispute were also sought, such as the 
Chief Statistician of Malaysia, an Assistant Professor of Business 
Administration at the University of Malaya, and the Assistant Minister 
of Labour. But the Association refused to concede anything new. On 
April 4th 1964, the Union therefore withdrew its case from the 
Commissioner for Industrial Relations and warned that it would resort 
to industrial action. The Minister of Labour intervened at this 
stage and discussed with the Association the possibility of re-opening 
joint negotiations. Earlier, the General Secretary of the Union had 
already met the Prime Minister, informed him of the possibility of 
the Union calling a nation-wide strike, and persuaded him success­
fully to discuss the problems with the employers. None of these how­
ever changed the Association's stand.
On May 6th 1964, the Union announced that by an overwhelming 
majority of its members, its Executive Council had decided to call 
a one-day pilot strike ten days later, to be followed by a 'cooling-off' 
period of eleven days, and that if the dispute was not resolved to 
its satisfaction by then it would go on an industry-wide strike for
#f 2an "indefinite period". The pilot strike took place as planned. It
^National Union of Plantation Workers, National Union of Plantation 
Workers to Commissioner for Industrial Relations, March 20th 1964.
O The results of the ballot issued to over 110,000 members showed 
that 84% voted for the strike, 6% against, 1% spoilt, and 9% not 
returned: National Union of Plantation Workers, Results of Ballot,
(Confidential document undated)', National Union of Plantation 
Workers, Press Release, April 23rd 1963; Kumaran, Collective Bar­
gaining in the Rubber Industry, p.27; and Malayan Planting Industries 
Employers' Association, Annual Report, 1964/65, p.9.
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demonstrated in no uncertain terms the influence of the Union on the 
great majority of rubber estate workers. According to the NUPW's 
Research Officer, there were more than 90% turn-outs in the Member 
Estates, and well over 50% turn-outs in many of the Non-Member 
Estates. A few Member Estates retaliated in the usual way by cutting 
off water and electricity supplies and dismissing some of their 
workers, while others employed strike-breakers. The strikers reacted 
to this violently and threatened damage to estate property and the 
personal security of senior staff resident on the estates.
A slanging match, or more politely a propaganda war, was then 
fought between the Association and the Union in the press, in which 
others joined as well. On the whole, there seemed to have been 
greater public support for the Union's cause than for the Association's 
stand. Moral and material support poured in for the Union from 
international bodies such as the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions and the Indian National Trade Union Congress, and from 
local bodies such as the Malayan Trade Union Congress and the Rail- 
waymen's Union of Malaya. It is significant that an organisation 
representing senior government officers in Malaysia, the Senior 
Government Officers' Association, also came out openly in support 
of the Union. The Union meanwhile hit at the Association where it 
hurt its Members most, by again questioning the motives of 'arrogant 
colonial employers' who it claimed were 'stupidly adamant' and un­
willing to adapt themselves to the view that they did 'not rule this 
country any more.'
Fully aware that a protracted strike could have disastrous 
consequences on the country's economy and possibly lead to violence 
in the estates, the Malaysian Cabinet met on May 13th and recommended 
to both parties to settle their differences by mediation. The parties
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agreed, the strike was postponed, and a high-powered Mediation Team 
comprising a Professor of Business Administration at the University 
of Malaya, two eminent lawyers, one eminent accountant, and led by 
the Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (himself a 
distinguished Malaysian economist), was immediately appointed.
After meeting the parties concerned and consulting other experts on 
the rubber industry in Malaysia, the Mediator submitted his recommen­
dations to the disputing parties on May 29th 1964 and these eventually
formed the basis upon which the new Agreements were drawn up in July 
21964. Once again, the negotiations took almost a year before a 
settlement was reached.
The wage-system in the 1964 Agreement has already been 
described in Chapter 4. It remained substantially the same as that 
in the 1962 Wage Agreement with three minor changes: (a) The Price
Element was now a separate item and was termed the Price Bonus, the 
Guaranteed Factor in the 1964 Agreement referring only to the Basic 
Element in the 1962 Agreement. Also the Price Bonus now varied with 
every one cent change in the price of rubber and not with every ten
Mediator, Raja Mohar bin Raja Badiozaman; Assistants: Mr Yong
Pung How (lawyer), Enche Hanafiah Hussein, M.P. (accountant), 
Professor A. Beedle (Professor of Business Administration), and 
Miss P.G. Lim (lawyer); Secretaries: Mr K. Pathmanaban and Enche
Sidek bin Ta'at, both of the Ministry of Labour.
2Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Memorandum on Recommendations 
of Raja Mohar bin Raja Badiozaman in the Wage Dispute between 
Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association and National 
Union of Plantation Workers, May 29th 1964; Malayan Planting In­
dustries Employers’ Association, Annual Report, 1964/65,pp.10-11; 
and National Union of Plantation Workers/Malayan Planting Indus­
tries Employers' Association, Collective Agreements: Executed on 
27th July 1964, Plantation House.
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cents change as before. (b) Age Differentials were introduced for 
field-workers for the first time in the Agreement, and (c) More 
details on method of adjusting changes in the rates of the 'other 
categories of daily-rated workers' were also introduced.(For details 
see Appendix B).
The results were impressive as far as the Union's objec­
tives were concerned. Thus, significant gains in rates were made 
as is obvious from the figures shown in Table 10.5 (these are apart 
from 7 to 167> increases in rates of the 'other categories of workers’). 
Further, tappers also obtained increases on the Output Factor: thus,
the rates per pound on the 'excess yield' were raised by 2 cents for 
each category of fields, and the assessed yield reduced by 1 pound 
in B and C fields; but all other rates, remained the same.
Finally, significant advances were also made by the Union 
on other matters: (a) paid holidays were increased from sixteen to
nineteen days in a year, (b) hospitalisation pay was increased from 
sixty days at half-pay to three months at half-pay at any one time 
in a year plus a maximum of twenty-eight days at half-pay in a year 
for certified sick leave given by a registered medical officer,
(c) T.B. leave pay introduced for the first time, workers being now 
eligible for half-pay in hospital up to nine months at any one time 
in a year, and (d) housing allowances introduced for the first time, 
all non-resident male workers (and certain other special categories 
as laid down in the Housing Allowance Agreement such as widows or 
divorcees) who were not provided with approved accommodation on the 
estates to receive a housing allowance of fifty cents per day worked.
No further items were introduced nor any other changes 
made, but the Mediator recommended that a committee be established
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to examine the possibility of introducing a fixed weekly day of rest 
in place of the seventh day of rest. This was done and on February
TABLE 10.5
DAILY RATES OVER SIMILAR PRICE-ZONES 
IN AGREEMENTS OF 1962 AND 1964
(in Malayan cents)
T a p p e r s Field-workers
Price-Zones 1962 
Agt.
1964
Lower
Level
Agt.
Upper
Level
1962 
Agt.
1964
Lower
Level
Agt.
Upper
Level
50- 60 205 - - 245 - -
60- 65 225 255 255 263 310 310
65- 70 225 255 255 270 310 310
70- 80 245 257 275 290 312 330
80- 90 260 277 295 305 332 350
90-100 275 297 315 320 352 370
100-110 290 317 335 335 372 390
110-120 305 337 355 350 392 410
120-130 320 357 375 365 412 430
130-140 335 377 395 380 432 450
140-150 350 397 415 395 452 470
150-160 365 417 435 410 472 490
Notes: (a) Tappers' Rates = Basic + Price Elements. The upper
and lower levels in the 1964 Agreement arise because 
of the different way in which the Price Bonus is 
calculated in this Agreement compared to the 1962 
Agreement.
(b) Field-workers = Adult Male Workers only.
1st 1965, the Association conceded the principle of a fixed weekly 
day of rest, all estate workers (other than essential workers and for 
workers in the East coast during the monsoon season) being now 
entitled to a fixed weekly day of rest on Fridays or Sundays, 
depending upon the current government practices in the States con­
cerned. The Union thus won an issue that it had unsuccessfully 
brought up in 1959 and 1962.
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More than ever before, these Agreements left the Asso­
ciation thoroughly dissatisfied with its bargaining-power. When 
the Essential (Arbitration in the Essential Services) Regulations, 
1965, and later the Essential (Trade Disputes in the Essential 
Services) Regulations, 1965, were introduced (see pp. 164-165), 
and the threat of industrial action by the Union removed, many 
Members felt they no longer required the 'collective protection' of 
the Association and so resigned from it (Table 9.2). Soon after this, 
the Agreements also expired officially on January 31st 1966. Another 
round of negotiations began, with the Union again putting forth 
further demands. At this stage, the Association was weakening and 
began considering the possibilities of dissolving itself to pave 
way for a stronger employers' organisation to emerge, one that 
would incorporate both expatriates and as many of the locals as 
possible (see Chapter 9).
In the meantime, the negotiations proceeded. The Associa­
tion dilly-dallied with the Union's proposals, the Union continued 
to press hard its case but was frustrated by the Emergency Regula­
tions from pursuing it further through industrial action, and the 
Ministry of Labour played its usual role of the middleman while 
waiting for the MPIEA to give way to the new organisation being 
considered. By mutual consent (at the Ministry's request), the 1964 
Agreements were extended until new agreements could be reached. In 
the midst of all these, the Government introduced the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967, Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association was 
inaugurated, and a new round of negotiations began between the new 
employers' organisation and the NUPW. The MAPA put up a very strong 
fight, refusing to concede anything to the Union. Despite concilia­
tion by the Ministry, a deadlock was soon reached. The Minister of
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L a b o u r  t h e n  r e f e r r e d  t h e  c a s e  t o  t h e  n e w l y - c o n s t i t u t e d  I n d u s t r i a l  
C o u r t  f o r  f i n a l  s e t t l e m e n t .  The C o u r t  h a n d e d  down i t s  Award i n  
March 19 68,  two y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  b e g a n  on  t h e  r e v i s i o n s  
t o  t h e  1964 A g r e e m e n t s .
The d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  Award do n o t  fo rm  p a r t  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  
b u t  some b r i e f  comments a r e  u s e f u l .  Th e Award i n c r e a s e d  t h e  G u a r a n ­
t e e d  Wage b u t  r e d u c e d  t h e  am oun ts  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  e a r n e d  f rom t h e  
o t h e r  r a t e s ,  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  b e i n g  a d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e a r n i n g s  l e v e l s  
o f  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s  u n d e r  s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  a s  i n  p r e - A w a r d  d a y s .  
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  Award made no s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  f r i n g e  
b e n e f i t s .  I t s  p r o v i s i o n s  w e r e  b i n d i n g  on  b o t h  p a r t i e s  f o r  a m i n i ­
mum p e r i o d  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s .  Th e U n io n  and t h e  MAPA d i s p u t e d  on some 
a s p e c t s  o f  i t s  d e t a i l e d  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  b u t  t h i s  was n o t  r e s o l v e d  
f i n a l l y  t i l l  A u g u s t  1969 when t h e  C o u r t  h a n d e d  down a n o t h e r  Award.
At  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  f i e l d w o r k  t h e  g e n e r a l  i m p r e s s i o n  o b t a i n e d  was 
t h a t  t h e  U n io n  and i t s  m em b er sh ip  w e r e  f a i r l y  d i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e  
d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  Award w h i l e  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  Members n o t  a s  d i s s a t i s ­
f i e d  a s  t h e y  had b e e n  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  l a s t  r o u n d  o f  n e g o t i a ­
t i o n s .  I t  seemed  t h e n  t h a t  t h e  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  E m p l o y e r s '  
A s s o c i a t i o n  and t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o m p u l s o r y  a r b i t r a t i o n  had some 
i m m e d i a t e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  t h e  e m p l o y e r s  a s  i t  g a v e  a b r e a t h e r  f o r  them 
s i n c e ,  u n d e r  t h e  new Award,  no f u r t h e r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c a n  commence 
u n t i l  e a r l y  197 1 .  B u t  i t  i s  t o o  e a r l y  t o  a s s e s s  p o s i t i v e l y .  A f t e r  
a l l ,  t h e  p e r i o d  s i n c e  1967 h a s  a l s o  s e e n  some t r a u m a t i c  c h a n g e s  i n  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  M a l a y s i a n  s o c i e t y  when t h e  G o ve rn m en t  t e m p o r a r i l y  
a b a n d o n e d  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  d e m o c r a c y  i n  f a v o u r  o f  an  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
t y p e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  (C hap .  9 ,  p .  1 4 4 ) .  T h i s  t o o  m u s t  h a v e  had i t s  
i n f l u e n c e  on i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s .  I t  d o e s  seem,  
h o w e v e r ,  w h a t e v e r  t h e  c a u s e s  t h e  U n i o n ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  e x t r a c t  s i g n i -
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ficant concessions from the employers has been halted in 1967/68 - 
at least for a short period of time.
IV
Chapters 9 and 10 have surveyed the materials immediately 
relevant to the details of wage-determination in the rubber estates. 
It seems appropriate at this stage to pause and comment on what 
seems to be the most striking features emerging from this background.
The inauguration of the NUPW in 1954 saw the beginnings of 
what has become the most influential trade union in Malaysia today. 
But more important it also saw the clear emergence for the first 
time in the industry of a moderate union willing to operate under 
the existing framework and, as is implied in the historical materials 
presented, the subjugation by it of the left-wing (or Communist) 
influence in the competition for loyalty of the plantation worker.
To continue to retain the lead in this competition (a lead consi­
dered essential both by the MPIEA and the Government), the Union 
had to meet periodically (and reasonably satisfactorily too) the 
demands of its members.
This it did at least until about the time of this study.
The continual changes in the provisions of the Agreements have made 
it impossible (regretfully) to construct any time-series index of 
agreed wages out of their terms to determine how successful was the 
Union in meeting its memberships' demands, but it seems reasonably 
clear that significant improvements were obtained by it both with 
regards to earnings levels and other conditions of employment. The 
impression given in Part I that this has occurred is therefore con­
firmed by the facts set out in the last two chapters.
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In fact, the interviews with workers and management 
suggested more. Thus, most were convinced that the gains made by 
the Union up to the Agreements of 1964 were real and more than off­
set any corresponding changes in the cost of living index in this 
period. Further, these gains had left the estate workers in the 
Member Estates (to a lesser extent also those in the Non-Member 
Estates) better off than most other rural workers in West Malaysia. 
The gains also seemed to have produced a much more contented and a 
generally more efficient work-force than what apparently had been 
the case a decade or so ago. There was, however, also an unhappy 
part in this survey: the negotiations became longer and more
difficult; the end of the period saw the collapse of the MPIEA; 
there was growing antagonism between the Union and the employers, and 
this was seen in the very first round of negotiations the Union had 
with the new reorganised employers’ association, MAPA; and the 
mechanism of a voluntary system of collective bargaining was being 
abandoned. These are matters of interest in themselves for further 
research but this study must limit itself to those of more immediate 
concern here, namely, on the influence of unionisation on the 
wage and the unemployment levels in the estates .
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CHAPTER 11
SOCIAL-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
I
The l a s t  two c h a p t e r s  have  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  NUPW had 
i n  t h e  y e a r s  f r o m  1 9 5 4 - 6 7  p r o v e d  i t s e l f  a s k i l f u l  and v i g o r o u s  
n e g o t i a t o r  and t h a t  i t  had a c h i e v e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  s u c c e s s e s  f o r  i t s  
members on  t h e  MPIEA E s t a t e s ,  b e n e f i t t i n g  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  a l s o  o t h e r  
w o r k e r s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  B u t  n o t  much h a s  b e e n  s a i d  a b o u t  t h e  
b r o a d e r  s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l  and t h e  e c o n o m ic  c o n t e x t  i n  w h i c h  t h e s e  
b a r g a i n s  w e r e  made,  and f rom t h e  r a t h e r  n a r r o w  v i e w p o i n t  s o  f a r  
a d o p t e d  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  make e v e n  a t e n t a t i v e  j u d g e m e n t  a b o u t  
t h e  c a u s e s  o f  i t s  s u c c e s s  o r  ev en  w h e t h e r ,  i f  a d e e p e r  a n a l y s i s  i s  
made,  i t s  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l  o r  s u c c e s s f u l  o n l y  i n  a s h o r t  
t e r m  and a s u p e r f i c i a l  way.  S o m e th in g  m u s t  t h e r e f o r e  b e  s a i d  a b o u t  
t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  b e f o r e  an  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s  
r o l e  i s  made .  T h u s ,  S e c t i o n  I I  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  r e m a r k s  b r i e f l y  on 
some o f  t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  
w h i c h  h a v e  h ad  a b e a r i n g  on t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s  demands  f o r  
im p ro v ed  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  and S e c t i o n  I I I  r e v i e w s  g e n e r a l l y  some 
o f  t h e  m a in  e c o n o m ic  t r e n d s  and p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  n a m e l y ,  
t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e ,  t h e  f o r m i d a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r o ­
d u c t i v i t y  p e r  a c r e a g e ,  new l a b o u r - s a v i n g  m e a s u r e s ,  t h e  f a l l  i n  
r u b b e r  p r i c e s  and t h e  t r e n d  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  w h i c h  h a v e  t o g e t h e r  
r e d u c e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  t h e  employment  l e v e l s  i n  t h e  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s .
I I
S o c i a l - P o l i t i c a l  F o r c e s
As s e e n  i n  C h a p t e r  10,  most  o f  t h e  A g r e e m e n t s  n e g o t i a t e d
1S5
between the Union and the Association in the period 1954-67 were 
based partly or wholly upon the recommendations of third-parties.
Under the voluntary system of industrial relations, the parties 
affected were allowed on paper to reject any recommendations they 
considered unacceptable to them; in practice, there came a time 
even within this systemwhen they were obliged to accept the decisions 
of third-parties or face official and public disapprovals from the 
government. The social and political forces that operated in the 
background in this period are therefore best described by examining 
those that influenced the third-parties most when they formulated 
their recommendations, or at least as judged from the interviews 
conducted.
On one side were forces that worked in favour of improving 
the conditions of work of estate workers, particularly of those 
employed in the Member Estates. Thus, political considerations 
favoured a certain amount of preference for the workers. The workers, 
though predominantly non-indigeneous and carried less weight in the 
political arena than would have been the case if it was mainly 
indigeneous, were nevertheless mostly local citizens. To a govern­
ment dependent upon votes for its continuation in office it was 
imperative to meet periodically at least some of the demands of its 
own workers. This was irrespective of whether the workers were 
organised (or not) into trade unions but obviously much more 
imperative, as in this case (as was seen in the last two chapters), 
when they were effectively organised and when they demonstrated 
collectively and convincingly their grievances, and also when they 
were led by a leadership that was generally acceptable to the 
government. Exactly to what extent this factor was taken into 
account is difficult to define but a strong impression persists
196
that since the third-parties were mostly locals who were closely 
identified with senior government Ministers, it was an important 
motivating element in their decisions. Recommendations with a 
tendency to weigh in favour of the Union's demands were therefore 
made to win friends for the ruling party and the ruling elites, use­
ful especially in the early years of self-government when these are 
trying to consolidate their positions.
Another factor was related to a general belief, rightly 
or wrongly, that estate workers have been long exploited by the 
expatriate employers and that it was only 'right' and 'fair' to 
remedy this after Independence. Thus, any wage reduction in any round 
of negotiations was generally considered to be unacceptable, whereas 
increases as acceptable guidelines. Further, it was considered 
necessary that these increases should gradually progress from 
initially meeting mainly 'minimum needs' (such as for food, shelter 
and clothing) to later meeting 'living needs' (which would also 
include some amounts for savings, children's education, retirement 
purposes and for some simple luxury items). Such guidelines were 
reinforced by other fairly prevalent beliefs, such as that rubber 
estate owners (especially the expatriates) were mostly rich limited 
liability companies and putting a little squeeze on them periodically 
would not harm them; further, if workers' living conditions were 
not progressively improved they could be more easily exploited by 
left-wing parties to strengthen their political opposition or even 
by the Communists to join their underground movement. Against 
these latter possibilities, the Union's demands were considered 
moderate, its 'extra-curricular' activities useful, and any assis­
tance by way of concessions to it to ensure its continued growth
seemed preferable.
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Then a g a i n  t h e r e  was a l s o  a g e n e r a l  a w a ren e s s  t h a t  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  main e f f o r t s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  have  been  d i r e c t e d  m o s t l y  
a t  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  i n d ig e n e o u s  r o l e  i n  t h e  economy and t h a t ,  i n  
t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  some segments  o f  t h e  h a v e - n o t s  amongst  t h e  o t h e r s  
have  been  n e g l e c t e d ,  t h e  Union e m p h a s i s i n g  t h a t  t h e  n o n - i n d i g e n e o u s  
e s t a t e  w o r k e r s  s t a n d i n g  o u t  p r o m i n e n t l y  a s  one of  t h e s e  g r o u p s .
I t  seemed t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  some o f  t h e  r ecom m enda t ions  made f o r  
improvements  i n  t h e  employment  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s  were 
p a r t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by a d e s i r e  to  c om pe nsa te  them f o r  t h i s  n e g l e c t  
by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .
But  t h e s e  f o r c e s  had to  be b a l a n c e d  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  r e s ­
t r a i n i n g  o n e s ,  such  as  an economic c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  c a p i t a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and th e  a b i l i t y  of  e x p a t r i a t e  em p loye rs  t o  p r o v i d e  t h i s  
c a p i t a l ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  p r o s p e r i t y  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o t h e r  o v e r r i d i n g  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Thus ,  t h e  amounts  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  f l o w i n g  i n  were 
o f t e n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  t r e a t m e n t  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
e x p a t r i a t e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  r e c e i v e .  I t  was t h e r e f o r e  a lm o s t  
e q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  any c o n c e s s i o n s  made t o  t h e  Union o u g h t  no t  
be o b v i o u s l y  s e e n  as  b e i n g  ' a n t i - e x p a t r i a t e ' .  Hence,  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  e s t a t e s  t o  implement  t h e  r ecom m enda t ions  was a l s o  
c o n s i d e r e d .  T h i s  was n e c e s s a r y  a l s o  f o r  a n o t h e r  r e a s o n :  upon t h e
i n d u s t r y ' s  p r o s p e r i t y  depended to  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  t h e  r e v e n u e s  
which  t h e  government  needed  t o  implement  one o f  i t s  most  i m p o r t a n t  
s o c i a l  and economic o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h a t  o f  u p l i f t i n g  t h e  l o t  o f  t h e  
i n d i g e n e o u s  p o p u l a t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  r u r a l  a r e a s . Too g r e a t  
a b i a s  f o r  e s t a t e  w o rk e rs  c o u ld  t h u s  c u t  i n t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  
e f f o r t s  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  and t h i s  i t  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be p o l i t i c a l l y
more u n d e s i r a b l e  t h a n  n o t  showing a p r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s .
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Thus ,  w h i l e  t h e  recommenda t ions made t e n d e d  t o  f a v o u r  t h e  U n i o n ' s  
demands,  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  f a v o u r  was l i m i t e d  by o t h e r  economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  The r ecom menda t ions  t h e r e f o r e  were 
n o t  so  b i a s e d  as  t o  make e s t a t e  i n v e s t m e n t  u n p r o f i t a b l e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  o p e r a t e d  e f f i c i e n t l y .
I l l
Economic Background  
1. D e c l i n e  i n  E s t a t e  A creage
A s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  r e c e n t  e v o l u t i o n  has  b e e n  t h e  d e c l i n e  
i n  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e .  The d e t a i l s  were  shown i n  T a b l e  1 .2  (p .  7) and 
need  n o t  be  r e p r o d u c e d  h e r e .  I t  w i l l  be  n o t i c e d  t h a t  i n  a l l  b u t  
two y e a r s  (1957,  1961) t h e r e  was a d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  p l a n t e d  a c r e a g e  
unde r  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s ,  w i t h  e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e  ones  i n  1958, 1959 and 
s i n c e  1964.  S i n c e  i t  i s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  Union o p e r a t e d  
( h a v i n g  had no i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  s m a l l h o l d i n g s ) ,  i t  i s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  
a s k  w h e t h e r  i t s  p o l i c y  has  c o n t r i b u t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  a t r e n d  
which  has  u n d o u b t e d l y  damaged t h e  employment  p r o s p e c t s  o f  i t s  
mem bers .
One main f a c t o r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h i s  t r e n d  was t h e  g e n e r a l  
u n c e r t a i n t y  amongst  t h e  e x p a t r i a t e  owners  o f  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  and i t s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e i r  
i n v e s t m e n t s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h a t  i n  some o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  c o m p e t in g  f o r  
c a p i t a l .  The l a r g e  d e c l i n e s  i n  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  b e tw een  1957-60  ( j u s t  
b e f o r e  and a f t e r  I ndepe nde nc e )  stemmed m o s t l y  f rom t h i s  f a c t o r .  Bu t  
s i n c e  t h e  new l o c a l  government  showed, u n e x p e c t e d l y  from t h e  e x p a ­
t r i a t e s '  p o i n t  o f  view,  r e m a rk a b l e  a b i l i t y  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a b i l i t y ,  c o n f i d e n c e  i n c r e a s e d  and c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w  d e c r e a s e d .
S i n c e  1965 however ,  f e a r s  were  r e v i v e d  b e c a u s e  o f  ( a )  a g e n e r a l
199
f e e l i n g  t h a t  r a c e  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  m a in  c o m m u n i t i e s  i n  t h e  
c o u n t r y  (M a la y s  and C h i n e s e )  was d e t e r i o r a t i n g  q u i t e  r a p i d l y ,  ( b )  
t h e  e a r l y  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  im p e n d i n g  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  
an d  A m e r i c a n  m i l i t a r y  p r e s e n c e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  and ( c )  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
p r e s s u r e s  on e x p a t r i a t e  c o m p a n i e s  t o  M a l a y s i a n i s e  t h e i r  t o p  p o s t s  
f o r  w h i c h  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  t r a i n e d  l o c a l  p e r s o n n e l  was f a r  and 
few b e t w e e n .
The p h enom ena l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ( t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  
s h o r t l y )  was  a n o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  
t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e .  The t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  made f a v o u r e d  
i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  r e p l a n t i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  a c r e a g e ,  and 
a l l o w e d  c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  t o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g ,  
and n o t  j u s t  m a i n t a i n i n g ,  o u t p u t .  No t  t o  h a v e  c o n t r a c t e d  w o u ld  h a v e  
t h e r e f o r e  i m p l i e d  a much h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  
f o r  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r  t h a n  t h a t  w h ich  a c t u a l l y  e x i s t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
g e n e r a l l y  downward s l i d e  o f  r u b b e r  p r i c e s  ( T a b l e  1 1 . 2 ) .
A t h i r d  e l e m e n t  was r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  ' s  p o l i c y  
o f  s h o w i n g  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  s m a l l h o l d e r s  a s  a g a i n s t  t h e  e s t a t e  o w n e r s .  
T h i s  was p a r t l y  p o l i t i c a l  b e c a u s e  t h e  f o r m e r  w e r e  m o s t l y  M a l a y s  (who,  
a s  s e e n  i n  C h a p t e r  1,  f o r m e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e )  w h i l e  t h e  
l a t t e r  m o s t l y  N o n -M a lay s  o r  e x p a t r i a t e s ,  and p a r t l y  e c o n o m ic  b e c a u s e  
o f  a g e n u i n e  b e l i e f  t h a t  s m a l l h o l d e r s  n e e d e d  more  a s s i s t a n c e  t h a n  
t h e  e s t a t e  o w n e r s .  T h u s ,  e s t a t e s  had g r e a t e r  o b l i g a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  law t o  pay e d u c a t i o n  and m e d i c a l  r a t e s ,  o r  q u i t  r e n t s . ^  
F u r t h e r ,  u n d e r  t h e  G o v e rn m en t  R e p l a n t i n g  Schemes ( g r a n t s  g i v e n  by  
t h e  G o v e rn m en t  t o  r u b b e r  o w n e r s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  r e p l a n t i n g  o f  l o w -
^ F e d e r a t i o n  o f  M a l a y a ,  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S u b d i v i s i o n  o f  E s t a t e s  Commi- 
t t e e ,  G ove rn m en t  P r i n t e r ,  K u a la  Lumpur ,  1963 ,  p p . 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 .
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yielding derelict trees with pedigreed higher-yielding materials),
smallholders were not only entitled to replant larger areas owned by
them but were also given larger grants per acre than the estate 
1owners. This naturally encouraged to some extent the break-up
of estates into smallholdings, a process well-known in Malaysia
oas the subdivision of estates.
The increase in the demand for land by non-indigeneous 
citizens immediately after Independence as a manner of laying a 
stake in the country, and a scarcity of land and capital pushed up 
the prices of the smaller lots of land. This made it a lucrative 
business for many to purchase large estates, subdivide them into 
smallholdings and sell them in the market.
Another cause was related to the fears amongst the estate 
owners of the future of natural rubber. The war-time period saw 
most of the world's largest consumers of natural rubber cut off from 
their sources of supply in South-East Asia, and this forced the 
pace in the development (with State aid) of an alternative product, 
the synthetic rubber. Technical advances subsequently made in the 
production of synthetic rubber made it a very near substitute for 
natural rubber in a large number of uses, and also brought its cost 
of production down. The result has been felt in the slow and steady 
fall in the prices of natural rubber over the last few years (Table
^Federation of Malaya, Rubber Industry (Replanting) Fund Ordinance, 
No.8 of 1952, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
For a comprehensive study on subdivision, see Aziz, Ungku A., Sub­
division of Estates in Malaya, 1951-60, Vol. I-III, Department of 
Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1963.
3
The scarcity of land itself was mainly artificially-created since, 
as a matter of Government policy, alienation of new land to non- 
indigeneous citizens by the States who control it was restrictive 
despite its availability.
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1 1 . 2 ) .  I n  t u r n  t h e s e  f a l l s  have c a u s e d  s i g n i f i c a n t  l o s s e s  o f  r e v e n u e ,  
and p r o d u c t i o n  has  had t o  be s t e p p e d  up s im p l y  t o  r e t a i n  t h e  o l d  
l e v e l s  o f  income g e n e r a t e d  by t h e  i n d u s t r y .  In  g e n e r a l ,  t h e s e  f a l l s  
have  c o n f u s e d  many owners  as  t o  w h e th e r  t h e y  s h o u ld  r e p l a n t  f u r t h e r ,  
e x t e n d  t h e i r  a c r e a g e ,  o r  d e c r e a s e  t h e i r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ;  
i n  t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  was t h a t  much e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  was 
c o n v e r t e d  f o r  o t h e r  u s e s  such  as  o i l  pa lm,  c o c o n u t ,  t e a  and c o f f e e ,  
o r  f o r  m in i n g ,  i n d u s t r i a l  deve lopmen t  and h o u s i n g .
Thus ,  even  w i t h o u t  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  in  wage and f r i n g e  b e n e f i t s  
c o s t s  on t h e  l a r g e r  e s t a t e s  d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r ,  f a c t o r s  such  as  t h e s e  
would have  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  much of  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  
b e tw e en  1954 -67 .  But  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  l a b o u r  must  be 
r e c k o n e d  a s  an a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  w o rk in g  i n  two ways:  i t  must  have
d e c r e a s e d  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  e s t a t e s  i t  a f f e c t e d ,  and 
i t  w i l l  have  improved  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s m a l l h o l d i n g s  
and t h e  Non-Member E s t a t e s  where  i t s  e f f e c t s  were l e s s .  I t  w i l l  have  
t h u s  added t o  b o t h  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  and t h e  demand f o r  e s t a t e  l a n d  f o r  
s u b d i v i s i o n .  But  t h e r e  i s  no way of  t e l l i n g  how i m p o r t a n t  t h i s  w i l l  
have  b e e n .  In  so f a r  a s  t h e  l a r g e r  e s t a t e s  r em a in e d  p r o f i t a b l e  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  p e r i o d  ( a s  w i l l  be i n d i c a t e d  l a t e r ) ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  i t  w i l l  have  b e e n  a b i g  one .  And, i n  so  f a r  as  t h e  a l t e r n a ­
t i v e  t o  t h e  U n i o n ' s  p o l i c y  i n  t h e s e  y e a r s  m ig h t  have  b e e n  n o t  an 
o r d e r l y  f r e e  m arke t  w i t h  lower  wages b u t  a d i s o r d e r l y  c o n d i t i o n  o f  
one k in d  o r  a n o t h e r  ( a s  w i l l  be  s u g g e s t e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ) ,  i t  
i s  c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  i t  p u r s u e d  r e s u l t e d  i n  l e s s  and n o t  
more s u b d i v i s i o n  t h a n  m ig h t  o t h e r w i s e  ha ve  o c c u r r e d .  In  s h o r t ,  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  wage and f r i n g e  b e n e f i t s  c o s t s  were a lm o s t  c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  as  i m p o r t a n t  i n  c a u s i n g  a d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  (and 
t h e r e f o r e  i n  t h e  employment  l e v e l s )  as  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  m en t io n e d  above .
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The e x a c t  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  em ploymen t  l e v e l s  
c a u s e d  by t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
d e t e r m i n e ,  b u t  a c r u d e  e s t i m a t e  i s  p o s s i b l e .  A ssu m in g  t h a t  t h e  
r a t i o  o f  p l a n t e d  a c r e a g e  t o  t o t a l  l a b o u r - f o r c e  i n  1967 had r e m a i n e d  
a t  t h e  same l e v e l  a s  i t  was i n  1955,  t h a t  i s  a t  7 . 2 4 ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  
i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  o f  2 6 9 , 0 0 0  a c r e s  w o u ld  h a v e  c a u s e d  an  a p p r o x i ­
m a t e  f a l l  i n  employmen t  l e v e l s  o f  a l i t t l e  o v e r  3 7 , 0 0 0  w o r k e r s ,  an  
am ou nt  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a b o u t  80% o f  t h e  t o t a l  f a l l  o f  4 6 , 3 0 0  w o r k e r s  i n  
t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 5 4 - 1 9 6 7  ( s e e  T a b l e s  1 . 2  an d  6 . 6 ) .  How many o f  t h e s e  
w e r e  a c t u a l l y  u n em p lo y ed  i s  a g a i n  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e ,  u n l e s s  a 
s u r v e y  had b e e n  c o n d u c t e d ,  b u t  t h e r e  i s  some r e a s o n  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
t h e  I n d i a n s  w e r e  r e l a t i v e l y  w o r s e  o f f  t h a n  t h e  o t h e r s  ( a c c o u n t i n g  
p a r t l y  f o r  t h e  f a c t s  r e c o r d e d  i n  C h a p t e r  6 ) .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  am oun t  o f  e t h n i c  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  seem s  t o  h a v e  
t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  t h i s  w h o l e  p r o c e s s  s i n c e  t h e  new o w n e r s ,  b e i n g  m a i n l y  
C h i n e s e ,  p r e f e r r e d  t o  em ploy  a l a r g e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  C h i n e s e  l a b o u r  i n  
t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .
2 .  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  Change
Th e y e a r s  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
w e r e ,  a s  i s  w e l l - k n o w n ,  y e a r s  o f  f o r m i d a b l e  t e c h n i c a l  p r o g r e s s  i n  
t h e  i n d u s t r y .  B e s t  known i s  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  o u t p u t  p e r  a c r e  and 
p e r  man y e a r  i n p u t  ( T a b l e  1 1 . 1 ) .  T h u s ,  t o t a l  o u t p u t  i n c r e a s e d  f rom 
3 5 2 , 0 0 0  l o n g  t o n s  i n  1955 t o  5 2 6 , 0 0 0  l o n g  t o n s  i n  1967 (b y  50% ) ,  
y i e l d s  p e r  a c r e  f r om  49 0  pou nds  p e r  annum t o  921 p ounds  p e r  annum 
( b y  90%),  and o u t p u t s  p e r  man y e a r  i n p u t  f rom 1 . 2 7  t o  2 . 2 7  l o n g  
t o n s  (b y  80%) . T h e s e  i n c r e a s e s  w e r e  t^ie r e s u l t  o f  r e s e a r c h  b e g u n  
i n  M alaya i n  t h e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 s  and w h i c h ,  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  W or ld  War I I ,  
l e d  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  s e v e r a l  h i g h - y i e l d i n g  c l o n e s  o r  c l o n a l
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TABLE 11.1
TOTAL OUTPUT, PRODUCTIVITY PER ACRE AND PER MAN YEAR 
INPUT ON RUBBER ESTATES, 1955-1967
Year
Estate Output 
( '000 Long 
Tons)
Average Yield Per 
Acre Per Annum 
(in lbs)
Output Per Man 
Year Input 
(Long Tons)
1955 352 490 1.27
1956 351 496 1.25
1957 368 535 1.33
1958 389 586 1.38
1959 407 641 1.44
1960 413 676 1.45
1961 429 720 1.50
1962 438 746 1.53
1963 458 782 1.60
1964 477 818 1.73
1965 491 850 1.82
1966 514 898 2.06
1967 526 921 2.27
Source: Department of Statistics, Rubber Statistics Handbook,
1955-1967.
seeds followed by extensive planting and replanting using these 
materials. (The increase in man year inputs were influenced also 
by the tapping innovations to be discussed later in this chapter). 
When these trees were brought into tapping in the late 1950s, and 
together with improvements made in agricultural upkeep simultaneous 
with the application of yield stimulants and the introduction of 
newly evolved tapping techniques, the results were impressive.
More than the actual results obtained so far, the interviews also 
disclosed an increasing confidence within the industry of further
spectacular increases in the future, a beginning of which was made
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recently with the development of new processing of rubber resulting 
in the Standard Malaysian Rubber grades.
Less well-known have been innovations in other directions. 
Thus, experiments conducted into 'optimum' task-sizes have suggested 
that increased profits could be made with larger task-sizes than 
those prevailing in the 1950s. In the past, there was a preference 
for smaller task-sizes because these allowed tappers to tap the 
trees early in the morning when the flow of latex was at its best 
and when collection was begun before the weather became hot and humid. 
Smaller task-sizes not only resulted in higher yields per acre but 
also higher yields of better grade rubber because they enabled 
tappers to complete tapping of all trees with proper excision of bark 
and to observe proper tree sanitation. As wage costs increased in 
recent years, management experimented with larger task-sizes to cut 
down costs by employing fewer tappers. These experiments were faci­
litated by other advances made meanwhile in tapping techniques which 
speeded up the time taken to tap trees, and in the application of 
yield stimulants which gave higher yields because latex continued to 
flow smoothly without drying until late in the morning. Task-sizes 
have therefore been increased in recent years (even after allowing 
for the increases in the stand per acre taking place in this period), 
the effect being to reduce employment levels per given acreage.
The extent to which task-sizes were increased however was limited 
by the maximum amount of physical effort a tapper could exert a day 
and by the Union's opposition to such increases because of its 
effects on employment levels.
Experiments conducted with different systems of tapping 
have suggested that some shifts in the direction of the less labour-
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intensive systems could be made profitably. In the past, the 
most common system of tapping adopted was the half spiral alter­
nate-daily system (S/2.d/2.100%) which usually involved tapping a 
given field for about 155 days a year. With wage costs increasing, 
some attempts at shifting to the less labour-intensive systems of 
tapping, such as the half spiral third-daily system (S/2.d/3.67%), 
averaging 103 tapping days a year for a given field, or the full- 
spiral fourth-daily system (S/1.d/4.100%), averaging 78 tapping 
days a year for a given field, have been made. The effects have 
been to reduce employment levels since fewer tappers are required 
for a given acreage. The reluctance of management to introduce 
such changes in the past was due to the uncertainties of the effects 
of the different tapping systems on retardation of the growth of 
the tree, its tapping life-span, bark consumption, proportions of 
lower grades of rubber produced, bark renewal, incidence of panel 
diseases (Mouldy Rot) and drying of trees (Brown Bast) . Recent 
research however has suggested that if wage costs continued to rise, 
the less labour-intensive systems could, on balance, become more 
profitable.
Mechanisation was also being gradually introduced into 
some aspects of field and factory work. Thus, in some of the 
larger estates, mechanical sprayers and tractors were used to con­
trol interrow growths, and power-driven machines for felling and 
clearing; employment of these in place of manual labour was 
becoming common in the estates by 1967, an uncommon feature ten 
years earlier. Further, the quantity of work in the field, such 
as weeding, was also reduced in order to cut down on wage costs. 
Installation of automatic machines to manufacture rubber was also
introduced to reduce labour requirements. But, in so far as tapping
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was concerned, mechanization was no more than a topic for discussion 
with experiments only in infancy.
In the absence of primary data, it is not possible to 
state accurately the numbers retrenched from these innovations in 
the organisation of estate work, but a crude estimate would probably 
be in the region of the difference between the total numbers re­
trenched and the numbers affected as a result of the decline in the 
estate acreage (pg.202), which suggests a figure slightly over 
9,000 workers or about 20% of the total decline in the employment 
levels between 1954-67.
There are no grounds for seriously supposing that the 
existence of the Union hindered or encouraged the development of 
new high-yielding materials. The savings in land and capital charges 
per unit of rubber which these produced must have been overwhelmingly 
sufficient to motivate the research which has and is still producing 
them. The influence of the Union's pressure on wages on the other 
innovations is however less certain. It is possible that they were 
prompted by the desire to save wage costs. But in so far as they 
were changes that would profitably have been adopted even at lower 
wages it is unsafe to conclude that the rises in wages that the 
Union effected were the only dominant causes. This seems the most 
logical conclusion at this stage until another study, a detailed 
econometric one, is conducted to throw more light on the problem..'-*
3. Prices and Profitability
The increase in productivity has been accompanied by an 
equally well-known decline in rubber prices (Table 11.2). This is 
no place for a discussion of the general economics of the rubber 
industry, namely, the trends in the world demand for and the supply
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of natural and synthetic rubber, and of the changes in their costs 
of production, which have together produced the price-falls. But 
it is highly pertinent to an assessment of the current wage situa­
tion on the Malaysian estates and the role of the Union to know what, 
on the balance of these conflicting trends, has been the profits 
rates on estate invesment.
Unfortunately, the absence of any published data on indus­
try-wide profits makes it impossible to present such information, 
the problem being not so much the measurement of total revenue as 
the total cost of production. Total revenue can be fairly accurately 
estimated from the published data on prices and outputs of the 
different grades of rubber produced in any given year, and the 
trends obtained.1 Allowances will, of course, have to be made for 
items such as export duties and the research cess. The effect of 
export duties (imposed at the time the rubber is exported from 
Malaysia) and the research cess (imposed to finance funds required 
for research, development, and propaganda for the benefit of the 
industry) is to reduce the amount of the revenue that would other­
wise be received by the producers if estimates were made solely on 
the basis of the market price of rubber.
Total cost of production however can neither be easily 
nor accurately estimated. Even to obtain a very general indication 
of the trends in the total cost of production would require, at the 
least, another comprehensive study which would have to resolve 
problems of obtaining these data and of standardizing them (when 
obtained) in order to add them up as homogeneous units. The first
See Department of Statisitcs, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1955-1967.1
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can be partly solved by relying on the summary information given in 
some fairly accessible publications,1 or from the annual reports of 
the registered companies which are filed in the office of the 
Registrar of Companies. The second, the problem of standardization, 
cannot be resolved fully since the information available in these 
publications on the differences in the methods of depreciation used, 
items included (or excluded) from costs, and differences in their 
financial years, is either not available or is incomplete. Besides, 
the information contained in these publications is limited only to 
those obtained from the larger companies and estates, there being 
no published source of information on costs of production for the 
smaller and proprietary companies or estates. Thus, even after a 
laborious task that would certainly take a couple of years to complete, 
the total cost figures obtained from these sources would still not be 
representative of the industry's cost figures nor would they 
necessarily be accurate even in so far as the companies themselves 
are concerned because of the impossibilities of standardization.
In view of this and because the objective of this part is 
no more than to provide a very general picture of the profitability 
trends, only the annual profits information of the six Member Estates 
examined in Part I will be presented and discussed here (the informa­
tion available for the three Non-Member Estates is insufficient to 
examine their trends). These six estates, of course, constitute only 
a tiny portion of the estate sector but, as seen in Chapter 2, they
^Zorn and Leigh-Hunt (comp.), Manual of Rubber Planting Companies, 
Moor House, London, 1955-1967; Fraser & Co., (comp.), Facts and 
Figures of Malayan Companies, Singapore, 1955-1967 (No issue for 
1962); and Lyall & Evatt(comp.), Handbook of Malayan and Singapore 
Stocks and Shares, Singapore, 1961-1967.
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were a carefully selected sample. Further, interviews with an 
experienced planter of over thirty years' standing, who is presently 
the Adviser to the Malaysian Government on Rubber Industry Taxation 
and considered as one of the experts on the costs of production of 
natural rubber (Mr V.D. Nair), confirmed that the general trends 
indicated by the cost and profits experiences of these six estates 
were reasonably close to what would be the 'average' for the larger 
estates in West Malaysia. The main figures are summarised in Table 
11.3.
The Table shows that despite significant increases in 
productivities and despite decreases in costs of production (such 
decreases being obtained despite increases in the price of labour), 
the declines in the price-levels in this period have more than off­
set the productivity-increase and the cost-decrease advantages so 
that the profits per pound of rubber, per mature acre and per worker 
have shown a steady downward slide. But profits were still being 
made: assuming an average replanting cost of $800 per acre to bring
it to maturity, a figure which most of those interviewed gave, the 
profits per mature acre of $125 per annum in the worst year for rubber 
prices in this period (1967) still gives a reasonably good return, 
especially considering that the profits figures in Table 11.3 were 
understated. The returns for the other years (when prices were 
better) must have been obviously higher since replanting costs per 
acre have apparently not changed very much.
Some general comments from the interviews with the estate 
owners are also of interest here. Though all agreed that the profit­
ability trend was downwards, almost none suggested that investments 
in the rubber estates were as yet unprofitable relative to investments 
in other industries - especially if the estates concerned had
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TABLE 11.3
PROFITABILITY T R E N D S I N  SIX MEMBER ESTATES, 1955-1967
Year
Ave.Ex-Estate 
Price per lb 
(in M.£)
Ave.Ex-Estate 
Cost per lb 
(in M .£)
Ave.Profits 
per Pound 
(in M,£)
Total 
Output 
in lbs
Total 
Prof its 
in M.$
1955 101.04 58.21 42.83 8,086,815 3,463,583
1956 86.67 56.26 30.41 8,173,305 2,485,502
1957 78.65 56.43 22.22 9,019,540 2,004,141
1958 70.41 52.75 17.66 9,436,960 1,666,567
1959 91 .48 50.83 40.65 9,657,620 3,925,823
1960 98.08 49.28 48.80 10,079,293 4,918,695
1961 73.42 48.57 24.85 10,657,944 2,648,499
1962 66.04 45.42 20.62 11,260,260 2,321,866
1963 62.10 43.81 18.29 12,085,840 2,210,434
1964 56.00 43.11 12.89 12,068,045 1,555,571
1965 58.47 42.64 15.83 12,056,096 1,908,480
1966 54.54 40.88 13.66 12,310,480 1,681,612
1967 44.61 32 .46 12.15 12,277,408 1,491,705
Year Mature Acreage (in Acres)
Ave.Yield 
per Acre 
(in lbs)
Profits per 
Ma t.Ac. 
(in M.$)
Average Profits per
Labour Worker
Force (in M.$)
1955 14,415 561 240 N.A . N.A .
1956 14,415 567 172 N.A. N.A .
1957 14,204 635 141 N.A . N.A.
1958 13,960 676 119 N.A . N.A .
1959 13,660 707 287 N.A . N.A.
1960 13,457 749 366 N.A . N.A.
1961 13,457 792 197 2233 1186
1962 13,310 846 174 2229 1042
1963 13,296 908 166 2217 999
1964 12,907 935 121 2142 726
1965 12,704 949 150 2007 951
1966 12,460 988 135 1915 878
1967 11,892 1032 125 1816 821
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(* )  The u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h i s  T a b le  i s  more in  th e  t r e n d s  i t  
shows th an  in  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  p r o f i t s  . The a c t u a l  l e v e l s  o f  
p r o f i t s  w ere  h ig h e r  th an  t h o s e  shown h e r e .  T h is  i s  b eca u se  
t h e  A verage  E x - E s t a t e  p r i c e  o f  rubber  i s  n e t  o f  i t e m s  such  
a s  e x p o r t  d u ty ,  r e s e a r c h  c e s s ,  a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  c e s s  and 
r e p l a n t i n g  c e s s ,  some o f  w h ich  w ere  r e f u n d a b le .  Thus, t h e  
a n t i - i n f l a t i o n a r y  c e s s  was imposed when th e  p r i c e  o f  rubber  
e x c e e d e d  80 c e n t s  a pound; i t  was re fu n d ed  when t h e  p r i c e  
f e l l  be low  80 c e n t s  a pound. (T h is  c e s s  w as ,  how ever,  
abandoned s i n c e  1 9 6 3 ) .  F u r th e r ,  t h e  r e p l a n t i n g  c e s s  was 
imposed t o  o b t a i n  funds to  en c o u r a g e  r e p l a n t i n g  w i t h  h ig h e r -  
y i e l d i n g  m a t e r i a l s ;  ' g r a n t s '  up t o  v a r y in g  amounts w ere th e n  
made t o  e s t a t e  owners who u n d er to o k  r e p l a n t i n g .  T h ese  re fu n d s  
when r e c e i v e d  w ere  c r e d i t e d  t o  a s e p a r a t e  Revenue A ccount and 
n ot in c lu d e d  under th e  Rubber S a l e s  A c co u n t .
r e p l a n t e d  v i g o r o u s l y  enough in  th e  p a s t .  T h e ir  f e a r s  w ere  more about  
th e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  o f  t h e  f u tu r e  t r e n d  o f  rubber  p r i c e s  (and i t s  
i n f l u e n c e  on th e  f u t u r e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y )  th a n  a b o u t  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o n d i ­
t i o n s .  I t  seem s t h a t  i t  i s  t h e s e  f e a r s  w h ich  have  en co u ra g ed  
r e d u c t io n s  o f  a c r e a g e  (and d is c o u r a g e d  any p o s s i b l e  e x t e n s i o n s )  more 
th an  th e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  la b o u r  c o s t s  o f  p r o d u c t io n .  The c o n c l u ­
s i o n  seem s t o  b e  t h a t  w h i l e  p r o f i t s  h a v e  b een  f a l l i n g ,  th e y  a re  
s t i l l  a t  a r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l .  Thus, th e  U nion  c a n n o t  be ch arged
s e r i o u s l y  w i t h  s q u e e z i n g  th e  e s t a t e s  o u t  o f  e x i s t e n c e .
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CHAPTER 12
THE INFLUENCE OF UNIONISATION 
I
The two q u e s t i o n s  p o s e d  b y  t h e  f a c t s  s e t  o u t  i n  P a r t  I ,  
n a m e l y ,  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  Union  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  
l e v e l  o f  w ag es  on t h e  Member E s t a t e s  and t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  i t s  p o l i c y  
on  t h e  g r o w i n g  unem ploym en t  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s ,  c a n  now be d i s ­
c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  c o n c l u d i n g  c h a p t e r .
I I
NUPW and t h e  Wage L e v e l  i n  1967
S i n c e  November 1954,  t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t s  i n  t h e  wage l e v e l s  
( a n d  f r i n g e  b e n e f i t s )  on  t h e  Member E s t a t e s  w e r e  o b t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  
n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  U n io n .  The U n i o n  was t h e r e f o r e  p r o x i -  
m a t e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h em .  B u t  t h e  more  s i g n i f i c a n t  i s s u e  i s  t o  
d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  c a n  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  s o l e l y ,  
c h i e f l y ,  o r  o n l y  m a r g i n a l l y  c o n s e q u e n t i a l  upon  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  and 
t h e  p o l i c y  f o l l o w e d  by  t h e  U n io n .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n ­
s i d e r  w h a t  w o u ld  h a v e  h a p p e n e d  o t h e r w i s e  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  U n io n  
i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  T h i s  i s  an  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t a s k  b e c a u s e  t h e  
p r o b a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  f a r  f r o m  e a s i l y  d i s c e r n a b l e  and 
b e c a u s e  some e l e m e n t  o f  c o n j e c t u r e  m u s t  i n e v i t a b l y  e n t e r  i n  w o r k i n g  
o u t  t h e  p r o b a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  r e s u l t s  i n  e a c h  c a s e .  Th e t a s k  w ou ld  
seem e a s i e r  o n l y  i n  s t a n d a r d  economic  a n a l y s i s  when m a r k e t  s i t u a t i o n  
i s  t h e  k i n d  o f  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  a n a l y s i s  p r e s u n e s b u t  t h i s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  f i n d  i n  t h e  f l u i d  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  n e w ly  i n d e p e n d e n t  c o u n t r i e s  p l a g u e d
w i t h  o t h e r  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p r o b l e m s .
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The general economist considering the difference between 
the situation with and without an active union would tend to assume 
the alternative to be the kind of world postulated in simple economic 
theory, that is, an orderly free labour market without governmental 
intervention in relations between management and workers - in which 
workers with the same efficiency, zeal and submissiveness to managerial 
decisions competed for jobs against each other and in which the 
employers did not discriminate between applicants other than on 
grounds of efficiency. If that had been the situation in 1954 and 
had it persisted until 196 7, then the growing unemployment in the 
estates suggests that wages would have been much lower and fringe 
benefits lesser than they were at the time of this survey - at least 
as low as at that level when almost all the surplus labour in the 
market would have to be cleared off. The question then arises as to 
who (or what) was responsible for the actual higher wage levels in 
1967, and the extent of its responsibility.
Taking first only the entry of the Union and the policy it 
followed into account, it seems doubtful whether the increases obtained 
were due solely or chiefly to this new variable. The Union has never 
had 100% membership or near it, nor anything like the financial 
resources available to management. If management had only the Union 
to fight, it would have undoubtedly won. Wages would then have been 
lower - probably nearly as low as they would have been had workers 
competed for jobs in an orderly labour market without union support, 
since the Union might have secured some gains through its 'nuisance 
value'. Based on the above assumptions about the labour market, the 
Union's role was therefore only marginal. The higher wage levels in 
1967 were then chiefly due to the entry of the social and political
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forces discussed in Chapter 11. These assisted the Union and enabled 
it to achieve a wage level which it might not have otherwise attained 
on its own.
But empirical researchers on wage levels and wage structures 
know that labour markets are far too notoriously imperfect as to make 
any an exception, especially if it was found in such a complex social, 
political and economic environment as the rubber industry was in West 
Malaysia. It is therefore fairly certain that had the Union not 
existed, the alternative would not have been an orderly free market, 
and any temptation to jump too quickly to any simplistic conclusions 
based on an orderly free labour market model may not necessarily be 
valid in the peculiarly different conditions prevailing here between 
1954-67. Given population increases and the uncertain future for 
natural rubber, the orderly free market wage level might have been 
quite unattainable simply because it would have been too low for 
orderly conditions and, even if by some remote chance it was attained, 
it would have resulted in a labour force with lesser zeal and lower 
efficiency, a situation much less satisfactory to both sides than that 
which existed in 1967. The role of the Union must therefore be 
assessed against other more realistic alternatives, two of the most 
likely of which are discussed below.
First, a more probable alternative situation in the absence 
of the Union in 1954 would have been a labour force organised by a 
less responsible and more militant left-wing union leadership. The 
rise of the NUPW to preeminenee in the union affairs in the rubber 
industry was, as seen, one main factor in the elimination of a strong 
left-wing competition for a hold on the plantation worker; its ab­
sence could have resulted in the success of the left-wingers. While 
such a left-wing union leadership could have through sheer militancy
216
pushed up wage levels, it would have equally well produced a condi­
tion of strife and uncertainties in the estates. Besides, its 
success would have been only short-lived, and it seems doubtful 
whether significant gains could have been obtained in the short- 
run. Given the nature of the government in this period (one opposed 
strongly to militant unionism), there seems little doubt that such 
a union could not have won its sympathies nor that of any third- 
parties it nominated to settle any possible disputes in the estates. 
The union would have most certainly been banned by the government 
at some stage well before 1967 and its membership would then have 
been left stranded. For another union to emerge and pick up the 
strands for a new struggle, time would have been required. In the 
circumstances, the achievements of the left-wing union leadership 
in the period 1954-67 as a whole could not have been anywhere as 
remarkable as those prevailing in 1967. Whether the conditions 
prevailing in 1967 were due solely or chiefly to the Union and not 
to the other social and political pressures discussed earlier is, 
of course, argueable. In the writer’s judgement, since it was the 
Union that initiated the negotiations, and since it was specifically 
this Union's policy and its leadership in this period that influenced 
significantly the concessions obtained through the third-parties 
(despite the existence of other independent forces also working in 
that direction), the NUPW must therefore be considered being chiefly 
responsible for the higher wage levels in 1967.
Second, another equally probable alternative situation might 
have been the emergence of a wise management with the longsightedness 
to provide improvements in wage levels (and fringe benefits) in order 
to secure a reasonably efficient and stable work-force. Economic 
factors, such as those discussed in Chapter 11, were not entirely
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u n f a v o u r a b l e  t o  some i m p r o v e m e n t s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c o u l d  
h a v e  e n c o u r a g e d  many e s t a t e s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  e x p a t r i a t e - o w n e d  o n e s )  
t o  make t h e s e  i m p r o v e m e n t s .  However ,  b e c a u s e  o f  r i s i n g  unem ploym en t  
i n  t h e  e s t a t e s ,  t h e  u n c e r t a i n  e l e m e n t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t r e n d  o f  p r o f i t s ,  
a n d  t h e  n a t u r a l  d e s i r e  o f  m o s t  e m p l o y e r s  t o  m a x i m is e  p r o f i t s  w i t h  
t h e  'minimum b e s t ' ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  im p r o v e m e n t s  
v o l u n t a r i l y  made by e s t a t e  o w n e rs  w ould  h a v e  b e e n  l e s s  t h a n  t h o s e  
f o r c e d  up o n  them  by t h e  U n i o n .  T h a t  some o f  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  w e r e  
g r u d g i n g l y  made by t h e  Member E s t a t e s  and t h a t  t h e s e  c o n c e s s i o n s  w e r e  
p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d e m i s e  o f  t h e  MPIEA, a s  s e e n  i n  C h a p t e r s  
9 and 1 0 , s u p p o r t  t h i s  c o n t e n t i o n .  The r o l e  o f  t h e  e c o n o m ic  f a c t o r s  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h a p t e r  11 was M e r e l y  ' p e r m i s s i v e '  and i n  s e t t i n g  t h e  u p p e r  
l i m i t s  b eyond  w h i c h  t h e  w ag es  o u g h t  n o t  t o  r i s e ,  b u t  i t  was c h i e f l y  t h e  
NUPW t h a t  p u s h e d  up t h e  w ag es  and t h e  b e t t e r  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  p r e ­
v a i l i n g  i n  1967.
To c o n c l u d e ,  g i v e n  t h e  two m o s t  r e a l i s t i c  a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t u a ­
t i o n s  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  U n i o n  and c o m p a r i n g  t h e  1967 r e s u l t s  w i t h  
t h e i r  p r o b a b l e  r e s u l t s  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  i t  see ms  t h a t  i t  was t h e  NUPW 
(a n d  n o t  t h e  o t h e r  f o r c e s )  w h i c h  was  c h i e f l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
i m p r o v e m e n t s  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  w o r k e r s '  c o n d i t i o n s  s i n c e  1954 
and t h e r e f o r e  f o r  t h e  wage l e v e l  i n  1967 .  The s u g g e s t i o n  i m p l i e d  by 
t h e  f a c t s  s e t  o u t  i n  P a r t  I and C h a p t e r  10 i s  t h e r e f o r e  c o n f i r m e d  
h e r e .
I l l
NUPW and t h e  Unemployment  T r e n d s  1 9 5 4 - 6 7
W h e th e r  t h e  wage l e v e l  g a i n s  o b t a i n e d  by  t h e  U n io n  w e re
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c h i e f l y  o r  o n l y  m a r g i n a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e ^  f o r  t h e  g r o w i n g  unem ploym en t  
p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  i s  an  e q u a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n . t o  d i s c u s s  
i n  any d e p t h .  The  U n i o n ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  u nem ploym en t  t r e n d s  
c o u l d  h a v e  a r i s e n  o n l y  by t h e  numbers  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  d e c l i n e s  i n  t h e  
em pl oy m en t  l e v e l s  a r i s i n g  d i r e c t l y  o u t  o f  t h e  h i g h  p r i c e  o f  l a b o u r  i t  
a c h i e v e d .  T h u s ,  one  n e e d s  t o  m eas u r e  n o t  o n l y  t h e  a c t u a l  d e c l i n e s  
i n  t h e  em ploym en t  l e v e l s  due  s o l e l y  t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  
l a b o u r  ( a s  d i s t i n c t  f rom t h e  numbers  a f f e c t e d  b y  o t h e r  c a u s a l  e l e m e n t s ) ,  
b u t  a l s o  t h e  n u m b e r s  r e m a i n i n g  unem p lo y ed  f o r  some l e n g t h  o f  t i m e  a f t e r  
t h e  r e t r e n c h m e n t s .  O n ly  a d e t a i l e d  e c o n o m e t r i c  s t u d y  c a n  g i v e n  u s e f u l  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on  t h e  f i r s t ,  and o n l y  a s u r v e y  on  t h e  s e c o n d .  T h i s  
q u e s t i o n  i s  n o t  o n e  o f  t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  a s t u d y  o f  wage s t r u c t u r e  
a s  t o  c a l l  f o r  a d e t a i l e d  e c o n o m e t r i c  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  w o u ld  p r o b a b l y  t a k e  
a n o t h e r  y e a r  o r  s o  ( i f  i n  f a c t  i t  c a n  be  e f f e c t i v e l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  
s u c h  a c o m p l e x  l a b o u r  m a r k e t ) .  And r e g r e t f u l l y ,  no s u r v e y  h a s  y e t  b e e n  
c o n d u c t e d  by a n y o n e  i n  West M a l a y s i a  t o  g i v e  u s e f u l  and r e l i a b l e  i n f o r ­
m a t i o n  on t h e  s e c o n d .  I n  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  o n l y  some g e n e r a l  comments 
w i l l  b e  made h e r e .  T h e s e  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u g g e s t  b r o a d l y  
t h e  a c t u a l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s  wage p o l i c y  on  t h e  unem ploymen t  
t r e n d s  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s .
I n  t e r m s  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e  i s  some e v i d e n c e  t o  
s u p p o r t  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  employment  f e l l  b e c a u s e  p r i c e  o f  l a b o u r  
i n c r e a s e d .  T h u s ,  e v i d e n c e  was g i v e n  i n  C h a p t e r  11 t o  show t h a t  t h e  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  l a b o u r  w e re  p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e
^ O b v i o u s l y ,  t h e  U n io n  c a n n o t  be  h e l d  w h o l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  
i n c r e a s i n g  unem p lo y m en t  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  s i n c e  a p a r t  o f  t h i s  was 
a l s o  d u e  t o  f a c t o r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  h i g h  r a t e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s  and t h e  g e n e r a l  unem p lo y m en t  i n  
t h e  economy,  m a t t e r s  b r i e f l y  r e v i e w e d  i n  C h a p t e r  6 .  T h e s e  h a v e  
l i t t l e  o r  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  wage p o l i c y  p u r s u e d  by t h e  U nion  
b e t w e e n  1 9 5 4 - 6 7 .
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i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  t a s k - s i z e s ,  g r e a t e r  u s e  o f  l e s s  l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e  
s y s te m s  o f  t a p p i n g ,  s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  by m e c h a n i z a t i o n  i n  v a r i o u s  
a s p e c t s  o f  f i e l d  and f a c t o r y  work,  and d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  
work c o n s i d e r e d  e s s e n t i a l .  B u t ,  i t  must  be r e p e a t e d ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  
t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  wage c o s t  i n c r e a s e s  were  t h e  dom inan t  c a u s e s  i n  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s .  A p a r t  f rom t h i s ,  such  s h o r t - t e r m  
e f f e c t s  were  m ino r ,  a c r u d e  e s t i m a t e  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  o n l y  one o u t  o f  
f i v e  who w ere  r e t r e n c h e d  be tw een  1954-67 a r o s e  o u t  o f  t h e s e  i n n o v a t i o n s .  
T h e i r  e f f e c t s  on i n c r e a s i n g  unemployment  i n  t h e  e s t a t e s  (and t h e r e f o r e  
t h a t  o f  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  p r i c e  o f  l a b o u r )  must  
have  b e e n  m in o r .
The more i m p o r t a n t  c a u s e s  o f  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  employment  
l e v e l s  (and t h e r e f o r e  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  unemployment  l e v e l s )  
w e re  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l o n g e r - t e r m  p rob lem  o f  i n v e s t m e n t - d e c i s i o n s  i n  
r e p l a n t i n g  and e x t e n s i o n s  ( o r  d e c l i n e  i n  a c r e a g e ) ,  much t h e  most  
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e s e  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  b e i n g  l o n g - t e r m  
p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n g e s  and l o n g - t e r m  p r i c e  e x ­
p e c t a t i o n s ,  f a c t o r s  a l r e a d y  b r i e f l y  r e v i e w e d  in  C h a p t e r  11.  A c r u d e  
e s t i m a t e  had s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  f o u r  o u t  o f  f i v e  o f  t h o s e  r e t r e n c h e d  
a r o s e  o u t  o f  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e .  Wage c o s t  i n c r e a s e s  
a l s o  p l a y e d  an a d d i t i o n a l  p a r t  i n  t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  b u t  i t  seems q u i t e  
i n c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  su c h  i n c r e a s e s  were so  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  t h e  U n i o n ' s  s u c c e s s ,  t h e  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  would no t  have 
d e c r e a s e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  l e t  a l o n e  i n c r e a s e . .  . In  f a c t ,  
wha t  seems a s  p r o b a b l e ,  i n  i t s  a b s e n c e ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  o f  a 
d i s c o n t e n t e d  o r  a m i l i t a n t l y - o r g a n i s e d  l a b o u r  f o r c e  d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  
m ig h t  have  so  harmed e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  l o n g - t e r m  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  e s t a t e  a c r e a g e  c o u ld  have  p r o b a b l y  d e c r e a s e d  
f u r t h e r  and employment  l e v e l s  been  even  low e r  t h a n  t o d a y .  Fo r ,  a s
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already implied, investment decisions in the rubber estates have been 
as significantly influenced by the degree of optimism or pessimism 
owners of capital have on Malaysia's political and social stability as 
by other more conventional economic Considerations, and a radical left- 
wing union or a malcontent and inefficient work-force would have 
simply made matters worse.
In this context, the Union's policy of bargaining hard for 
wage and other improvements without being significantly inhibited by 
fears of increasing unemployment may well have been wise even though, 
it must be admitted, it is difficult to prove it one way or the other. 
Thus, any manipulation of the current wage level may neither solve the 
unemployment problem nor any other problems created in the process of 
manipulating it ; the solution to the estates ’ unemployment problem 
must lie elsewhere, such as in opening up more land more vigorously, 
setting up industries as rapidly as is possible, providing employment 
opportunities equitably irrespective of the workers’ racial affilia­
tions, and more concentration by the government on ’growth' (industrial) 
rather than on 'stagnant' (rural) sectors, but the details and
the implications of these issues do not come within the scope of the 
present study.
To conclude on the question raised, the NUPW was not entirely 
blameless for the unemployment increases in the estates since 1954, but 
its responsibility was probably no more than marginal. A major portion 
of the responsibility will probably be found in the social and political 
undercurrents prevailing in the country since 1954. The suggestion 
implied by the facts set out in Part I is therefore rejected here on 
the basis of the evidence currently available. Thus, any temptation to 
draw a sweeping conclusion based on elementary economic theory on the 
relationship between wage and employment levels may be misleading, espe­
cially in this market where so many other complex factors also operate.
221
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Apart from standard texts on wages and related matters, and 
articles on labour market studies published in various journals such 
as the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Oxford 
University Institute of Statistics, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Review of Economic Statistics and others,the following were also 
consulted:
Books
Awberry, S.S. and Dailey, F.W,, Labour and Trade Union Organisation
in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Government Printer, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1948.
Allen, G.C. and Donnithorne Audrey, G., Western Enterprise in Indo­
nesia and Malaya, Macmillan, New York, 1956.
Aziz, Ungku A ., Subdivision of Estates in Malaya, 1951-60, Vols. 1 - 
III, Department of Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1963.
Berg, Elliot J., Wage Structure in Less Developed Countries (monograph: 
1968).
Trade Unions and Wage Levels - The Nigerian Case 
(monograph: 1969), Centre for Research on Economic Develop­
ment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Brown, E.H. Phelps, The Economics of Labor, Yale University Press,
New Haven, 1962.
Cartter, Allan M., Theory of Wages and Employment, Irwin, Illinois, 1959. 
Dobb, Maurice, Wages, Nisbet, London, 1948.
Douglas, P.H., The Theory of Wages, Kelley, New York, 1934.
222
Dunlop, John T., (ed.), Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, Mac­
millan, New York, 1944.
The Theory of Wage Determination, Macmillan,
London, 1957.
Fisk, E.K., Studies in the Rural Economy of South-East Asia, Eastern 
Universities Press, Singapore, 1964.
Gamba, Charles, The National Union of Plantation Workers: The History
of the Plantation Workers of Malaya, 1946-1958, Donald Moore, 
Singapore, 1962.
Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, Donald Moore, 
Singapore, 1962.
Hicks, J.R., The Theory of Wages, Macmillan, London, 1932.
Isaac, J.E, Wages and Productivity, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1967.
and Ford, G.W., (eds.), Australian Labour Economics,
Sun Books, Melbourne, 1967.
Jefferys, Margot, Mobility in the Labour Market : Employment Changes 
in Battersea and Dagenham, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1954 .
Jones, E.M. Hugh, (ed.), Wage-Structure in Theory and Practice, North- 
Holland Publishing, Amsterdam, 1966.
Lasker, B., Human Bondage in South-East Asia, University of North 
Carolina, North Carolina, 1950.
Lewis, H.G., Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States : An
Empirical Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963.
Llm Chong-yah, Economic Development of Modern Malaya, Oxford University 
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1967.
MacDonald, Robert M., Collective Bargaining in the Automobile Indus­
try: a study of wage structure and competitive relations,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963.
223
Myers, Charles A., "Labor Mobility in Two Communities" in Bakke,
E. Wight, et al., Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, 1954.
and Maclaurin, W. Rupert, The Movement of Factory Workers:
A Study of a New England Industrial Community, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, 1943.
Myint, H., The Economics of Developing Countries, Hutchinson,
London, 1967.
Palmer, Gladys L., Labor Mobility in Six Cities: A Report on the Survey
of Patterns and Factors in Labor Mobility, 1940-1950, Social 
Science Research Council, New York, 1954.
Parmer, J.N., Colonial Labor Policy and Administration : A History of
Labor in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, 1910-1941, 
Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1954.
Rees, Albert, The Economics of Trade Unions, Cambridge University 
Press, Chicago, 1961.
Reynolds, Lloyd G., The Structure of Labor Markets: Wages and Labor 
Mobility in Theory and Practice, Harper, New York, 1951.
and Gregory, P., Wages, Productivity and Industrializa­
tion in Puerto Rico, Irwin, Illinois, 1965.
and Shister, Joseph, Job Horizons, Harper, New York, 1949. 
and Taft, Cynthia H., The Evolution of Wage Structure,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962.
Robertson, D.J., Factory Wage Structures and National Agreements, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960.
Ross, Arthur M., Trade Union Wage Policy, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1948.
Rothschild, K.W., The Theory of Wages, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954.
224
Salkever, Louis R., Toward a Wage Structure Theory, Humanities Press, 
New York, 1964.
Silcock, T.H. and Fisk, E.K., The Political Economy of Independent 
Malaya, a Case-Study in Development, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 1963.
Taylor, George W. and Pierson, Frank C., (eds.) New Concepts in Wage 
Determination, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957.
Thompson, V., Labor Problems in South-East Asia, Yale University Press, 
Yale, 1947.
Turner, H.A., Wage Trends, Wage Policies and Collective Bargaining: 
the Problem for Underdeveloped Countries, University Press, 
Cambridge, 1966.
Gungwu, Wang, (ed.) Malaysia : A Survey, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1964. 
Wermel, Michael T., The Evolution of the Classical Wage Theory, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1939.
Wootton, (Lady) Barbara, The Social Foundations of Wage Policy, Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1954.
Government Publications
Department of Statistics, Kuala Lumpur.
Federation of Malaya Report on Employment, Unemployment and 
Underemployment, 1962;
Report on Employment and Unemployment in Metropolitan Towns, 
States of Malaya, 1965;
Malaysia Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households, 1967/68; 
Provisional Data on Employment and Unemployment in West 
Malaysia, 1967/68 (Restricted circulation).
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, West Malaysia,;
Rubber Statistics Handbook (Annual)
225
Federation of Malaya: (Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur)
Trade Unions Enactment No. 11 of 1940;
Trade Unions Ordinance, No. 12 of 1946;
Wages Council Ordinance, No. 41 of 1947;
Industrial Courts Ordinance, No. 37 of 1948;
Trade Disputes Ordinance, No. 4 of 1949;
Arbitration Ordinance (Amendment), 1950;
The Employment Ordinance, No. 38 of 1955 ;
Rubber Industry (Anti-Inflationary Cess) Fund, No. 26 of 1956; 
Rubber Industry (Replanting) Fund Ordinance, No. 8 of 1952; 
Report of the Subdivision of Estates Committee, 1963;
Rubber Industry (Anti-Inflationary Cess) Fund (Winding-up),
No. 4 of 1963.
Labour Department, Review of Wages and Earnings in Malaya since 1947, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1951 (Mimeographed).
Supplement to the Review of Wages and Earnings in 
the Federation of Malaya since 1947, Kuala Lumpur, 1952. 
(Mimeographed).
Malaysia, Act of Parliament, Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, No.30 
of 1964.
Essential (Prohibition of Strikes and Proscribed Industrial 
Action) Regulations, 1965.
Essential (Arbitration in the Essential Services) Regulations, 
1965 .
Essential (Trade Disputes in the Essential Services) Regula- 
tions, 1965.
Industrial Relations Act, No. 35 of 1967.
Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
226
Malaysia, Industrial Court, Award No. 8/68, Industrial Court Cases
Nos. 7 & 9 of 1967 between Malayan Agricultural Producers' 
Association and National Union of Plantation Workers, Kuala 
Lumpur, March 1968.
Malaysia Official Year Book 1968, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur.
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kuala Lumpur, Memorandum on
Recommendations of Raja Mohar bin Raja Badiozaman in the 
Wage Dispute between MPIEA and NUPW (a letter dated) May 
29th 1964.
Ministry of Labour, Kuala Lumpur.
Annual Reports.
Registry of Trade Unions .
Other Publications
Aziz, Ungku A., "Government and Industrial Relations in Malaysia", a 
paper presented at the Second International Conference on 
Industrial Relations, Tokyo, March 1967.
Barlow, Colin and Lim Sow Ching, "Natural Rubber and West Malaysia" : 
paper presented at the Meeting of the South-East Asian 
Business Committee, Singapore, May 12-15, 1968.
Chan Chee-Kheong, Ng Choong Sooi and Barlow, Colin, Results of 1964 
Sample Survey of Estates in West Malaysia, Rubber Research 
Institute of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1969.
Fraser & Co., (comp.) Facts and Figures of Malayan Companies, 
1955-1967 (no issue for 1962), Singapore.
International Labour Organization,
Wages and Payroll Statistics, Geneva, 1949 
Basic Problems of Plantation Labour, Geneva, 1950.
Methods of Labour Productivity Statistics, Geneva, 1951.
227
Report on the Trade Union Situation in the Federation of 
Malaya, Geneva, 1962.
Jain, R.K., Migrants, Proletarians, or Malayans? South Indians on
the Plantation Frontier in Malaya, a Ph. D. Thesis, in the 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1966.
Kumaran, K.K., History of Wage Negotiations in the Planting Industry
(mimeographed : up to 1962), Plantation House, Petaling Jaya, 
1964 .
Collective Bargaining in the Rubber Industry (mimeographed 
up to 1964), Plantation House, Petaling Jaya.
Kwok Hon Wun, Labour Legislation in Malaya, a graduation exercise
(unpublished), in the Faculty of Economics, University of 
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1966/1967.
Lyall & Evatt, (comp.) Handbook of Malayan and Singapore Stocks and 
Shares, Singapore, 1961-1967.
Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association, Present and Contingent
Levels of Unemployment of Residents on Estates, Circular No. 
11/63, Kuala Lumpur, 1968.
Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association, Annual Reports 
(1947 to 1966), Kuala Lumpur.
Rules of the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' 
Associat ion (Revised 1959, Amended 1965).
MPIEA to NUPW, (a letter written on) July 2nd 1956.
Moorthy, Krishna, A Comparative Study of International Labour Organi- 
sation Conventions and Malayan Labour Laws (1948-1964), a 
graduation exercise (unpublished), in the Faculty of Economics, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1966/1967.
228
National Union of Plantation Workers and Malayan Planting Industries
Employers’ Association, An Agreement made between the MPIEA 
and the NUPW, November 1954, Plantation House, Petaling Jaya.
An Agreement made between the MPIEA and the NUPW,
August 1955, Plantation House.
Agreement on a Day of Rest between the MPIEA and the 
NUPW, September 1955, Plantation House.
Agreements made between the MPIEA and the NUPW, June 
1956, Plantation House.
Agreements made between the MPIEA and the NUPW, 
February 1959, Plantation House.
Rubber Industry Wages Agreement 1962/63, Plantation
House.
Collective Agreements, executed on 27th July 1964, 
Plantation House.
National Union of Plantation Workers, Plantation House, Petaling Jaya. 
1st Biennial Report, 1954-56.
General Reports (triennial) 1957-1968.
NUPW to MPIEA, Ref. No. 3 in 103/56, June 31st 1956 (a letter) 
Minutes of MPIEA-NUPW Main Consultative Council Meeting, 
September 19th, 1956.
Memorandum on Wage Proposals to MPIEA, January 31st 1958 
(mimeographed).
NUPW to MPIEA, Proposals for Variations in the 1959 Agreements 
Memorandum submitted on 9th August 1963 for Variations in the 
Agreements signed on 28th February 1962 between NUPW and
MPIEA.
229
NUPW to Commissioner for Industrial Relations, March 1964.
Results of Ballot (confidential docunent), April/May 1964. 
Resolutions Adopted, 5th Delegates Conference, December 1965. 
Black and White Book: Gist of Wages and Other Terms of 
Employment, 1946-1965, 1967.
Nijhar, K.S., "The Registration and Control of Trade Unions in West 
Malaysia, Ekonomi, (Journal of the Economics Society of the 
University of Malaya), Vol. VIII, No.1, December, 1966.
"Growth of Union Membership and Size of Trade Union 
Units in Malaya," Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia (Journal of the 
Economics Association of Malaysia), Vol. 11, No.2, December 
1965.
The Role of Trade Unions in a Developing Economy, seminar 
paper delivered to the Trade Union Leadership Course organised 
by the Malayan Trade Union Congress, Bangunan Buroh, January 
1969.
"The Emergence of Malayan Agricultural Producers' Asso­
ciation," in Employers* Organisations in Asia, (a forthcoming 
monograph) International Labour Organisation, Geneva. (1971).
Poobalasingam, C. , Inter-Industry Strikes Analysis, Malaya 1946-1965,
a graduation exercise (unpublished) in the Faculty of Economics, 
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1966/1967.
The Straits Times, The Straits Times Press, Kuala Lumpur.
The Sunday Mail, The Straits Times Press, Kuala Lumpur, March 7, 1971.
The Sunday Times, The Straits Times Press, Kuala Lumpur, March 7, 1971.
Teoh Hai Yap, Arbitration as a Means of Settling Labour-Management Dis­
putes in Malaysia, a graduation exercise (unpublished), in the 
Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur,
1966/1967.
2 30
Thomas, P.O. and Fong, A. Chu Chai, (comp.) Rubber Industry
Statistics, Rubber Research Institute of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1968.
Zorn and Leigh-Hunt (comp.) Manual of Rubber Planting Companies, 
Moor House, London, 1955-1967.
231
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR WORKER INTERVIEWS
Name o f  W o r k e r : _______________________________________
Name o f  E s t a t e :  _______________________________________
( A l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  g i v e n  w i l l  be  t r e a t e d  a s  s t r i c t l y  c o n f i d e n t i a l ,  
and w i l l  be  s u m m a r i s e d  i n  s u c h  a way s o  a s  t o  o b s c u r e  t h e  i d e n t i t y  
o f  t h e  p e r s o n s  c o - o p e r a t i n g  i n  t h i s  s t u d y ) .
PART I PERSONAL, FAMILY, PRESENT EMPLOYMENT PARTICULARS AND AVERAGE 
DAILY EARNINGS
1. R ace
2.  Sex
3.  Age
4 .  M a r i t a l  S t a t u s
5.  No. o f  members l i v i n g  i n  t h e  same h o u s e h o l d  ( e x c l u d i n g  s e l f ) .
D e t a i l s  on  e a c h  o f  th em :  e . g .  w h e t h e r  em p lo y ed  o r  n o t ;  i f
e m p l o y e d ,  w h e t h e r  i n  t h e  r u b b e r  i n d u s t r y  o r  o u t s i d e .
6 .  Do you h a v e  any o t h e r  r e l a t i v e s ,  n o t  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  same h o u s e h o l d ,  
e m p lo y ed  i n  o t h e r  r u b b e r  e s t a t e s ?
S p e c i f y  d e t a i l s  o f  j o b ,  l o c a t i o n ,  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
7 .  Do you h a v e  any o t h e r  r e l a t i v e s ,  n o t  l i v i n g  i n  t h e  same h o u s e h o l d ,  
em p lo y ed  o u t s i d e  t h e  r u b b e r  i n d u s t r y ,  e . g .  o t h e r  p l a n t a t i o n  
i n d u s t r i e s  ( t e a ,  c o c o n u t ,  o i l  p a l m ) ,  m a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  com merce ,  
and s e r v i c e s ?
S p e c i f y  d e t a i l s  o f  j o b ,  i n d u s t r y ,  l o c a t i o n ,  and r e l a t i p n s h i p s .
8 .  E d u c a t i o n :  When d i d  you s t a r t  s c h o o l i n g ?
Type o f  S c h o o l  a t t e n d e d :  H i g h e s t  S t a n d a r d  P a s s e d :  A d d i t i o n a l
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  i f  a n y .
9 .  P r e s e n t  o c c u p a t i o n a l  g r a d e :  Kangany ( T y p e ) / T a p p e r / F i e l d  W o r k e r /
F a c t o r y  W o r k e r .
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10. Method of Payment: Monthly/Time Rates/Piece-Rates:
11. Method of Employment: Directly Employed/Through a Contractor:
12. Resident/Non-Resident Labour
13 . Average Daily Earnings in July 1967
PART II EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
1. When did you leave School? Month/Year.
Why did you leave School? Would you have liked to continue 
schooling then?
2. Did you do any part-time work while you were Schooling?
What? Why?
3. While at School, what did you want to do for a job?
Why? What did your parents want you to do?
4. Were you determined to work in the rubber industry or were you 
hopeful you could go out of the industry for other kinds of 
jobs? Please elaborate.
/REGULAR JOBS?
5. State the following regarding your 1st Regular Job if under 37 
years old or Job in 1946 if over 37:
(Job = if employed for 12 or more days a month for a continuous 
period exceeding 3 months)
(a) Month/Year in which you actually started to work:
(b) Occupational Grade: Kangany/Tapper/Factory, Worker/Field
Worker/Others.
6. How did you know there was a vacancy for this job and how did 
you obtain it e.g. advertisements, news from friends/relatives, 
recommendations from friends/relatives/managers etc.? Please 
elaborate.
7. Is this the usual way of getting jobs of this nature? Are there 
other ways? Please elaborate.
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8. Did you know much about the job by way of wages, working 
conditions etc. before taking it? Please elaborate.
9. Were you happy with the job - wages, working conditions e.g. 
relationship to superiors, environment, family considerations 
e.g. children's schooling facilities or possibilities of others 
in family obtaining jobs nearby, promotional chances etc. Please 
elaborate.
10. Did you have a choice of any other alternative job(s) when you 
took on this job? What?
11. Could you have obtained any other alternative jobs? What? Why?
Did you try? How? Please elaborate.
12. When did you leave this job? Month/Year. Why?
13. What did you do after leaving this job? Explain details e.g. if 
unemployed, how long; if looking for other jobs, where and when 
job obtained. Please elaborate.
(Repeat the above for 2nd, 3rd, 4th etc. Regular Jobs, if applicable).
/'"unemployment PER I ods7
14. Were you unemployed (for more than 6 months at a stretch) after 
leaving school?
Please elaborate details.
15. Have you ever been unemployed for more than 6 months at a stretch 
after starting on your 1st Job (if under 37) or Job in 1946 (if 
over 37)?
Please elaborate details for each occasion: Periods of unemploy­
ment. Reasons (if any), etc.
16. What did you do for a living on each of the occasions when you 
were unemployed? Please elaborate.
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PART III KNOWLEDGE OF LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS 
MOBILITY
1. Have you any idea of what others in your occupational grade, with 
your qualifications and experience, are earning per month:
in this estate? in other estates? in other industries?
Please explain sources of information.
2. Have you any idea of what others in the other occupational cate­
gories are earning per month:
in this estate? in other estates? in other industries?
Please explain sources of information.
3. Are you presently aware of job openings for your grade of labour 
elsewhere? Which paid better? Please elaborate.
4. Do you expect to stay on in this job for as long as you can?
Why? Because of "side income" e.g. poultry rearing, cattle grazing? 
Please elaborate.
5. Are you now looking around for other jobs elsewhere?
Will you be looking around later for other jobs elsewhere? Please 
elaborate. Why? How?
6. Do you ever expect to move upwards for a better job:
in this estate? in another estate? in another industry?
Please elaborate types of jobs expected, willing to work for, 
minimum salary levels that will attract you out of the present 
job, etc.
7. Are there any places where you wouldn't want to work even if 
offered jobs now? Why?
8. Suppose you lost this job now, what would you do for a job, and 
for a living?
Would you be willing to go to Sabah to work in the rubber estates 
there if you were unemployed now? Why?
9. Are there any places where you would particularly like to work?
Please elaborate.
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10. Suppose you had a choice of getting a wage increase in your present 
job or a guarantee of steady work in the estate for 3 years, which 
would you choose? Please elaborate.
11. Within this estate itself, would you prefer to change to some other 
jobs for which you may be qualified? Why?
12. Do you think that the NUPW has raised your earnings and fringe 
benefits above what they would have been otherwise? Are you a 
Union Member?
Please elaborate.
13. What do you hope or expect your children to become when they grow up?
PART IV OCCUPATIONAL PREFERENCES
1. For Kanganies: (a) Do you prefer to be a Kangany to what you
were before? Why?
(b) Which would you prefer to be - a factory 
Kangany, a tapping Kangany or a field Kangany? Why?
2. For Tappers: (a) Would you prefer to become a Kangany? Why?
Which type - factory/tapping/field? Why?
(b) Would you prefer to become a factory worker?
Why?
(c) Become a field worker? Why?
(d) How many trees are you tapping per day now?
Would you be willing to tap more trees than you are doing now?
How many extra? Why?
3. For Field Workers: (a) Would you prefer to become a Kangany?
Why? Which type - factory/tapping/field? Why?
(b) Would you prefer to become a tapper? Why?
(c) Would you prefer to become a factory worker?
Why?
(d) Would you prefer to do some other work as 
a field worker than what you are doing now?
What? Why?
236
4. For Factory Workers:
(a) Would you prefer to become a Kangany? Why? Which type
factory/tapping/field? Why?
(b) Would you prefer to become a tapper? Why?
(c) Become a field worker? Why?
PART V INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS
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APPENDIX B
AGREEMENT ON WAGES BETWEEN THE MALAYAN PLANTING INDUSTRIES EMPLOYERS ' 
ASSOCIATION (REFERRED TO HEREIN AS 'THE ASSOCIATION') AND THE NATIONAL 
UNION OF PLANTATION WORKERS (REFERRED TO HEREIN AS 'THE UNION').
1. WAGES OF TAPPERS
It is hereby agreed that wages of tappers employed by 
estates in the membership of the Association shall, with effect from 
1st February, 1964, be calculated in accordance with the following 
provisions:-
(a) GENERAL
The wages of tappers will consist of a guaranteed factor, an 
output factor, and a price bonus as provided in Clause 3.
(b) CLASSIFICATION OF FIELDS
(i) The classification of a field or area as at present
classified under the provisions of the Agreement dated 
7th February, 1959, may be changed from Category A to 
Category C or from Category B to Category C if the yield 
per acre in the preceding financial year has fallen below:
if under Low Level Tapping   450 lbs
if under High Level Tapping   700 lbs
if under High/Low Level Tapping ........  750 lbs
and from Category A to Category B if the yield per acre 
in the preceding financial year has fallen below:
if under Low Level Tapping   750 lbs
if under High Level Tapping   850 lbs
if under High/Low Level Tapping ........  1000 lbs
The Union Committee on the estate may make representations 
to the Management if it considers that any field should 
be reclassified under the provisions of this Sub-Clause.
(ii) Areas newly brought into tapping
Areas newly brought into tapping will be classified in 
Category A not later than one complete calendar year after
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commencement of tapping, except where yield perfor­
mance per acre or per tapper does not justify such 
classification, in which case it will be classified 
in Category A as soon as classification is justified. 
During the period preceding such classification, tappers 
in such areas shall, notwithstanding the succeeding 
provisions of this Clause, be paid at suitable daily 
or poundage rates, such rates being based on the average 
earnings of tappers on Category A fields on the estate 
or, where there are no Category A fields on the estate, 
on earnings for a daily poundage of 24 lbs. latex (d.r.c.) 
in Category A .
(iii) Declassification of low-yielding areas
Fields or areas, the yield per acre of which is below:
if under Low Level Tapping   300 lbs
if under High Level Tapping   450 lbs
if under High/Low Level Tapping ........  550 lbs
may be declassified and tappers in such fields or areas 
be paid at suitable poundage rates, provided that the 
average earnings of a tapper on any such field or area 
shall not fall below the guaranteed factor and provided 
further that such poundage rates shall not be less than 
the average earnings for latex (d.r.c.) in such field or 
area immediately prior to declassification divided by 
the average poundage of latex (d.r.c.) per tapper.
(c) GUARANTEED FACTOR
A tapper shall be paid the guaranteed factor for each day 
worked irrespective of the size of his allotted task provided 
that:
(i) there shall be no reduction, except at the discretion 
of the Management, in the size of the task actually 
being tapped at the date of this Agreement;
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(ii) the guaranteed factor is payable for the performance 
by him of the full duties of a tapper on his task.
(d) RATE OF GUARANTEED FACTOR
The guaranteed factor shall be $2.55 a day while the average 
monthly price falls between 60 and 70 cents a pound, the 
average price for this purpose being the average of the daily 
Noon Buyers' price for R.S.S. No. 1 in bales F.O.B. Singapore 
for the month ending on the 20th of the preceding month, pro­
vided however that the guaranteed factor shall be increased 
or decreased by 10 cents for every 10 points or part thereof 
by which the Retail Price Index published by the Department 
of Statistics rises above 125 or falls below 90.
(e) WASHOUTS
The guaranteed factor will be paid for days on which a 'wash­
out' occurs, it being agreed that tappers will on such days 
endeavour to bring in all the latex possible in the circumstances.
(f) OUTPUT FACTOR
(i) Latex. A tapper shall, in addition to the guaranteed 
factor and, where applicable the price bonus, be paid 
at the following rates in accordance with the average 
daily poundage of latex (dry rubber content) brought in 
by him during the month excluding the poundage brought 
in on 'washout' days, such average being calculated to 
the nearest pound:
On Category A Fields - 8 cents a pound for poundage in
excess of an average of 14 lbs.
On Category B Fields - 10 cents a pound for poundage
in excess of an average of 8 lbs. 
On Category C Fields - 12 cents a pound for poundage
in excess of an average of 4 lbs.
(ii) Scrap. A tapper shall be paid 4 cents a pound (wet 
weight) for scrap brought in by him.
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(g) LATE TAPPING
Tappers shall be informed not later than 10 a.m. whether there 
will be tapping.
When tapping (other than double tapping) is ordered to commence 
after 10 a.m. the rates in Sub-Clause (f) (i) above will be 
increased as follows:
On Category A Fields - to 10 cents a pound for poundage in
excess of 14 lbs.
On Category B Fields - to 13 cents a pound for poundage in
excess of 8 lbs.
On Category C Fields - to 16 cents a pound for poundage in
excess of 4 lbs.
(h) APPLICATION OF STIMULANTS
A tapper required to apply stimulants will be paid for such work.
(i) POUNDAGE BOARDS
A board, or boards, shall be put up on which the poundage in 
respect of each tapper is displayed daily.
2• WAGES OF FIELD WORKERS
It is hereby agreed that field workers employed by estates 
in the membership of the Association shall, with effect from 1st 
February, 1964, be paid in accordance with the following provisions:
(a) The daily rates while the average monthly price as calculated 
in the manner set out in Sub-Clause 1(d) above falls between
60 and 70 cents a pound shall be:
(i) Adult Male Workers under 55 years   $3.10
(ii) Adult Male Workers 55 years & above   $2.90
(iii) Adult Female Workers under 50 years   $2.50
(iv) Adult Female Workers 50 years &. above))Young Persons (under 16 years) and ) ..... $2.30
)Workers who are not able-bodied )
(b) The rates set out in Sub-Clause (a) above shall be increased 
or decreased by 10 cents for every 10 points or part thereof
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by which the Retail Price Index published by the Department 
of Statistics rises above 125 or falls below 90.
(c) The daily rates payable under this Clause are for eight hours 
of work inclusive of a break of half an hour permitted for 
refreshments in the field. Management will, with effect from 
1st August, 1964, offer eight hours of work inclusive of such 
break.
(d) Any dispute whether a worker is fully able-bodied or not will 
be settled by examination of the worker by the Medical Officer 
(Registered Medical Practitioner) of the Estate, or, where 
there is no such Medical Officer, by the Medical Officer of 
the Government Hospital.
3. PRICE BONUS
It is hereby agreed all workers to whom this Agreement 
applies will be paid a price bonus of 2 cents per day worked for 
each whole cent by which the average monthly price of rubber 
calculated in the manner set out in Sub-Clause 1(d) above exceeds 
70 cents a pound.
4. OTHER DAILY RATED WORKERS
(a) It is hereby agreed that a Joint Working Party composed of 7 
representatives each nominated by the Association and the 
Union respectively will be appointed to examine the rates to 
be paid to other daily-rated workers and to report back on 
or before 30th September, 1964, and the rates for such cate­
gories agreed between the Association and the Union in the 
light of the Joint Working Party's Report shall be payable 
with effect from 1st February, 1964.
(b) It is hereby agreed that in the interim the following increases 
in the daily rates of such categories will be paid with effect 
from 1st February, 1964:
(i) Adult Male Workers under 55 .... ^  x per cent270years
24 2
(ii) Adult Male Workers 55 years 
and above
20 x 100
270 Per cent
(iii) Adult Female Workers under 
50 years
35 x 100 
215 per cent
(iv) Adult Female Workers 50 years).... 
and over )
)
Young Persons (under 16 yrs);) 15 x 100 per cent
and ) 215
)
Workers who are not able- ) 
bodied )
Provided, however, that, where the same wage rates are now
being paid, irrespective of age, to all workers in any
particular category, the interim increase shall be
— — x. ^99 Per cent in the case of male workers and ^5 x 100 270 — ZTS----
per cent in the case of female workers.
5. LABOUR ON INDIRECT CONTRACT
In the case of workers employed by contractors, the 
contractor will be paid a sufficient amount to enable him to 
observe the terms and conditions of this Agreement in respect of 
workers employed by him on the estate.
6. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
(a) This Agreement shall continue in force until 31st January, 
1966;
(b) Either party may at any time on or after 31st October, 1965, 
terminate this Agreement by giving the other party three 
calendar months' notice in writing.
7. INTERPRETATION
It is hereby agreed that any dispute relating to the inter­
pretation of this Agreement shall, unless settled by negotiation 
between the parties, be referred for settlement to the Industrial 
Court under the provisions of Section 4 of the Industrial Courts 
Ordinance.
SIGNED THIS 27th DAY OF JULY 1964.
On behalf of the 
National Union of 
Plantation Workers
On behalf of the Malayan 
Planting Industries Employers’ 
Associa tion.
(P.P. NARAYANAN) 
GENERAL SECRETARY
(D.H. MITCHELL) 
SECRETARY
Kuala Lumpur
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
TABLE C.l
AVERAGE ANNUAL COST OF LIVING INDEX FOR LABOURERS (ALL RACES)
Year Total Weighted Index (1955 = 100)
1955 100
1956 101
1957 106
1958 105
1959 102
1960 102
1961 102
1962 102
1963 105
1964 104
1965 104
1966 106
1967 110
Source: Ministry of Labour, Annual 
Reports, 1955-1967.
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TABLE C .2
METHODS OF SECURING FIRST JOB AMONGST POST-WAR ENTRANTS,
By Race
M e t h o d s Indians Chinese Malays
Through friends and relatives 117 27 9
Applied directly to estate manager 
or other senior staff 32 - 7
Through Labour Employment Exchange 7 - 4
Through Union Officials 4 - -
Through third-party contractors - 69 5
Miscellaneous 3 - 1
Totals 163 96 26
TABLE C.3
METHODS OF SECURING SUBSEQUENT JOBS ARISING OUT OF JOB CHANGES,
By Race
M e t h o d s Indians Chinese Malays
Through friends and relatives 24 17 4
Applied directly to estate manager 
or other senior staff - - -
Through Labour Employment Exchange - - 1
Through Union Officials 4 - -
Through third-party contractors - 178 -
Miscellaneous - 4 6
Totals 28 199 11
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TABLE C.4
AVERAGE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST POST-WAR ENTRANTS 
Race by Year in which First Jobs Obtained
Years in which Jobs 
Obtained
Average
Indians
Duration of Unemployment 
(to nearest month)*
Chinese Malays
1946 - 1951 6 7 -
1952 - 1957 7 6 -
1958 - 1962 12 8 7
1963 - 1967 14 9 7
Average 12 8 7
Duration = Month/Year in which first Job obtained less Month/Year 
worker reached 15th year.
TABLE C .5
ESTIMATES OF AVERAGE DAILY EARNINGS OF CHECKROLL TAPPERS 
IN RUBBER ESTATES IN WEST MALAYSIA, 1955-1967
(Malayan $/£)
Year Source I Source II
1955 2.88 2.40
1956 3.13 2.60
1957 3.13 -
1958 2.96 -
1959 3.20 3.00
1960 3.68 -
1961 3.23 -
1962 3 .27 3.05
1963 3.52 -
1964 3.46 -
1965 3.83 3.55
1966 3.75 -
1967 3.76 3.65
Sources: I. Ministry of Labour, Annual Reports, 
1955-57, 1959-63, and unpublished 
statistics in Ministry's office.
II. Research Department, 
of Plantation Workers. 
Sample not known).
National Union 
(Details of
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TABLE C . 6
SUBDIVISION OF ESTATES 
AREA AND NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED
Year
Approximate 
area affected 
(in acres)
Approximate 
No.of estates 
involved
Approximate 
No.of workers 
involved
1950 - 1961 231,850 290 15,584
1962 1,334 1 131
1963 2,718 1 211
1964 4,022 2 462
1965 25,575 21 2,645
1966 20,149 11 2,937
1967 38,149 14 6,073
Note: The approximate acreage affected here need not tally exactly
with the year-to-year figures in the decline in the estate 
acreage (Table 1.2, p.7) because the figures here are esti­
mates of acreage actually affected or believed would be 
affected. Further, the decline in the estate acreage also 
arose from other sources besides subdivision.
Source: Research Department, National Union of Plantation Workers.
CURRICULUM VITAE
I. Qualifications
1. Certificate of Education (Distinction), University of Birming­
ham, 1957.
Awards from Amateur Athletic Association (U.K.), Football 
Association (U.K.), School of Skiing (Norway), etc.
2. Bachelor of Arts in Economics (2nd Class Upper Honours),
University of Malaya, 1963.
3. Successfully completed Post-Graduate Development Program for
Foreign Executives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Summer School, 1963.
4. Master of Business Administration (1st Class Honours),
University of British Columbia, 1965.
5. Elected Associate Member of the British Institute of
Management, 1969.
II. Teaching Appointments
1. Teacher, High School, Bukit Mertajam, Jan.1958-May 1960.
(English, History and Physical Education).
2. Senior Economics Teacher, Penang Free School, Jan.1963-July 1963.
(Economics and English).
3. Part-time Tutor, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, Jan. 1964-Apr.1965.
(Industrial Relations and Industrial Administration).
4. Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya, May 1965-
(Lectured in Industrial Relations, Business Policies and 
Practices, Marketing in the Faculty of Economics, and in 
Industrial Administration in the Faculty of Engineering: 
and part-time in Business Administration in the Mara Insti­
tute of Technology).
(On study leave as a Research Scholar in the Australian 
National University, Nov. 1967-Jan. 1971).
